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RURAL FINANCING IN THAILAND 
By Visit Limsombunchai 
Rural financing in Thailand is heavily dependent on bank lending. Therefore, 
understanding the determinants of bank lending in the rural sector is an important element 
for promoting the development of credit accessibility to Thai farmers in the rural regions. 
Appropriate bank lending decisions would reduce lending costs and increase repayment 
rate and profits to the banks. Thus, a well-developed rural financial market would lead to 
sustainable development in the rural sector. 
The purpose of this research is to identify critical factors in the bank lending decision and 
to investigate what factors affect the credit availability and loan price in rural lending in 
Thailand. This research also investigates the impact of the relationship lending (i.e., the 
relationship between the bank and the borrower) and the predictive power among the 
different estimation techniques in predicting the bank lending decision, amount of credit 
granted, and interest rate charged. 
The data used in this research are obtained from the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperative (BAAC). During the period of 2001 to 2003, a total of 18,798 credit files 
under the normal loan scheme are made available. The credit files are analyzed using the 
logistic regression (Logit), multiple linear regression (MLR), and four different types of 
the artificial neural networks (ANN), namely multi-layer feed-forward neural networks 
(MLFN), Ward networks (WD), general regression neural networks (GRNN) , and 
probabilistic neural networks (PNN). 
The results show that the total asset value (Asset), value of collateral (CollateraT) , and the 
length of the bank-borrower relationship (Duration) are crucial factors in determining bank 
lending decision, amount of credit granted, and interest rate charged. As expected, Asset 
has a positive impact on the bank lending decision and the amount of credit granted, while 
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Collateral has a positive and a negative influence on the amount of credit granted and the 
interest rate charged, respectively. However, Collateral has no significant impact on the 
bank lending decision, while Asset has a significant negative impact on the loan pIice in 
some specifications. 
Duration has a significant negative impact on bank lending decision, amount of credit 
granted, and interest rate charged, which implies the importance of relationship lending in 
the Thailand rural financial market. However, the negative relationships between Duration 
and the bank lending decision, and between Duration and the amount of credit granted, 
contradict the postulated hypothesizes. The results imply that the bank uses information 
from the borrowers and monitors the lending risk via the lending decision and amount of 
credit granted. On the other hand, the relationship lending benefits the borrowers via loan 
pricing since the borrowers with a long term relationship with the bank receive a lower 
lending rate. 
The predictive results of both in-sample and out-of-sample on bank lending decision, 
amount of credit granted, and interest rate charged show that in terms of predictive 
accuracy, most of the artificial neural networks models outperform the logistic and the 
mUltiple regression models. The empirical results also show the supeIiority of using the 
PNN model to classify and screen the loan applications, and the GRNN model to 
determine the amount of credit granted and interest rate charged. 
Keywords: Thailand, Rural financing, Lending decision model, Credit availability model, 
Loan pricing model, Logistic regression, Multiple linear regression, and 
Artificial neural networks. 
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CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Thailand is an agricultural country, but industrialization has surpassed agriculture activities 
as evident in the past few decades. The country is made up of approximately 320 million 
rais (1 rai = 0.16 ha or 0.395 acre) and approximately 131 million rais (or about 40 
percent) is considered as farmland and about 80 million rais (or about 25 percent) is forest 
land (see Table 1.1). During 1999-2000, 50 percent (about 65 million rais) of the total 
cultivated land were used to produce rice, 22 percent (about 28 million rais) for cash crops 
and 20 percent (about 26 million rais) for fruits (Office of Agricultural Economics, 2003). 
The majority of the Thai population (about 55 percent or 35 million people, in 2002) 
resides in the rural areas and is involved in the agricultural sector. For example, in 1980, 
the employment in the agricultural sector accounted for 73 percent of the total 
employment, which is one of the highest proportions found among developing countries 
(see Table 1.2) (Krongkaew, 1995). The employment in this sector has dropped to 42 
percent of the total employment in 2002 but it still absorbed more than two-fifth of the 
total labor force. Thus the agricultural sector still plays a major role in the Thai economy in 
terms of employment and production. 
However, the agricultural sector in Thailand has shrunk over the past two decades, in line 
with the increased investments in the industrial, manufacturing and service sectors. For 
example, in 1988, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) share of the agricultural sector 
(crops, livestock, forestry and fisheries) at current market prices was 16 percent, while the 
service and industrial sectors were 52 percent and 28 percent, respectively (see Table 1.3). 
The agriculture sector's share of the GDP was further reduced to 10 percent in 1993, while 
the service and industrial sectors' share of the GDP increased to 53 percent and 30 percent 
respectively. Furthermore its share of the total GDP declined to 10 percent in 2001, but the 
sector's total value increased from 252 million baht in 1988 to 320 and 532 million baht in 
1993 and 2001, respectively. 
Thailand agriculture sector generates foreign exchange earnings to the country. The share 
of agricultural exports in tenns of the total value of exports is above 50 percent until 1988. 
For example, in 1987 more than half of the foreign exchange earnings came from 
agricultural products. 
Table 1.1: Land utilization in Thailand 
Year 
Total area Forestry Farmland Unclassified land 
(Rai) Rai % Rai % Rai % 
1988 320,696,888 89,880,182 28.03 131,772,759 41.09 99,043,947 30.88 
1989 320,696,888 89,635,625 27.95 131,831,185 41.11 99,230,078 30.94 
1990 320,696,888 87,488,536 27.28 131,124,409 40.89 102,083,943 31.83 
1991 320,696,888 85,436,284 26.64 133,076,188 41.50 102,184,416 31.86 
1992 320,696,888 84,344,169 26.30 132,051,209 41.18 104,301,510 32.52 
1993 320,696,888 83,450,623 26.02 131,207,893 40.91 106,038,372 33.06 
1994 320,696,888 83,801,555 26.13 131,833,288 41.11 105,062,045 32.76 
1995 320,696,888 82,178,161 25.62 132,478,570 41.31 106,040,157 33.07 
1996 320,696,888 81,808,415 25.51 131,819,506 41.10 107,068,967 33.39 
1997 320,696,888 81,441,164 25.40 131,107,608 40.88 108,148,116 33.72 
1998 320,696,888 81,076,428 25.28 130,393,525 40.66 109,226,935 34.06 
1999 320,696,888 80,610,219 25.14 131,341,384 40.95 108,745,285 33.91 
Source: Department of Agricultural Economics (OAB.) (Various years) 
Table 1.2: Population, employment and unemployment rate of Thailand 
Year 
Population Population Emrloyment Unemployment 
(M. people) Agri·(%l Non-agri·{%l Agri·{%l Non-agri·(%l (%) 
1980 n.a. n.a. n.a. 72.50 27.50 n.a. 
1990 54.55 66.80 33.20 66.50 33.50 n.a. 
1996 60.12 n.a. n.a. 45.29 54.71 3.55 
1997 60.82 n.a. n.a. 45.05 54.95 3.22 
1998 61.47 n.a. n.a. 44.68 55.32 7.27 
1999 61.66 n.a. n.a. 45.27 54.73 6.28 
2000 61.88 56.20 43.80 44.39 55.61 5.81 
2001 62.31 n.a. n.a. 42.24 57.76 5.15 
2002 62.80 54.85 45.15 41.64 58.36 3.65 
Note: n.a. - not available 
Source: National Statistic Office (NSO.) and Office of Agricultural Economics (OAE.) (Various years) 
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Table 1.3: Value of gross domestic product of Thailand by sector at current market prices 
(Million baht) 
Year 
Gross Domestic Product 
Agriculture Industry Construction Service Total 
1988 252.35 429.63 74.45 803.38 1,559.80 
16.18% 27.54% 4.77% 51.50% 100.00% 
1989 279.95 528.60 102.12 946.32 1,856.99 
15.08% 28.47% 5.50% 50.96% 100.00% 
1990 272.94 628.84 136.24 1,145.54 2,183.55 
12.50% 28.80% 6.24% 52.46% 100.00% 
1991 317.09 747.27 168.28 1,274.00 2,506.64 
12.65% 29.81% 6.71% 50.83% 100.00% 
1992 348.13 821.29 190.53 1,470.97 2,830.91 
12.30% 29.01% 6.73% 51.96% 100.00% 
1993 320.05 936.62 220.77 1,687.78 3,165.22 
10.11 % 29.59% 6.97% 53.32% 100.00% 
1994 383.20 1,067.67 267.80 1,910.67 3,629.34 
10.56% 29.42% 7.38% 52.65% 100.00% 
1995 458.98 1,240.78 302.64 2,183.82 4,186.21 
10.96% 29.64% 7.23% 52.17% 100.00% 
1996 505.03 1,366.94 341.52 2,397.56 4,611.04 
10.95% 29.64% 7.41% 52.00% 100.00% 
1997 513.99 1,443.24 271.82 2,503.55 4,732.61 
10.86% 30.50% 5.74% 52.90% 100.00% 
1998 564.88 1,446.35 178.68 2,436.54 4,626.45 
12.21 % 31.26% 3.86% 52.67% 100.00% 
1999 502.83 1,534.07 166.25 2,433.93 4,637.08 
10.84% 33.08% 3.59% 52.49% 100.00% 
2000 510.99 1,693.55 150.07 2,561.90 4,916.51 
10.39% 34.45% 3.05% 52.11% 100.00% 
2001 532.08 1,764.95 152.36 2,674.02 5,123.42 
10.39% 34.45% 2.97% 52.19% 100.00% 
Source: Bank of Thailand (BOT.) (Various years) 
The proportion of agricultural exports has declined while the proportion of non-agricultural 
(industrial and service sectors) exports has increased as Thailand experienced an 
industrialization process since 1980s (see Table 1.4) (Krongkaew, 1995). The agricultural 
export share fell to 23 percent in 2001, but its export value experienced an increase from 
194,198 million baht in 1988 to 677,893 million baht in 2001. This indicates that the 
values of agricultural export have been growing but its growth rates have been dominated 
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by the growth rate in non-agriculture export. The agricultural trade balance has never been 
in deficit unlike the other sectors. The trade surplus in agricultural sector has tripled from 
115,980 million baht in 1988 to 361,025 million baht in 200l. 
The agriculture sector, associated with the rural sector, has contributed considerably to the 
growth of Thai economy in many ways. It has not only provided the supply of food and 
inputs, but has also been a source of employment and foreign exchange earnings. The 
important role of an agriculture sector in Thailand should be promoted by the policy 
makers and the industrialization process should not be promoted at the expense of the 
agriculture sector because the development of the agriculture sector complements the 
process of the industrialization. 
Table 1.4: Value of exports, import and trade balance of Thailand (Millions baht) 
Year Export ImQort Trade balance 
Total Agriculture % Total Agriculture % Total Agriculture 
1987 299,853 153,991 5l.36 334,340 53,556 16.02 -34,487 100,435 
1988 403,570 194,198 48.12 513,114 78,218 15.24 -109,544 115,980 
1989 516,315 230,537 44.65 662,679 102,244 15.43 -146,364 128,293 
1990 589,818 224,168 38.01 852,962 125,710 14.74 -263,144 98,458 
1991 725,449 256,038 35.29 956,408 142,869 14.94 -230,959 113,169 
1992 824,643 285,264 34.59 1,033,245 158,454 15.34 -208,602 126,810 
1993 940,862 279,857 29.74 1,170,846 159,889 13.66 -229,984 119,968 
1994 1,137,601 336,290 29.56 1,369,034 179,857 13.14 -231,433 156,433 
1995 1,406,310 407,218 28.96 1,834,537 213,538 1l.64 -428,227 193,680 
1996 1,411,039 412,677 29.25 1,832,825 216,833 11.83 -421,786 195,844 
1997 1,806,932 485,198 26.85 1,924,263 228,831 11.89 -117,331 256,367 
1998 2,248,777 591,690 26.31 1,774,050 226,827 12.79 474,727 364,863 
1999 2,214,249 556,498 25.13 1,907,391 228,097 11.96 306,858 328,401 
2000 2,768,064 626,911 22.65 2,494,133 275,459 11.04 273,931 351,452 
2001 2,893,176 677,893 23.43 2,756,656 316,868 11.49 136,520 361,025 
Source: Department of Agricultural Economics (OAE.) (Various years) 
1.2 Agricultural credit, rural finance, and debt burden 
Agricultural credit is very important and necessary for the survival of the agricultural 
sector in Thailand. Farms in Thailand are generally under capitalized!, where a majority of 
I The capital-labour ratio of Thailand agricultural sector is lower than the other major Southeast Asian 
counties, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippine (Asian Development Bank, 2002). 
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the fanners are small-scale peasant fanners who are poor and lack of investment funds 
(Asian Development Bank, 2002). According to the National Statistic Office's 1999 socio-
economic survey, poverty is mostly concentrated among fann households. For example, 
5.3 million households or 54 percent are poor and about 4.2 million households or 72 
percent of the country's ultra-poor (i.e. those below 80 percent of the poverty line2) are 
small fann owners or fann workers. Therefore, they borrow heavily to finance their fann 
productions, investment and private consumption. Table 1.5 shows the increasing trends of 
household outstanding debt and the average outstanding debt in Thailand agriculture 
sector. 
The proportion of agricultural households with an outstanding debt has monotonically 
increased from 25 percent in 1988 to 34 percent in 1991 and to 60 percent in 1999 (see 
Table 1.5). The average outstanding debt has also risen from 6,047 baht per household in 
1988 to 12,772 and 37,231 baht per household in 1991 and 1999, respectively. The average 
loan size in each year has increased from 3,831 baht per household in 1971 to 15,049 baht 
per household in 1995 and then 18,493 baht per household in 1999. The average loan size 
has increased nearly 500 percent over the last 28 years. The large portion of loan was 
primarily for agricultural productions (about 70 percent on the average) (see Table 1.6). 
Table 1.5: Number of households, households with outstanding debt, and the average 
outstanding debt in agricultural sector of Thailand 
Year No. of household 
No. of household % Average outstanding debt 
with outstanding debt (Baht/household) 
1988 5,040,132 1,279,000 25.38 6,046.78 
1990 5,073,471 1,408,000 27.75 7,828.94 
1991 5,130,531 1,729,831 33.72 12,771.74 
1995 5,502,782 2,857,993 51.94 24,672.13 
1998 5,513,855 3,050,412 55.32 37,019.35 
1999 5,642,890 3,379,163 59.88 37,231.00 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (OAB.) (Various years) 
The credit market in the rural areas is characterized by state-owned financial institutions, 
such as Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperative (BAAC), Government Saving 
Bank (GSB), and Government Housing Bank (GHB), private commercial banks, 
2 The poverty line in Thailand was equivalent to an average of 878 Baht/person/month in 1998. 
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cooperatives, informal institutions, such as production credit groups, credit unions, savings 
groups, village funds, and traditional informal sources such as relatives, neighbors, and 
money lenders (Poramacom, 2001). 
Over the last 20 years, institutional credit has shown its growing role gradually replacing 
the informal credit market. The proportion of institutional credit has increased from 64 
percent in 1971 to 91 percent in 1995, but declined to 84 percent in 1999 caused by the 
1997 financial crisis (see Table 1.6). BAAC provides financial assistance to farmer, farmer 
association and/or agricultural co-operative and is the only formal credit source with a high 
significant share in Thailand agricultural credit market. In 1999, 62 percent of the total 
loan in agricultural sector came from BAAC, whereas, 13 percent came from agricultural 
co-operatives and 8 percent from commercial banks (see Table 1.7). 
Table l.6: Average loan size, sources ofloan and borrowing purposes 
Year 
Average Loan size Sources of loan (%) Borrowing Purposes (%) 
(Baht/household) Informal Institution Agri. Non-agri. 
1971 3,830.98 36.35 63.65 70.30 29.70 
1976 2,187.07 36.97 63.03 79.44 20.56 
1978 3,053.63 36.12 63.88 73.67 26.33 
1980 4,360.63 42.10 57.90 76.53 23.47 
1982 4,788.86 33.81 66.19 74.33 25.67 
1986 3,206.43 29.55 70.45 76.49 23.51 
1988 5,137.27 28.12 71.88 81.49 18.51 
1990 6,759.27 17.95 82.05 77.99 22.01 
1991 8,924.59 18.97 81.03 81.27 18.73 
1995 15,048.83 9.01 90.99 70.39 29.61 
1998 17,854.48 16.96 83.04 69.03 30.97 
1999 18,493.14 16.10 83.90 67.30 32.70 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (OAE.) (Various years) 
BAAC's outstanding credit increased more than 9 times from 1987 to 1999. The 
outstanding credit in 1987 was 25 billion baht (35 percent) compared to 176 billion baht 
(53 percent) in 1996 and 229 billion baht (63 percent) in 1999. On the other hand, the 
proportion of outstanding credit relative to the total commercial banks debt has decreased 
from 64 percent in 1987 to 37 percent in 1999 (see Table 1.8). This demonstrates the 
important role of BAAC in Thailand's agricultural credit market relative to other formal 
credit institutions. 
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Table 1.7: Sources ofloan in 1996 and 1999 
Item 
Informal: 
Relatives 
Neighbours 
Landlord/money lenders 
Rice mill owner 
Farmer saving groups 
Others 
Institutional: 
BAAC 
Agricultural co-operatives 
Commercial banks 
Finance companies 
1996 1999 
15.40 16.10 
3.10 3.80 
2.20 2.50 
2.90 6.80 
0.20 1.20 
1.40 0.90 
5.70 0.90 
84.60 83.90 
59.70 61.80 
12.30 12.60 
12.30 8.30 
0.30 1.20 
Source: Office of Agricultural Economics (OAE) (1996, 1999) 
Table 1.8: Outstanding credit classified by types of financial institutions 
Year 
Commercial banks 1 BAAC Finance companies Total 
B. Baht % B. Baht % B. Baht % B. Baht 
1987 45.80 63.79 25.10 34.96 0.90 1.25 71.80 
1992 131.00 65.43 65.20 32.57 4.00 2.00 200.20 
1996 159.20 47.49 176.00 52.51 n.a. n.a. 335.20 
1997 156.60 44.92 192.00 55.08 n.a. n.a. 348.60 
1998 148.30 41.62 208.00 58.38 n.a. n.a. 356.30 
1999 133.80 36.93 228.50 63.07 n.a. n.a. 362.30 
Note: 11 Including the Government Saving Bank (GSB) and Government Rousing Bank (GRB). 
n.a. - not available 
Source: Bank of Thailand (BOT) (Various years) 
% 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
BAAC has classified agricultural loans into the following categories (Natetayaluck, 
2001a): 
1. Short-term loans for agricultural production (0 - 12 months). 
This loan is generally used for annual inputs required in the production of farm crops 
and livestock such as purchasing seed, feed, fertilizer, pay for operating expenses, 
etc. In some cases, the loan period can be extended up to 18 months. 
2. Loans for postponement of farm production sale (0 - 6 months). 
The purpose of this loan is to assist the farmers who want to store their products 
temporary and sell them at higher prices later, after the harvesting season. 
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3. Medium-term loans (1- 3 years). 
This type of loan has to be repaid, between 1 to 3 years except for some special cases 
where the duration of loan may be increased to 5 years. The loans are mostly for 
land improvements, purchasing machinery and livestock. 
4. Cash Credit loans. 
This type of credit allows the farmer to borrow extra cash up to a prespecified limit. 
Normally, the contract term of cash credit loans is not longer than 5 years. 
5. Long-term loans for refinancing old debts. 
The main objective of the loan is for reimbursement of previous debts, redemption or 
repurchase of agricultural lands that belong to the farmer themselves or their parent, 
spouse or child. This type of loan prevents the farmers from losing their land to 
informal credit lenders. The pay back period of the loan is not longer than 10 years. 
6. Long-term loans for agricultural investment. 
This type of loan is typically used for tree crops, purchasing a farm or additional 
lands, financing buildings and other permanent or long-life improvements. The loan 
contract term is between 15 - 20 years and may include a repaying grace period for 
the borrowers. 
7. Loans for other occupations related to the agriculture. 
The loan may be utilized for operating expenses and/or investment in an agricultural 
business, e.g. procurement inputs, food processing, trading, etc. 
The above 7 types of credit can be further classified into 3 categories according to the term 
of the loan: 
1. Short-term credit: production credit with a repayment period of less than 1 year. 
2. Medium-term credit or intermediate-term credit: repayment period is between 1 - 5 
years. 
3. Long-term credit: real-estate or long-term investment credit with a repayment period 
more than 5 years, but typically is not longer than 15 years. 
The short-term loan in 1999 accounted for 60 percent of the total loan while the proportion 
of medium-term and long-term loans were about 22 percent and 18 percent, respectively 
(Agricultural Statistics of Thailand Crop Year 1999-2000). These figures indicated that 
most farmers placed a high demand on short-term credit rather than medium to long-term 
investment credits. The high demand for short-term credit was caused by the run-up in 
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input prices, especially gasoline price during the gulf war, and the cumulative impact of 
low commodity prices problem. 
The major problems facing Thailand's rural finance are similar to those experienced by 
most developing countries. These include (Davis et aI., 1998; Thailand Development 
Research Institute, 1998): 
1. Indebtedness. The outstanding debt of the agricultural household has continuously 
increased over time (see Table 1.5). This problem is related to the operational 
problems as farmers always have inadequate cash flows and profits to service loan 
repayments. 
2. High interest rate charged. The interest rate charged on the agricultural loans is 
usually higher than traditional bank rates due to the higher risk and uncertainty on 
the agriculture productions. 
3. Lack of collateral. Because of this problem, farmers may not have access to the 
credit, or may be charged a high interest rate to substitute for a high credit risk. This 
problem is partly due to slower progress made in reforming property rights and land 
title. 
4. Limited sources of funds. Commercial banks and other financial institutions are 
generally wary of the involvement with rural lending, since they have to deal with 
higher risk. As a result, farmers and agricultural processors are mainly confined to 
dealing with BAAC. 
5. Short of credit services. Financial institutions prefer to deal with large enterprises. 
They have been slow to adjust themselves to deal with small scale lending, such as 
small-scale processor, traders, and private farmers. 
6. Lack of financial management knowledge and skills. About 60 percent of 
agricultural households incurred some form of debts (see Table 1.5), but it is 
unreasonable to expect farmers to have adequate financial management knowledge 
and skills in dealing with bankers or other financial institutions. 
1.3 The impact of the 1997 financial crisis 
In 1997, the Asian financial crisis which was caused by excessive short-term private 
borrowings and a series of misguided policies resulted in a severe deflation and contraction 
of the Thai economy. The deterioration triggered by a currency speculation, the fragility of 
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financial institutions and capital outflow negatively affected both the financial and the real 
economic sectors. The baht devaluation and the sudden withdrawal of foreign funds led to 
a strict lending policy, financial distress in many enterprises and falling output, which 
resulted in a decrease demand for labor and massive layoffs. Consequently, the 
unemployment rate increased from 3 percent in the first quarter of 1997 to around 5 
percent and 6 percent in the first quarter of 1998 and 1999, respectively. The sectors hit 
hardest included the financial services, property, and part of business services and 
manufacturing that served the domestic market (Bhipatboonthong, 2002). On the financial 
sector itself, a total of 56 financial firms were closed in late 1997. Furthermore, in 1998, 
six banks and 12 other financial companies were brought under the control of the Bank of 
Thailand. 
The financial crisis resulted in an overall negative economic growth rate for Thailand. The 
bulk of the impact of the financial crisis was felt in 1998 when the overall economic 
growth rate dropped from -1 percent in 1997 to -11 percent in 1998. The preponderance of 
the decline in economic activity included the construction, industrial and service sectors, 
where their growth rates were -38 percent, -11 percent and -9 percent in 1998, 
respectively (see Table 1.9). 
Table 1.9: Thailand's economic growth by sector at 1988 prices 
Year Growth rate 
Agriculture Industry Construction Service Total 
1994 4.95% 9.41% 14.15% 9.03% 8.99% 
1995 3.45% 11.93% 6.72% 9.14% 9.24% 
1996 4.14% 7.29% 7.05% 5.22% 5.90% 
1997 -0.90% 2.20% -25.64% -0.78% -1.37% 
1998 -1.52% -10.91% -38.25% -9.49% -10.51% 
1999 2.17% 12.09% -6.84% 0.53% 4.45% 
2000 6.44% 5.97% -9.54% 4.08% 4.65% 
2001 2.68% 1.48% -0.95% 2.27% 1.94% 
Source: Bank of Thailand (BOT) (Various years) 
Despite favorable terms of trade in export arising from the baht devaluation and the 
improvement in prices for most agricultural products, productions and exports did not 
immediately improve, because of the E1 Nino effect in 1997. The growth rate of 
agricultural sector was -2 percent in 1998. However, the agricultural sector had the 
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minimal impact from the financial crisis compared to the manufacturing and service 
sectors. As a result, the agricultural sector played a greater role in promoting economic 
growth during the financial crisis. The agriculture sector had a crisis carrying capacity and 
generated new employment for the unemployed urban. 
An attempt of the Thai government to disentangle the effects from the economic and 
financial crisis was to strengthen the rural sector. The government strategic and policy 
frameworks for the rural development in Thailand include (Natetayaluck, 2001b): 
1. Off-fann employment and rural enterprises must be expanded by: 
1. Creating the enabling environment for rural enterprise growth. 
2. Expanding rural credit for establishment of Small and Medium Enterprise (SMEs) 
and micro-enterprises. 
3. Increase private sector participation and development and Civil Society 
Organization (CSO) partnerships in development of off-fann employment. 
4. Strengthening vocational schooling and skills development in rural areas. 
5. Improving the incentive and regulatory framework for efficient intennediation. 
6. Reviewing the institutional framework for industrial development. 
II. Rural finance markets must be strengthened by: 
1. Transfonning of the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperative (BAAC) 
into an independent commercial rural bank. 
2. Expanding micro finances for small fanners and poor households. 
3. Improving the policy framework for efficient intennediation. 
4. Reducing government intervention in rural banking. 
5. Improving the rural financial sectors training and supervision programmes. 
However, the 1997 financial crisis has also changed the relative importance ofloan sources 
in the agriculture sector. For example, the borrowing share of the infonnal sector has 
increased slightly in 1999 from 1996 (see Table 1.7). The proportion of loans from 
landlords and moneylenders has increased from 3 percent in 1996 to 7 percent in 1999. In 
contrast, the share of commercial banks loans has reduced from 12 percent in 1996 to 8 
percent in 1999, with some of this gap partly filled by BAAC. 
In addition, the data on repayment rate of BAAC's individual clients showed a drop in 
repayments of long tenn and medium-term loan after the crisis (see Table 1.10). The 
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repayment rate was healthy during the early 1990s where short- and medium-term loans 
including cash credit line had an average repayment rate of about 85 percent while long-
term loan averaged almost 80 percent. From 1995 to 1996, long term refinancing credit 
repayment rate depreciated by 23 percent points and dropped to 24 percent in 1999. While 
the repayment rate of short-term credit was 87 percent during the financial crisis year, it 
dropped by 6 percent and then increased to 83 percent in 1999. The medium-term credit 
repayment rate continued to decline significantly, and long-term investment credit also 
dropped significantly in 1998. 
Default repayment took place before the financial crisis and the deterioration on the debt 
repayment was further impacted by the financial crisis. This gave rise to the question on 
bank rational lending decision-making. 
Table 1.10: BAAC repayment rates by individual clients (%) 
Loan category Average 
Average 
1997 1998 1999 
1992 - 1994 1995 - 1996 
Short-term 90.70 88.95 86.80 81.30 83.10 
Medium-term 86.63 84.75 72.30 67.90 64.40 
Cash credit lines 88.03 86.75 82.50 74.90 76.30 
Long-term(refinancing) 78.47 55.20 41.00 27.60 23.90 
Long -term( investment) 81.07 78.55 70.20 52.20 59.20 
Source: Bank for Agriculture and Agriculture Co-operatives (BAAC) (Various years) 
1.4 Research objectives 
The Thai rural sector is dependent heavily on bank lending. However, most commercial 
banks prefer to lend to large commercial farmers than to rural households. The commercial 
farmers normally acquire large loans with long repayment periods, which are more 
profitable for the banks, while rural households tend to acquire small loans that incur high 
transaction and administration costs with a high default risk. As a result, some rural 
households are denied access to formal credit and have to resort to informal borrowing 
with very high interest rates. 
Understanding the capital market system and bank lending determinants in rural areas help 
to improve the development of credit accessibility to farmers in rural regions. The 
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rationality of banks lending decisions includes reducing lending costs and increasing 
repayment rate and operating profits to the banks. As a c~nsequence, a well-developed 
rural financial market would promote economic growth and development in the rural 
sector. 
This research examines the detenninants of bank lending decision, credit availability, and 
loan price in Thailand's rural financial market, and to provide policy makers 
recommendations to increase fanners' access to credit and to improve Thailand's rural 
financial system. 
The objectives ofthis research include: 
1. To provide an overview of the rural financial system in Thailand. 
2. To identify critical factors in the lending decision process of the Bank for Agriculture 
and Agricultural Cooperative (BAAC) for the rural household (from the BAAC's 
perspective). 
3. To investigate factors affecting the amount of credit granted and interest rate charged 
in rural lending. 
4. To examine the impact of the relationship between lender and borrower on the 
lending decision, credit availability and credit price. 
The research also exammes the different bank lending behavior between agricultural 
lending and non-agricultural lending, and compares the results from different estimation 
techniques, such as multiple regression, logit regression, and artificial neural networks 
1.5 Contribution of the research 
This research is expected to contribute to the development of Thailand's rural financial 
market in addition to analyzing the rational behavior of bank lending processes. Since 
limited research has been conducted on rural finance regarding the lending process, an 
understanding of the rationale of the bank lending decision-making would improve the 
efficiency of Thailand rural financial markets and the rural sector development. 
Furthennore, the expansion of the commercial bank lending to the rural sector would be an 
effective way towards poverty alleviation and improving the quality life of the rural 
households. 
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In addition, this research would benefit both lenders and borrowers. Instead of using 
subjective evaluation decision-rules, which are bias and unreliable, lenders can apply an 
objective evaluation technique with a standard process and criteria to appraise their 
customer's credit risks and creditworthiness. A good credit risk assessment promotes a 
healthy credit market including competitive price of credit. Furthermore, it provides 
support to the lenders on credit risk management, reduction of default risk, increase in 
repayment rate and profits. 
Borrowers can evaluate whether they qualify for new loans or an extension of existing 
loans. They will be able to estimate the credit availability and the price of credit 
corresponding to their risk level. This information would enhance the borrowers' decision-
making process when they acquire loans. Self-assessment by the borrowers is also 
supportive to the credit suppliers as it may reduce the number of applications for credit 
from ineligible candidates and processing and administrative costs. 
1.6 Data and methodology 
This research uses the data and information from Thai bank credit files. All Thai banks 
have been approached to participate in this research. All participants who provided their 
customer credit files for this research were kept in strict confidence. 
The data includes the loans granted in 1999 - 2003. As suggested by Heckman (1979), to 
avoid two types of estimation bias, choice and selection bias, which typically plague 
lending decision models, the credit files were be selected at random. 
The analysis is divided into the following: 
1. Descriptive analysis: 
Frequency table, graph, average, and percentage are used to answer Research 
Objective 1. 
2. Quantitative analysis: 
To examine Research Objectives 2 and 4, a credit scoring model is developed via 
logistic regression and artificial neural networks (ANN) technique. 
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To examine Research Objectives 3 and 4, multiple regression and artificial neural 
networks (ANN) technique are employed to assess the credit availability and loan 
pricing models, and to verify the impact of relationship lending. 
1. 7 Outline of this thesis 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the 
relevant literature and the theoretical background on credit scoring, the demand for credit 
and credit availability models, interest rate and loan pricing models, and relationship 
lending. Chapter 3 describes the empirical models, the estimation techniques, the data, and 
the data collection method. Chapter 4 presents the results, and discussions of the results 
generated by the analysis. The prediction capability among the different estimation 
techniques is also compared. Chapter 5 summarizes the major findings and implications, 
followed by the limitation of the research and recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides an overview on bank lending decision, credit scoring model, demand 
for credit, and cost of credit. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 discusses the 
bank lending decision and creditworthiness evaluation techniques. Section 2.2 discusses 
the concept of credit scoring and explains how credit scoring works. The benefits and 
limitations of credit scoring are discussed in Section 2.3. The variables and modeling 
techniques that are commonly used in credit scoring models are summarized in Sections 
2.4 and 2.5, respectively. Section 2.6 discusses the demand for credit and credit 
availability model, and Section 2.7 discusses about interest rate and loan pricing model. 
Section 2.8 reviews previous studies on relationship lending and the impact of relationship 
lending on credit availability and credit price. 
2.1 Banks' lending decision: judgmental versus credit scoring 
Generally, a bank lending decision depends upon the borrower credit risk, that is the 
probability of the borrower not repaying the loan. Credit analysis includes the valuation of 
the financial history and financial statements of the applicant credit background. It is the 
primary method used in appraising credit risks. The objectives of credit analysis are to 
detennine the financial strength of the borrowers, to estimate the borrower's probability of 
repayment, and to reduce the risk of nonpayment to an acceptable level. There are two 
major problems in credit analysis: the assessment of all important factors about an 
applicant simultaneously and the evaluation of all applicants objectively (Plata and Nartea, 
1998; Sinkey, 2002). 
There are two main techniques that can be applied to evaluate a borrower creditworthiness 
(Crook, 1996): 
1. Loan officer subjective assessment (judgmental technique) and 
2. Credit scoring technique. 
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Creditworthiness is the characteristics of an individual that makes him or her qualify for a 
loan while someone who is not creditworthy is unqualified for the loan (Lewis, 1992). The 
subjective assessment of the borrower creditworthiness is normally based on the 6Cs' -
Character, Capacity, Cash, Collateral, Conditions and Control (Rose, 1993) (see Table 
2.1). 
However, Lewis (1992), Crook (1996), and Glassman and Wilkins (1997) argue that the 
judgmental assessment technique seems to be inefficient, unexplainable, inconsistent and 
non-uniform. Thus, credit scoring models have become more preferable technique for 
creditworthiness and credit risk appraisal. 
2.2 What is credit scoring? 
Credit scoring, introduced in the 1950s, is a method in evaluating the credit risk of loan 
applications. Using historical data and statistical techniques, credit scoring tries to 
segregate the effect of various applicant characteristics on delinquencies and defaults 
(Turvey and Brown, 1990; Mester, 1997; Glassman and Wilkins, 1997; Frame et aI., 
2001). A surge in interest about credit scoring models has been motivated primarily by two 
requirements of major lending institutions over the last few years: emphasizing on 
increased efficiencies in processing of loan applications and prudent risk management 
(Glassman and Wilkins, 1997). 
Credit scoring is broadly applied in consumer lending, especially in credit cards, and has 
been used in mortgage lending recently. Credit scoring has not been widely used in 
business lending because business loans differ substantially across borrowers, making it 
more difficult to build up an accurate method of scoring. However, this is changing. The 
complexity and flexibility of statistical models and advanced computing technology have 
made such scoring possible. Thus, many banks are using credit scoring to evaluate loan 
applications, which is a cost effective credit management tool (Mester, 1997). 
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Table 2.1: The six basic Cs' in lending 
Character Capacity Cash Collateral Conditions Control 
• Customer past • Identity of customer • Past earnings, • Ownership of assets • Customer position in • Applicable banking 
payment record. and guarantors. dividends, and sales • Ages of assets. industry and laws and regulations 
• Experience of other • Copies of charters record. • Vulnerability to expected market regarding the 
lender with current resolutions, • Adequacy of obsolescence. share. character and quality 
customer. agreements, and other projected cash flow. • Liquidation value. • Customer of acceptable loans. 
• Purpose ofloan documents bearing on • Availability of liquid • Degree of performance vis-a.-vis • Adequate 
Customer track record the legal standing of reserves. specialization in comparable firms in documentation for 
in forecasting. the borrowing • Turnover of assets. industry. examiners. 
• Credit rating. customer. payables, receivables, • Liens, encumbrances • Competitive climate • Signed 
• Presence of cosigners • Description of and inventory. and restrictions. for customer product. acknowledgments 
or guarantors of the history, legal • Capital structure and • Leases and • Sensitivity of and correctly 
proposed loan. structure, owners, leverage. mortgages issued. customer and prepared loan 
natural of operations, • Expense controls. • Insurance covered. industry to business documents. 
productions, and • Coverage ratios. • Guarantees and cycles and changes in • Consistency of loan 
principal customers • Recent performance warranties issued. technology. request with bank 
and suppliers for a of borrower stock • Bank relative • Labor market written loan policy. 
business borrower. and PIE ratio. position as creditor. conditions. • Inputs from noncredit 
• Management quality. • Lawsuits and tax • Impact of inflation on personnel (such as 
• Content of auditor situation. customer balance economists or 
report and statement • Probable future sheet and cash flow. 
political experts) on 
footnotes. financing needs. • Long-run industry external factors I 
outlook. affecting loan I • Recent accounting i 
changes. • Regulation; political repayment. 
I 
I 
and environmental 
factors. I 
Source: Rose, 1993: p. 195 
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The overall idea of credit scoring models is quite straightforward. A large historical loans 
sample on the similar loan type is divided into those that paid and those that defaulted. 
Based on statistical probabilities, the combination of borrower characteristics that 
differentiate "good" from "bad" loans generate a score, which is an estimate of the 
riskiness of each new loan (Crook, 1996). Based on the score, banks or lenders can rank 
their loan applications or borrowers in term of risk, and then decide whether to make loans 
and how to price them. Crook (1996) argues that the aim of credit scoring is to predict risk, 
not to explain it. Therefore, it is not necessary that the predictive model also explains why 
some borrowers default on the loan repayment and others do not. 
Credit history information and other data regarding repayment ability, which are generally 
provided by borrower, is analyzed (often electronically via a computer). The model then 
attempts to predict the applicant's likelihood of default based on previous experience with 
borrowers of similar loan profiles. A well-designed model should give high scores to 
borrowers whose loans will perform well and low scores to borrowers whose loans will not 
perfonn well. In some systems, the score is compared with a certain critical value (cut-off 
point) and the result is either accept or reject decision. To develop a good credit scoring 
model, sufficient historical data is needed to reflect loan performance in all economic 
conditions. However, there is no perfect scoring model. It may be possible that some bad 
borrowers may get a high score and receive the loans, and vise versa (McAllister and 
Mingo, 1994). 
2.3 Benefits and limitations of credit scoring 
Credit scoring techniques have a number of benefits compared to judgmental techniques 
for both lenders and borrowers. The perceived benefits of credit scoring that have led to its 
increasing use in loan assessment include (Chandler and Coffman, 1979; Lewis, 1992; 
Crook, 1996; Glassman and Wilkins, 1997; Mester, 1997): 
1. Increase efficiencies and reduce costs. 
Traditional loan approval process usually takes up to at least two weeks. Credit 
scoring can reduce this process to days or hours, and fewer loan officers can handle a 
large number of applications. Credit scoring can increase efficiency by leaving loan 
officers to concentrate only on ambiguous cases. This means cost saving to the bank 
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and benefits to the borrowers. The borrowers need to provide only the infonnation 
used in the model and the application process becomes shorter. 
2. More objective, reduce unfair lending practices and personal bias. 
Credit scoring is an objective process that can help lenders to ensure that the same 
decision criteria is applied to all borrowers, regardless of race, gender, or other 
factors prohibited by commercial law from being used in credit appraisal. The 
models are built on larger samples, and consider the characteristics of both good and 
bad borrowers, whereas judgmental methods are usually negatively biased towards 
perceptions of bad borrowers only. 
3. Ability to control risk levels. 
For lenders, it is easier to control the number of new loans granted in high risk 
categories when credit scoring is used compared to judgmental method. Credit 
analyst can estimate credit risk of the borrowers with reasonable degree of 
confidence and can raise or drop the cut-off score to adjust the risk of the loan 
portfolio. 
4. Continual learning system. 
Credit scoring models are based on statistical techniques. By repeatedly re-estimating 
the models with a larger data set, the systems can learn over time and can predict the 
next borrower behavior more accurately. With the recent development of neural 
networks - "self-learning" computer programs modeled on the human mind - the 
level that the credit scoring process can develop in tenns of complexity and accuracy 
is unknown. Certainly, continual learning system will make the models more 
efficient in a short period. 
According to Feldman (1997), credit scoring can alter small-business lending in three 
areas: 
1. The interaction between borrowers and lenders. 
Credit scoring allows lenders to underwrite and monitor loans without actually 
meeting the borrowers. This development is in stark contrast to the perceived 
importance of a local bank-borrower relationship. In fact, because of the scoring 
systems, borrowers can obtain unsecured credit from distant lenders through direct 
marketing channels. 
2. Loan pricing. 
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The price of small-business loan should decline, especially for high credit quality 
borrowers who will no longer have to bear the cost of extensive underwriting. In 
addition, increased competition, resulting from small businesses having access to 
more lenders should further lower borrowing costs. 
3. Credit availability. 
Credit scoring should Increase credit availability for small businesses. Better 
information about the repayment prospects of a small-business applicant makes it 
more likely that a lender will provide a larger loan amount and the loan price will be 
based on expected risk. 
While the benefits of credit scoring are fairly well known, the limitations in using credit 
scoring should not be ignored. The weaknesses of credit scoring models include (Capon, 
1982; Crook, 1996; Glassman and Wilkins, 1997; Mester, 1997): 
1. Data and the accuracy of the models: 
Credit scoring models are extremely complex, and they are only good if data is 
available. Inaccurate and insufficient credit report information can invalidate the 
credit scoring results. The data on which the system is fed need an adequate sample 
of both well-performing and poorly performing loans. The data should be up to date 
and the models should be re-estimated frequently to ensure that changes in the 
relationship between potential factors and loan performance are captured. 
2. Knowing the customers: 
The use of credit scoring models can not substitute the value gained by knowing the 
customers personally, although the models attempt to mimic actual behavior of 
borrowers. This is especially important when dealing with applications and 
customers who have not had a pristine credit history or where the ability to repay a 
loan may be the primary factor on which a credit decision is based. In such cases, 
credit scoring may not be able to capture the true repayment likelihood of the 
applicants. 
3. Economic fluctuations: 
Because credit scoring models are based on historical data, the models are 
susceptible to biases due to the timeframe of the data and business cycle. A good 
credit scoring model needs to make accurate predictions in both good and bad 
economic situations. Therefore, the data on which the model is based should address 
both expansions and recessions. If the data on which the model is used does not 
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include repayment behavior in an economic downturn, and if adjustments are not 
made, lenders may have to face with a higher risk than they have planned. 
4. Selection bias: 
Generally, only accepted applicants information is used to estimate the coefficients 
in credit scoring models. Thus, the selection bias may lead to bias on estimated 
weights in credit scoring models. 
2.4 Variables commonly used in credit scoring models 
The pragmatism and empiricism of credit scoring implies that any characteristic and 
environment of the borrower that has obvious connections with default risk should be used 
in the scoring system (Lewis, 1992). Lewis (1992) suggests that there is no need to justify 
the case for any variable. If it helps the predictions, it should be used. However, some 
characteristics should not be used in the credit scoring models because they are 
discriminatory and legally banned, such as race, religion, and gender, and some of them are 
culturally unacceptable, such as health and conviction records. 
However, the major factors commonly used in credit sconng models include the 
borrowers' liquidity, profitability, solvency (or leverage), efficiency and repayment 
capacity (Turvey and Brown, 1990; Turvey and Weers ink, 1997; Novak and LaDue, 1999; 
Barney et aI., 1999). 
Liquidity reflects the capacity of borrower to generate cash to meet its short-term financial 
obligations. The variables commonly used to measure liquidity are (Lee et aI. 1988; Rose, 
1993): 
1. Current ratio = Current assets 
Current liabilities 
2. Acid-test ratio or quick ratio = Current assets - Inventories 
Current liabilities 
3. Net Working capital = Current assets - Current liabilities 
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Low ratio on current and acid-test ratios and low net working capital indicate illiquidity 
and the borrower may not be able to generate sufficient funds to meet fixed financial 
obligations. Thus, default risk is expected to increase as liquidity decreases. 
Profitability refers to efficiency of the borrower's activities and their ability to generate 
profit. Common measures of profitability include the following (Lee et. aI., 1988; Barney 
et aI., 1999): 
1. Return on assets = Net return 
Total assets 
2. Return on equity = Net return 
Equity 
Low profitability ratios may imply misuse of resources, which may increase the probability 
of loan default. Thus, borrowers with high profitability ratios are relatively preferred. 
Solvency ( or leverage) indicates the amount of debt that a borrower has taken in addition 
to the loan being applied for. Key financial ratios used to analyze solvency include (Lee et 
al. 1988; Rose, 1993): 
1. Leverage ratio = Total liabilities 
Total assets 
2. Debt-to-equity ratio = Total liabilities 
Equity 
The above ratios measure the overall financial position of the borrower because they 
reflect the likelihood that the sale of all assets should produce sufficient cash to cover all 
debt outstanding and indicate how much debt financing is used compared to equity 
financing. The higher ratios mean high debt financing, high financial risk and less likely 
additional loans will be granted. 
The measure of efficiency includes gross ratio and capital turnover ratio. They are used to 
indicate the input-output efficiency of the business and the efficiency with which capital is 
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being employed in the business, respectively (Lee et aI. 1988; Turvey and Brown, 1990; 
Barney et aI., 1999). 
1. Gross ratio = Total expenses 
Gross income 
2. Capital turnover ratio = Gross income 
Total assets 
A high value of gross ratio (lower value of capital turnover ratio) implies inefficiencies in 
input use or production (capital utilization), and it is expected that the default risk increases 
as the gross ratio increases (capital turnover ratio decreases). 
Repayment ability measures the borrower's ability to successfully meet principal and 
interest commitments from future cash flow. Repayment ability is measured by three 
variables (Rose, 1993; Barney et aI., 1999): 
1. Interest expense ratio = Interest payment 
Total income 
2. Interest coverage ratio = Earning before tax and interest 
Interest payment 
3. Debt repayment ratio = Total debt and interest payment 
Total income 
Higher ratios on both interest expense ratio and debt repayment ratio are expected to 
increase the probability of loan default. 
The above ratios can be easily calculated from the borrower's financial statements. Thus, 
lenders always use these financial ratios in combination with other factors such as the 
borrower's personal attributes in the credit appraisal. However, the selection of financial 
ratios across studies is inconsistent. Lufburrow et aI. (1984) used liquidity, solvency, 
collateral, repayment ability and repayment history when they estimated credit scoring for 
a production credit association in Illinois. Fischer and Moore (1986) utilized profitability, 
solvency, and efficiency with credit scoring function for the St. Paul Bank for Cooperative 
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to assess the borrower's credit risk. Mortensen et. al. (1988) tried to predict the probability 
of the fanners' loan default in North Dakota with only two ratios, solvency and efficiency 
(see Table 2.2). 
Miller and LaDue (1989) used combinations of profitability, solvency, and efficiency in 
their credit assessment models for a bank case focusing on dairy fanns in New York. In 
addition, Turvey and Brown (1990) used liquidity, profitability, solvency, efficiency, and 
repayment capacity in estimating the credit scoring for Canada's fann credit corporation, 
while Barney et al. (1999) used them to estimate the fann debt failure prediction model for 
the fanners home administration in the United States. (see Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2: Financial ratios commonly used in credit scoring models 
C >. C >. ..... u u ...... ..... ..... ~ '0 \:I ~ ..... Q) . .... g. > ..... u ...... ~ l:!3 ..... 0 8 ....l CIl ~ p.. 
LufbUlTOW et al. (1984) ./ ./ 
Fischer and Moore (1986) ./ ./ ./ 
Mortensen et. al. (1988) ./ ./ 
BalTY and Ellinger (1989) ./ ./ ./ ./ 
Miller and LaDue (1989) ./ ./ ./ 
Turvey and Brown (1990) ./ ./ ./ ./ 
Turvey and Weersink (1997) ./ ./ ./ 
./ ./1/,2/ 
./ ./11 
Novak and LaDue (1999) ./ ./ 
Barney et al. (1999) ./ ./ ./ ./ 
./ 
./ ./2/ 
Wu and Wang (2000) ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
Note: 11 Dummy variables on region and farm type. 
21 Dummy variables on loan for refinance or restmcturing. 
According to the literature, not all financial ratios have a significant impact on the 
probability of loan default. For example, Turvey and Brown (1990) reported that only 
CUlTent ratio and return on assets had a negative impact on the bOlTower's default risk, 
while leverage ratio had a positive impact on the default risk. Novak and LaDue (1999) 
and Turvey and Weers ink (1997) found a positive relationship between leverage ratio and 
the probability of loan default. Furthennore, Wu and Wang (2000) indicated that debt-to-
equity ratio was positively related to the bOlTower's default risk. The authors also found 
that capital turnover ratio had a negative relationship with the probability to default on the 
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loan repayment, which was inconsistent with the financial theory. Table 2.3 summarizes 
the empirical relationships between the financial ratios and the probability of loan default. 
Table 2.3: Empirical relationships between the financial ratios and the probability of loan 
default 
Variable Probability of loan default 
Liquidity 
- CutTent ratio 
- Quick ratio 
- Net working capital 
Profitability 
- Return on assets 
- Return on equity 
Solvency 
- Leverage ratio 
- Debt-to-equity ratio 
Efficiency 
- Gross ratio 
- Capital turnover ratio 
Repayment ability 
- Interest expense ratio 
- Interest coverage ratio 
- Debt repayment ratio 
Note: n.s. = no significant impact found 
n.a. = not available 
Negative 
Negative 
n.s. 
Negative 
n.s. 
Positive 
Positive 
n.s. 
Positive 
n.s. 
n.s. 
n.s. 
2.5 Credit scoring and modeling techniques 
Source 
Turvey and Brown (1990) 
Turvey and Weersink (1997) 
n.a. 
Turvey and Brown (1990) 
Turvey and Weersink (1997) 
n.a. 
Turvey and Brown (1990) 
Turvey and Weersink (1997) 
Novak and LaDue (1999) 
Wu and Wang (2000) 
n.a. 
Wu and Wang (2000) 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Several statistical methods have been used to estimate credit scoring models in assessing 
agricultural credits, such as discriminant analysis (Dunn and Frey, 1976), linear probability 
models (Turvey, 1991), logit models (Mortensen et aI., 1988), and probit models 
(Lufburrow et aI., 1984). The last three methods are standard statistical techniques for 
estimating the probability of default based on historical data on loan performances and 
characteristics of the borrowers. The linear probability model assumes that the probability 
of default and the factors are linear in relationship. The logit model assumes that the 
probability of default is logistically distributed. The probit model assumes that the 
probability of default follows the standard cumulative normal distribution function and 
discriminant analysis divides borrowers into high and low default risk groups (Mester, 
1997). 
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Historically, discriminant analysis has been popular. However, there are questions 
concerning the econometric properties since the technique is neither unbiased nor a 
consistent estimator, and most of the exogenous variables used in the model generally 
violate the normal distribution assumptions (Collins and Green, 1982; Ladue, 1989). 
Collins and Green (1982) pointed out that the linear probability model could present 
reasonable prediction results compared to discriminant analysis and logit models. 
However, Judge et aI. (1985), Greene (1997) and Pyndick and Rubinfeld (1998) indicated 
that the predictive value of linear probability models may not necessarily lie between zero 
and one, which violates the probability theory. Moreover, the variance of the models is 
generally heteroscedasticity, which lead to inconsistent estimation problem and invalid 
conventional measure of fit such as the R2. 
The logit and probit models are very similar to each other. Both of them provide 
asymptotically consistent, efficient and unbiased estimates. The logit model is generally 
preferred to the probit model because of its simplicity. Recently, the logit model has 
dominated the agricultural credit scoring literature (Barney et aI., 1999; Novak and LaDue, 
1999; Lee and Jung, 1999) (see Table 2.4). 
Table 2.4: Credit scoring techniques 
DA. LPM. Logit Probit RPA. ANN. 
Dunn and Frey (1976) ./ 
Lufburrow et aI. (1984) ./ 
Mortensen et. aI. (1988) ./ 
Miller and LaDue (1989) ./ 
Turvey and Brown (1990) ./ 
Turvey (1991) ././././ 
Jensen (1992) ./ 
Altman et aI. (1994)./ ./ 
Turvey and Weersink (1997) ./ 
Novak and LaDue (1999) ././ 
Lee and Jung (1999) ./ ./ 
Barney et aI. (1999) ././ ./ 
Wu and Wang (2000) ./ ./ 
Note: DA. = Discriminant Analysis, LPM. = Linear Probability Model, Logit. = Logistic Model, Probit. = 
Probit Model, RP A. = Recursive Partitioning Algorithms, ANN. = Artificial Neural Networks. 
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Turvey (1991) empirically compared agriculture credit sconng models usmg four 
parametric methods with a single date set. The author recommended the logistic model 
over the probit model, linear probability model and discriminant analysis based on 
predictive power and ease of use, in addition to the consistent statistical property. 
However, Novak and LaDue (1999) argued that the problems in a logit model include: 
1. The need to pre select the exact explanatory variables without well-developed theory; 
2. Inability to identify an individual variable's relative importance; 
3. Reduction ofthe information space dimensionality; and 
4. Limited ability to incorporate relative misclassification costs. 
Thus, recursIve partitioning algorithm (nonparametric classification method) was 
introduced as an alternative technique for credit scoring analysis, which allows direct 
incorporation of misclassification costs. However, recursive partitioning algorithm 
outperformed the logistic regression based on within-sample observation only, while the 
logistic regression is superior to recursive partitioning algorithm based on more 
appropriate out-of-sample observations. 
Artificial neural network (ANN), a new classification technique, is artificial intelligent 
algorithms that allow for some learning process through experience to discern the 
relationship between the borrower characteristics and the probability of default. Since there 
are no assumptions about functional form, or about the distributions of the variables and 
errors of the model, ANN is more flexible than the standard statistical technique (Mester, 
1997). It also allows for nonlinear relationship and complex classificatory equations. The 
user does not need to specify in detail about the functional form before estimating the 
classification equations, instead it lets the data determine the appropriate functional forms. 
The final equations may be very complex to explain or understand (Crook, 1996). 
Altman et al. (1994) applied the linear discriminant analysis and the neural network 
techniques to analyze over 1,000 healthy, vulnerable and unsound Italian industrial firms 
from 1982 - 1992. The authors found that artificial neural network and discriminant 
analysis yielded the same degree of accuracy. Furthermore, Lee and Jung (1999) utilized 
artificial neural network and logistic regression with a total of 21,678 credit files from 
several credit unions in South Korea. The authors found that both models were very 
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powerful for prediction delinquency. However, the logistic regression outperfOlmed the 
neural network for the urban accounts, while the neural network outperformed the logistic 
regression for the rural accounts. 
Barneyet al. (1999) applied accounting data contained in the Farm and Home Plan (FHP) 
in predicting farm debt failure in the United States. The authors' predictive results 
indicated that the neural network model outperforms both the linear probability model and 
the logit model in predicting farm debt failure based on an error rate. In addition, Wu and 
Wang (2000) applied the neural network method to small business lending decisions in 
central New York. The authors found that the neural network has a stronger discriminating 
power for classifying the acceptance and rejection group than traditional parametric and 
non-parametric classifiers. 
According to empirical studies, there is no unanimous agreement as to the best method for 
estimating credit scoring models and new methods continue to evolve. However, the logit 
models and artificial neural networks have been applied frequently in previous research. 
2.6 Demand for credit and credit availability model 
Demand for credit is a derived demand. Households or firms desire credit in order to make 
certain production and consumption expenditures as well as investments (Feder et al., 
1993). To determine the optimal level of credit utilization, the costs and returns of credit 
must be considered. 
The law of diminishing marginal return indicates that the return (i.e. marginal value 
products) from additional units of resources and resource services acquired with borrowed 
funds will decline at an accelerating rate, as indicated by curve r in Figure 2.1. Curve i 
represents the marginal cost of borrowing or interest rate and is upward sloping. This is 
because the borrowing cost increases when the leverage increases. The assumption that the 
borrowing cost is constant is unrealistic. The extremely high degree of credit use is 
disfavour for the lender, as it incurs cost in the form of increased financial risk. Thus, the 
lender might react by increasing the interest rate on the loan, or simply refusing to provide 
additional credit (Lee et al., 1988). 
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium in credit utilization 
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Conceptually, the gain from the use of credit is maximized when the marginal rate of 
return r is equal to the marginal cost of borrowing i (see Figure 2.1). Thus, the optimal 
level of credit use is BM, where the curve r intersects the curve i at E. As long as the 
marginal rate of return exceeds the marginal cost of using a loan, the borrower will 
increase the level of credit use (Barry et aI., 1995). The optimal credit use would increase 
the borrower's income. If some of this income is reinvested, saved, or used to repay debts, 
the wealth (asset) of the borrower will increase. Therefore, the credit utilization and the 
process of investing back a portion of the earnings result in the growth of the borrower's 
wealth. 
However, it is possible that the financial institutions may limit the credit extended to the 
borrower, which is known as credit rationing. As a result, the amount of credit provided by 
the institutional lender might not meet with the borrower's demand for credit to maximize 
the borrower's gain. Thus, the borrower might decide to borrow from more expensive 
sources, such as non-financial institution lenders, as long as the return from credit use still 
exceed the cost of fund from those sources (see Figure 2.2). The borrowers who have an 
unlimited access to the institutional credit will not borrow from the more expensive source. 
Therefore, the amount of credit borrowing from a more expensive source can be used to 
measure the degree to which the borrowers are supply constrained by the financial 
institutions (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). 
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Figure 2.2: Sources and uses of funds 
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Figure 2.2 shows the sources and the uses of funds. Assuming that the financial institutions 
ration the amount of credit they offer to the borrower to the amount of Be. Since the 
borrower's demand for credit is BM, the borrower might want to borrow from the 
alternative source of funds, for instance Source A. If HK is the marginal cost of borrowing 
from Source A, the demand for credit of the borrower is only BD, where the marginal rate 
of return is equal to the marginal cost of borrowing. As a result, the borrower borrows only 
BC from the financial institution and borrows CD from Source A3. 
Since the availability of credit to the borrower is simultaneously determined by the 
borrower demand for credit and the supply of credit, it is difficult to measure credit 
availability directly. Changes in the level of credit use might be due to changes in demand 
for credit (assuming that the supply curve is observed), or by changes in supply of credit 
(assuming that the demand curve is observed). Although the amount of credit provided by 
the lender can be used as a proxy, it may underestimate the credit available to the 
borrower, since the borrower may receive a small amount of loan because the borrower is 
liquidity constrained, or because the borrower has little need for external funds (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1994). However, it can be expected that credit availability for a good borrower 
3 For CD to be an appropriate measure of institutional credit rationing, the marginal cost of borrowing from 
the alternative source must exceed the marginal cost of available institutional credit. If this is not true, the 
amount CD will be a function of the price financial institutions charge, as opposed to the volume of credit 
they are willing to offer (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). 
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should be greater than for a bad borrower. Consistent with this reasoning, the borrower 
who has a high asset value, high average earning, and low earning volatility would have 
greater access to credit. Furthennore, the borrower with a high education, high work 
experience, and high profitability would be granted a larger loan. 
Bard et al. (2000) argue that borrower, loan, and lender characteristics, and financial 
market structure may influence the lenders' decision on the amount of the loan. Borrower 
characteristics that signal credit risk may affect the loan amount. Loan traits affecting the 
amount of loan include purpose of the loan and loan-to-value ratio. Bank attributes such as 
lending focus, lending polices, lending limits, reserve requirements, and available of funds 
are supply-side factors that could affect the availability of credit. Market structure features, 
such as market share and concentration, may also influence the lenders' lending polices. 
Therefore, the credit availability model could be expressed as follows: 
(2.1) 
where Ai is the loan amount for loan i; 
Bi is a vector of borrower and loan characteristics believed to influence the 
loan amount; 
Li is a vector of bank characteristics that may affect the loan size; 
Ci is the market structure variable hypothesised to influence loan supply. 
2.7 Interest rate and loan pricing model 
In general, interest rate is considered to be comprised of four components (Goodwin and 
Mishra, 2000): 
1. a return to productive capital, 
2. an adjustment reflecting a positive rate of time preference, 
3. a premium for expected inflation, and 
4. a default risk premium. 
The first three components are expected to be identical across the borrowers and lenders 
for a given size and tenn of the loan. Thus, the interest rates differences across the identical 
loan contracts can only be explained by the differences in the default risk premiums. If the 
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competition among the lenders in the lending market is sufficient, it will abolish the non-
competitive loan pricing practices and the interest rates should equalize across the lenders. 
As a result, the differences in the interest rates are represented by the financial risk of the 
borrowers. 
However, the competition among lenders may not be strong enough to fully eliminate the 
differences in interest rates across the lenders. Moreover, it is likely that different groups of 
lenders (for example, commercial banks and governmental banks) do not usually compete 
against one another for the same pool of loans. Different lenders appear to have different 
cost structures and different lending practices, which may be another important factor 
explaining the difference in the interest rates charged. 
The market interest rate is determined by the interaction of the borrowers' demand for 
loans and the supply of loanable funds. The change in inflation and the financial market 
condition has an influence on the interest rate. Thus, the interest rate must be conditioned 
on the time of loan commencing. The supply of loanable funds depends on the current 
interest rate in the market, the cost of credit and other operating costs, the perceived 
riskiness of the loans relative to the alternative investment options available to the lenders, 
and the demand for loanable funds in the economy. The demand for loanable funds largely 
depends upon the current, and the future expectation, of the health of the economy. Since 
many loans have the contract term extended over several years, the expectations of future 
financial market conditions also play an important role in shaping the demand and supply 
of loanable funds. 
Interest rate can be viewed as the loan price from the interaction of the demand and supply 
for loanable funds. When the individual loans are considered at a point in time, the factors 
related to the expectations ofthe future economy and the future financial market conditions 
are expected to be homogeneous across the competing lenders and borrowers. Therefore, 
the differences of the loan prices would be determined by the characteristics of the 
borrowers, the characteristics of the individual loans, and the likelihood that the loan will 
be repaid or default. 
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In general, the interest rate charged by a lender must cover the cost of funds, loan 
administration and service costs, a default risk premium and a profit for the lender (Lee et 
aI., 1988). A simple loan pricing model can be expressed as follows (Rose, 1993): 
Marginal cost Estimated 
Loan 
of raising 
Non-funds 
margin to Lender's 
loanable protect the desired 
interest = + operating + + (2.2) funds to lend lender profit 
rate costs 
to the against margm 
borrower default risk 
The loan pricing model (equation 2.2) can be formally expressed in general form as 
follows (Bard et aI., 2000): 
where 
(2.3) 
Ri is the interest rate for loan i; 
Bi is a vector of borrower and loan characteristics that may influence credit risk 
(e.g. financial performance, production efficiency, risk-management ability, 
experience, and loan size) (Miller et aI., 1993); 
Li is a vector of bank characteristics thought to influence the interest rate (e.g. 
lending costs, desired rate ofretum, and other lending policies); 
Ci represents the market structure characteristic that may influence pricing 
behaviour (e.g. market concentration or market share). 
2.8 Relationship lending: impact on credit availability and loan price 
The issue of credit availability and the interest rate charged to borrowers, especially to 
small borrowers, have been widely discussed because many borrowers can not get enough 
credit at reasonable interest rates, even if they have an opportunity to invest in positive net 
present value projects. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) suggest that the capital market frictions 
such as information asymmetries and agency costs may explain why credit does not always 
flow to borrowers with profitable investment opportunity. 
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Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that the capital market differs from most markets because 
prices and interest rates do not always adjust to clear the market. The authors show that 
interest rate charged determines not only the demand for capital but also the riskiness of 
the borrowers. A higher interest rate either draws riskier applicants (the adverse selection 
effect) or influences borrowers to choose riskier investment projects (the incentive or 
moral hazard effect). Thus, lenders may decide to ration the quantity of loans rather than 
raise the interest rate to clear the market if an increase in the rate increases the average 
riskiness of borrowers. 
To overcome asymmetric information problems, relationship lending (relationship building 
between the lender and the borrower) is one of the most reasonable strategies because it 
allows the lender to gather relevant information about the prospects and creditworthiness 
of the borrower over a considerable time period. The continuous contact between borrower 
and lender in the provision of various financial services can produce valuable input for the 
lender in making decisions. For example, banks (or lenders) can acquire information by 
monitoring the borrower performance over time under certain credit arrangements and/or 
through the provision of other services, such as deposit account or compensating balances. 
Banks may utilize this information in their decisions about the credit extension and the 
term of credit, such as interest rate charged, required collateral from the borrower, and 
attached other conditions to the loan. The borrower with close relation to the banks should 
have a lower cost of capital, lower required collateral, and greater availability of funds 
compared to a borrower without such relation (Petersen and Raj an, 1994; Berger and 
Udell,2002). 
Boot (2000) outlines five potential benefits in relationship lending. First, relationship 
lending facilitates information reuse through time, which encourages information 
production and monitoring by the lenders. Second, relationship lending facilitates flexible 
and implicit long-term contract. Third, loan contracts typically include covenants to 
mitigate agency costs that become suboptimal as new information arrives. Depending on 
the relative bargaining strengths, the development of long-term relationship facilitates low 
cost of renegotiation of the covenants. Fourth, relationship lending often involves collateral 
or personal guarantees, and long-term contractual relationship encourage monitoring and 
the efficient use of costly collateral. Fifth, relationship lending accommodates the inter-
temporal smoothing of loan terms, which benefits young and informational opaque firms. 
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In recent years, there are a nmnber of empirical studies that have investigated on 
relationship lending. For example, Berger and Udell (1995), Blackwell and Winters 
(1997), Athavale and Edmister (1999), and Bodenhom (2003) found evidence of an inverse 
relationship between the bank-borrower relationship and the loan rate (see Table 2.5). On 
the other hand, Greenbaum et al. (1989), Sharpe (1990), Angelini et al. (1998), and 
Degryse and Cayseele (1998) suggested that borrowers with existing relationship were 
charged higher loan rates. Greenbaum et al. (1989) argued that the incumbent banks can 
charge higher loan rates due to their information advantage relative to their competitors. 
Degryse and Cayseele (2000) found offsetting relationship effects. The authors argued that 
on one hand, the loan rate increases with the length of the bank-borrower relationship. On 
the other hand, loan rates decline with the scope of the bank-borrower relationship, which 
is defined as the purchase of other financial services from the bank. 
Table 2.5: The length of bank-borrower relationship and availability and cost of credit 
Availability of credit Cost of credit 
Greenbaum et al. (1989) Positive 
Sharpe (1990) Positive 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) Positive No 
Berger and Udell (1995) Positive Negative 
Blackwell and Winters (1997) Negative 
Cole (1998) Positive 
Angelini et al. (1998) Positive Positive 
Elsas and Krahnen (1998) No 
Harhoffand Korting (1998) Positive No 
Athavale and Edmister (1999) Negative 
Degryse and Cayseele (2000) No Positive 
Bodenhom (2003) Negative 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) examined the effects of the banking relationship on the 
availability of credit to small firms and on the pricing of the credit. The authors found a 
positive relationship between the availability of credit and the length of time the firm 
associated with the financial institution. In contrast, they could not find any significant 
relationship between the duration of the lending and the loan price to support the 
hypothesis that relationship lending reduces loan rates. Thus, they conclude that the 
banking relationship affect the availability of credit more than the credit price. 
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Berger and Udell (1995) argued that relationship lending is less important in asset-based 
lending, such as mortgages and term loans. The authors contended that lines of credit, 
which tend to be cash-flow-based loans, are relationship loans. To avoid diluting the effect 
of the relationship lending, they excluded transaction-based loans and used only lines of 
credit data, unlike Petersen and Rajan's (1994) study. The authors found that the borrowers 
with longer banking relationships paid lower interest rate. However, the relationship was 
significant only in the sub sample of loans greater than $500,000 in total assets. The 
authors also found that the borrowers with longer banking relationships received larger 
loans and were less likely to pledge collateral. 
Blackwell and Winters (1997) conducted a study on banking relationships and the effect of 
monitoring on loan pricing. The authors used 174 lines of credit data from 6 banks from 
two holding companies. Using regression analysis similar to that of Petersen and Rajan 
(1994) and Berger and Udell (1995), they observed a positive relationship between the 
loan's interest rate and the bank's monitoring effort. Their findings also showed that banks 
less frequently reviewed firms with whom they had longer lending relationships, and 
ultimately, charged lower interest rates (banks pass along the monitoring cost saving to the 
borrower in the form oflower interest rates). 
Athavale and Edmister (1999) indicated that banks obtain private information about their 
customers, as well as monitoring borrowers, and have an information advantage in the 
production of other services. The authors results showed that relationship influenced the 
price of credit such that subsequent loans were priced significantly lower than prior loans 
to reflect the benefits of lower monitoring costs arising out of the relationship. Thus, they 
concluded that borrowers received some positive values from continuing the banking 
relationship. 
Bodenhom (2003) used the contract-specific loan records of a 19th-century U.S. bank to 
analyze the value of firm-bank relationships. The author determined that that small firms 
excluded from arm's-length markets found it advantageous to form extensive and durable 
relationships with banks. The author's results showed that repeat borrowing over long 
periods lead to lower interest costs, lower guarantee usage, and a greater likelihood of 
maintaining a banking relationship during financial panics and other macroeconomic 
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downturns. Therefore, the author concluded that extended banking relationship was, 
indeed, valuable. 
There are many studies that broadly confirm the importance of relationship lending on the 
credit availability (see Table 2.5). For example, Angelini et al. (1998), and Harhoff and 
Korting (1998) showed that the credit availability for small firms typically increased with 
the length of the bank-borrower relationship. In addition, Elsas and Krahnen (1998) found 
that banks continued to lend to the customers who had a good relationship with the banks 
in spite of a deterioration in the customer's credit rating. 
The major factors included in the loan pricing and the credit availability models of a firm 
are (Petersen and Raj an, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Blackwell and Winters, 1997; 
Keasey and Watson, 2000) (see Table 2.6): 
1. Firm characteristics. 
These include firm size (total assets), and firm age. 
2. Credit risk proxies. 
Key financial ratios, including current ratio, return on assets, leverage ratio, capital 
turnover ratio and interest coverage ratio, risk level, and collateral requirement 
dummies are conventionally utilized as credit risk proxies to control for the 
observable risk of the borrower. 
3. Relationship indicators. 
Six variables have been used as relationship indicators in the previous literature. 
These include: duration of the relationship, borrowing concentration ratio, number of 
banks from which the firm borrows, housebank (major financial source) status, 
dummy variables on deposit accounts with and other services from current lender. 
4. Dummy variables. 
These include bank, industry, region, loan type, loan size, and lending year dummies. 
According to the literatures, the firms' size and age played an important role on both price 
and availability of credit. The results suggest that larger and older firms received more 
credit and pay lower interest than smaller and younger firms (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Blackwell and Winters, 1997; Goodwin and Mishra, 2000). Furthermore, secured loans 
usually carried higher interest rates than unsecured loans, as riskier borrowers needed to 
provide collateral (Berger and Udell, 1995; Blackwell and Winters, 1997; Strahan, 1999). 
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Quick ratio, return on assets, capital turnover ratio, and interest coverage ratio were 
positively related to the credit availability, but negatively related to the loan price (Berger 
and Udell, 1995; Strahan, 1999), while leverage ratio was positively related to the loan 
price (Strahan, 1999; Keasey and Watson, 2000). 
For relationship indicators, duration of the relationship, borrowing concentration ratio, 
housebank status, and the number of banks from which the film borrows are considered as 
the key factors in determining the loan price and the credit availability. Long-term 
relationship and borrowing from only one or a few banks reduce the interest rate and 
increase the amount of credit (see Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Blackwell and Winters, 1997, 
Degryse and Cayseele, 2000). In addition, long-term loans and large loans are cheaper than 
the other loan types and sizes (see Keasey and Watson, 2000; Bodenhorn, 2003; Degryse 
and Ongena, 2005). 
Table 2.6: Factors influencing the credit availability and cost of credit 
Factors 
Firm characteristics 
- Firm size (total assets) 
- Firm age 
Credit risk proxies 
- Quick ratio 
- Return on assets 
- Leverage ratio 
- Capital turnover ratio 
- Interest coverage ratio 
Credit availability Cost of credit 
Positive Negative 
• Petersen and Rajan (1994); • 
Strahan (1999). 
Petersen and Rajan (1994); 
Blackwell and Winters (1997); 
Strahan (1999); Goodwin and 
Mishra (2000). 
Positive 
• Petersen and Rajan (1994); 
Angelini et al. (1998); Harhoff 
and Korting (1998); Akhavein 
et al. (2004). 
Positive 
• Strahan (1999). 
Positive 
• Strahan (1999). 
Positive 
• Strahan (1999). 
Positive 
• Strahan (1999). 
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Negative 
• Petersen and Rajan (1994); 
Blackwell and Winters (1997); 
Harhoff and Korting (1998); 
Strahan (1999); Degryse and 
Cayseele (2000); Goodwin and 
Mishra (2000); Keasey and 
Watson (2000). 
Negative 
• Berger and Udell (1995); 
Strahan (1999). 
Negative 
• Strahan (1999). 
Positive 
• Keasey and Watson (2000). 
Negative 
• Strahan (1999). 
Negative 
• Strahan (1999). 
Table 2.6: Factors influencing the credit availability and cost of credit (Cont) 
Factors 
- Collateral requirement 
Relationship factors 
- Duration of the relationship 
- BOlTowing concentration ratio 
- No. ofbolTowing bank 
- Housebank status 
Dummy variables 
- Loan type 
- Loan size 
Credit availability 
(See Table 2.5) 
Negative 
• Petersen and Rajan (1994); 
Harhoff and Korting (1998); 
Angelini et al. (1998). 
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Cost of credit 
Negative 
• Degryse and Cayseele (2000); 
Keasey and Watson (2000). 
Positive 
• Berger and Udell (1995); 
Blackwell and Winters (1997); 
Athavale and Edmister (1999); 
Strahan (1999); Bodenhom 
(2003). 
(See Table 2.5) 
Negative 
• Blackwell and Winters (1997). 
Positive 
• Petersen and Rajan (1994). 
Negative 
• Degryse and Cayseele (2000); 
Degryse and Ongena (2005). 
Negative (Long-term loan) 
• Goodwin and Mishra (2000); 
Degryse and Cayseele (2000). 
Negative 
• Strahan (1999); Degryse and 
Cayseele (2000); Keasey and 
Watson (2000); Bodenhom 
(2003); Degryse and Ongena 
(2005). 
Positive 
• Goodwin and Mishra (2000). 
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the research methodology. The research models and the variables 
used in the models are presented and discussed in the first section. The estimation 
techniques are discussed in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 provides the fundamental concept of 
the artificial neural networks and illustrates the networks' topologies. The data collection 
and the characteristics of borrowers and loans are discussed in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, 
respectively. 
3.1 Research models 
According to the banking literature discussed in Chapter 2, bank lending decision (credit 
scoring), credit availability, and loan pricing models are functions of borrower 
characteristics, credit risk proxies, relationship indicators, and dummy variables (see 
equation 3.1,3.2, and 3.3). 
Lending decision = f (Borrower characteristics, Credit risk proxies, 
Relationship indicators, Dummy variables) (3.1) 
Credit availability = f (Borrower characteristics, Credit risk proxies, 
Relationship indicators, Dummy variables) (3.2) 
Loan price = f (Borrower characteristics, Credit risk proxies, 
where 
Relationship indicators, Dummy variables) (3.3) 
Dependent variables are: 
• Lending decision = 1 if loan is paid (good loan or creditworthiness); 0 if 
loan is default (bad loan or not credit worthiness), 
• Credit availability = Volume ofloan granted (in Thai baht), 
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• Loan price = Interest rate charged, excluding application fee, borrowing fee, 
and other fees; 
Borrower characteristics include: 
• Asset (+, +, -) = Total asset value prior to credit decision (in Thai baht), 
• Age (+, +, -) = Age of the borrower (in years), 
• Education (+, +, -) = 0 if the highest qualification of the borrower is primary 
school or lower; 1 otherwise; 
Credit risk proxies include: 
• Collateral (+1-, +1-, +1-) = Total value of collateral pledged to the lending 
bank (in Thai baht), 
• Current ratio (+, +, -) = Current assets divided by current liabilities 
(measures liquidity), 
• Return on asset (+, +, -) = Net return divided by total assets (measures 
profitability), 
• Leverage ratio (-, -, +) = Total liabilities divided by total assets (measures 
solvency), 
• Capital turnover ratio (+, +, -) = Gross Income divided by total assets 
(measures efficiency), 
• Debt repayment ratio (-, -, +) = Total debt and interest payment divided by 
total income (measures repayment ability); 
Relationship indicators include: 
• Borrowing from others (-, -, +) = 1 if the borrower has an outstanding debt 
with other financial sources; 0 if the borrower borrows from only one bank, 
• Duration (+, +, -) = The number of years of bank-borrower relationship 
prior to the credit decision; 
Dummy variables include: 
• Sector = 1 for agricultural loan; 0 for non-agricultural loan, 
• Province = Dummy variables for province - Province j. (1 if the observation 
is in province j; 0 otherwise), 
• Major production = Dummy variables for major production - Horticulture, 
Orchard/Vegetable, Livestock/Aquaculture, and Others (1 if the borrower's 
major production is in the identified major production group; 0 otherwise), 
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• Loan type = Dummy variables for loan type - Cash credit loan, Short-term 
loan (shorter than 12 months), Medium-term loan (between 1 to 5 years), 
and Long-term loan (longer than 5 years) (1 if the loan contract belongs to a 
specific loan type; 0 otherwise), 
• Loan size = Dummy variables for loan size - Small loan (less than 0.1 
million baht), Medium loan (between 0.1 to 1 million baht), and Large loan 
(more than 1 million baht) (1 if the amount of credit is categorized into a 
particular size; 0 otherwise)4, 
• Lending bank = Dummy variables for lending bank - Bank k. (1 if loan is 
granted by bank k; 0 otherwise), 
• Lending year = Dummy variables for lending year (1 for the year of 
observation; 0 otherwise). 
The sets of three positive and negative signs in the above specification indicate the 
hypothesized signs of the variable on bank lending decision, credit availability, and loan 
pricing models, respectively. For example, Asset (+, +, -) is positively related to the 
probability of a good loan, positively related to the loan amount, but negatively related to 
the loan price. 
Bank lending decision (credit scoring), credit availability, and loan pricing models are 
based on quantifiable information, information from the financial statements and historical 
data, rather than intangible information, such as borrower characteristics and reliability of 
the borrower, which is difficult to verify and quantify. However, the literature has 
primarily focused on the bank-borrower relationship that assists the bank to obtain such 
information. The proximity relationship between the bank and the borrower has shown to 
facilitate monitoring and screening, and can overcome problems of asymmetric 
information (Boot, 2000). Thus, it is important to integrate all relevant information into the 
models. 
The total asset value of the borrower (Asset) reflects the borrower's wealth. The lender 
generally prefers to lend to the borrower with higher level of wealth. According to 
Angelini et al. (1998), Cole (1998), and Degryse and Cayseele (2000), the variable Age is 
4 NZD 1 = 29.6791 baht (the exchange rate on 22 June 2005) 
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referred as the actual age of the borrowing finn. It represents the finn's experience in the 
business and also reflects the infonnation revealed to the public as a whole. This research 
focuses on the rural lending and the borrowers typically are individual borrower. Thus, the 
Age variable in this research refers to the age of the borrower and reflects the borrower's 
reputation and the different investment opportunities between young and old borrowers. 
Education indicates the literacy level of the borrower. 
Total value of collateral5 (Collateral) indicates whether the loan is secured or not, and 
shows the ability and intention to repay the loan by the borrower. A relatively high 
collateral value compared to the loan amount will make the loan less risky from the 
lender's point of view. The key financial ratios used in Credit risk proxies include Current 
ratio, Return on asset, Leverage ratio, Capital turnover ratio, and Debt repayment ratio. 
They are employed to represent liquidity, profitability, solvency, efficiency, and repayment 
ability of the borrower, respectively. The purpose of using the financial variables in the 
models is to control for the observable risk of the borrower that detennine the bank lending 
decision, amount of credit granted and the loan rate. Assuming that all else is equal, a 
riskier borrower is expected to have a lower probability of a good loan, receive a smaller 
amount of credit, and pay a higher loan rate. 
Borrowing from others is a dummy variable indicating whether the borrower has an 
alternative source of funds or not. If the borrower has only a single source of funds, the 
borrower might also buy other products and services from the bank. Therefore, the bank 
could obtain more infonnation about the borrower's financial status. These sources of 
infonnation should reduce the monitoring costs of the bank, the expected cost of the loan, 
and the loan rate6 (Degryse and Cayseele, 2000). The length of bank-borrower relationship 
(Duration) is another measurement of the relationship. The relationship between the bank 
and the borrower starts when the borrower buys a product from the bank. Duration 
indicates the proximity relationship between the bank and the borrower. 
5 A fi.llther distinction can be made between "inside coJlateral" (assets of the borrower) and "outside 
collateral" (assets belong to another party). However, the data limitations may prevent a clear distinction 
between inside and outside coJlateral. Therefore, in this research, it is assumed that there is no different 
between inside and outside collateral. 
6 Since the borrower also buys the other products and services from the bank, the bargaining power of the 
borrower would increase. In other words, cross-subsidization could negatively influence the loan rate 
(Degryse and Cayseele, 2000). 
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Dummy variables are included to describe the systematic effects relating to the type of 
borrower and the type of contract. These variables include Sector, Province, Major 
production, Loan type, Loan size, and Lending bank. Since it is generally assumed that an 
agricultural loan is more risky than non-agricultural loan, it is expected that an agricultural 
loan will be charged at a higher lending rate. Province dummy variables are included to 
account for the province effect, because different provinces have different risk levels, due 
to the different economic, social, and environmental conditions of each province. Lending 
bank and Lending year dummy variables are also included to control for the variation that 
might occur from the banks and to control for the business cycle effects, respectively. 
Major production, Loan type, and Loan size dummy variables are hypothesized to 
influence bank lending decision, credit availability, and loan price. For example, the 
borrower who has a cash crop (Horticulture) as their major production would require a 
smaller amount of credit than the other farm types, and the contract term for the cash crop 
production is a short-term contract. Thus, this group of borrowers would have a higher 
probability to obtain a loan and should be charged a lower loan rate. This is because the 
Short-term loan is less risky than Medium-term or Long-term loan, and the lending risk is 
relatively low. In contrast, if the major production of the borrowers is either Orchard or 
Livestock, which may need a Large and Long-term loan, they would be expected to pay a 
higher loan rate. 
With reference to the literature, it is expected that most of the variables in Borrower 
characteristics, Credit risk proxies and Relationship indicators, except Collateral, 
Leverage ratio, Debt repayment ratio and Borrowing from others, should have a positive 
relationship with the lending decision (probability of a good loan) and the availability of 
credit (volume of credit), but a negative relationship with the loan price (interest rate 
charge). Conversely, Leverage ratio, Debt repayment ratio and Borrowing from others 
would have a positive relationship with the interest rate charge and a negative relationship 
with the lending decision and the availability of credit (see Turvey and Brown, 1990; 
Petersen and Raj an, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Degryse and Cayseele; 2000). 
The literature shows that collateral can mitigate moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems in loan contracting (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Chan and Thakor, 1987). The good 
borrowers signal their better prospect through their willingness to pledge collateral. Thus, 
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Collateral should increase the availability of credit and decrease the price of credit. 
However, the collateralized loans are riskier and are charged higher loan rates than 
uncollateralized loans (see Berger and Udell, 1990; Blackwell and Winters, 1997; Athavale 
and Edmister, 1999; Bodenhom, 2003). Therefore, its impact on lending decision, credit 
availability and credit price is ambiguous. 
3.2 Estimation techniques 
The bank lending decision (credit scoring) model will be analyzed using logistic regression 
and artificial neural networks, while both credit availability and loan pricing models will 
be estimated by multiple linear regression analysis and artificial neural networks technique. 
The bank lending decision model is given as follows (Gujarati, 1995): 
where 
(3.4) 
Yj equals to 1 if loan is paid (good loan); 0 if loan is default (bad loan); 
Pj is the estimated probability of a good loan (high value of Pj implies low 
default risk); 
a and Pj are an intercept term and parameters, respectively. 
X jj are Borrower characteristics, Credit risk proxies, Relationship indicators 
and Dummy variables; 
Ej is the error term, 
Equation 3.4 represents the cumulative logistic distribution function. If Pi is the probability 
of a good loan, then, the probability of a bad loan or ( I-Pi) given as follows: 
1 
(I-P)=-
I l+ez; 
(3.5) 
Therefore, the odds ratio in favo~ of a good loan or ( Pi ) can be written as follows: 
I-Pi 
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(3.6) 
Taking the natural log on equation 3.6 becomes: 
Z. = In(~) = a. + " AX .. +8. 
1 1- P. .L.Jl'J IJ 1 
1 
(3.7) 
where Zj is the natural logarithm of the 'odds ratio in favor of a good loan. 
The model is a binary choice model and the use of ordinary least squares estimation 
technique is inappropriate (Maddala, 1983). Thus, to obtain efficient parameter estimates, 
the maximum likelihood estimation tec1mique is applied to the logistic regression. The 
likelihood function L for the model is given as follows (Maddala, 2001): 
L= ITPi IT(1-Pi ) (3.8) 
Yi =) Yi=O 
From equation 3.7, the probability of a good loan can be obtained by the following 
equation (Greene, 1997): 
eZi 
p. =Prob(Y. =IIX .. ) =-
1 1 IJ 1 + eZi (3.9) 
The credit availability and loan pricing models are given as follow (see equation 3.10): 
where 
(3.10) 
Yj is volume of credit grant or interest rate charge; 
a. and Pi are an intercept term and the parameters, respectively; 
Xij are Borrower characteristics, Credit risk proxies, Relationship indicators 
and Dummy variables; 
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Ej is the error term. 
To estimate the credit availability and loan pricing models, the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method is utilized. 
Four different types of artificial neural networks will be applied in this research including 
multi-layer feed-forward neural network (MLFN) with one hidden layer, Ward network 
(WN), general regression neural network (GRNN) and probabilistic neural network (PNN). 
However, the PNN is only applicable to the lending decision model since it is a special 
neural network for choice modeling. Therefore, only the first three networks will be 
applied with credit availability and loan pricing models. 
To develop the bank lending decision (credit scoring), credit availability (volume of credit) 
and loan pricing (interest rate charge) models via the artificial neural networks technique, 
the same set of dependent and independent variables used in the logistic and multiple 
regression models are utilized and the neural networks software package, NeuroShe112, is 
used to construct the models. 
To evaluate and compare the forecast accuracy between different estimation techniques for 
all the models, the out-of-sample forecasting procedure will be employed. The sample size 
will be randomly divided into two different sets, namely the "estimation set" and the 
"forecasting set", or the "training set" and the "production set". The estimation and the 
forecasting sets contain 80% and 20% of the total sample, respectively. The forecast 
classification result, R-squared (R2) and Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) will be 
calculated and compared (see equation 3.11 and 3.12)7. The model with a higher 
percentage correct on the forecast classification, higher R2 and lower RMSE is considered 
to be a relatively superior model. 
7 The forecast classification (at cut-off point = 0.5) will be applied only to the bank lending decision model 
since it is a binary choice model, while both R 2 and RMSE will be applied to both credit availability and loan 
pricing models. 
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where 
t(yi-yi) 
R2 =1_-"i=...!.1 ___ _ 
t(Yi -YY 
i=l 
1 II ( " \2 
RMSE = - L Yi - Yi ) 
n i=l 
Yi is actual value (volume of credit or interest rate charge); 
Y is mean value ofYj; 
Yi is estimated value ofYi; 
n is the number of observations on the forecasting set. 
3.3 Artificial neural networks (ANN) 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
Statistical estimation techniques and artificial neural networks are closely related to each 
other. The major difference between them is that the statistical techniques have 
concentrated on linear problems that are relatively tractable, while neural network deals 
mainly with non-linear problems (Smith, 1996). 
Neural computing inspired by the understanding of the biological nervous system and 
artificial neural networks (ANN) are computing models that imitate the human brain's 
working and learning processes (Martin and Jain, 1999). The basic functional element in 
biological and artificial systems are simple processing units called neurons, or nodes in 
artificial systems, which communicate by sending signals to each other through a large 
number of interconnections. These interconnections are the synapses in the biological 
systems (see Figure 3.1) and weighted connections in the artificial systems, Wij in Figure 
3.2. Each neuron in biological system and each node in artificial systems perform a 
relatively straightforward function. It obtains the inputs from other neurons (nodes) or 
external sources (Xi in Figure 3.2) and processes them into an output signal, which is 
transferred to other units (Pham and Liu, 1995). 
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Figure 3.1: Biological neuron 
Source: Anonymous 
Figure 3.2: Artificial neuron and structure of a computational unit (node j) 
Source: Modified from Coakley and Brown (2000) 
Ollqmt 
Ei), \v .. x. ') J\..~ 1J"'1, 
A biological neuron collects information via its dendrites. The information is processed by 
the soma and the neuron's axon transfers the signal to other neurons. An artificial neuron 
consists of two main components: a summation and a transfer function. The summation 
function sums up all the input signals from each connection (Xi) times the value of the 
connection weight between connection i and node j (Wij) (see Figure 3.2). Following the 
summation of the inputs, the output for node j is determined by applying a transfer function 
Fj, also known as the activation function, to the summation value (see equation 3.13 and 
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3.14). The output is then transfelTed to the other artificial neurons in next layer of the 
network. 
where 
(3.13) 
(3.14) 
Uj is output for node j; 
Fj is a transfer function in different functional fonns: linear functions, linear 
threshold functions, step linear functions, sigmoid function, Gaussian functions 
and etc (Coakley and Brown, 2000). 
The biological nervous system is systematized around a main nervous center, the brain. 
Information from outside or inside of the body arrives through specific sensory routes and 
are only perceptible to specific sensory regions located in definite area of the brain, where 
they are recognized, processed, and interpreted. These areas intelTelate with many other 
regions of the brain and the decision is made to respond to the stimulus that has been 
received. The parallel processing of infonnation by the brain makes it possible to analyze 
multiple pieces of data from various sources at the same time (Tarasenko, 1998). 
Similarly, an artificial neural network consists of three main layers: input layer, hidden 
layer(s) and output layer. Generally, at one end of the network, the input layer, information 
or data is received. Thus, each neuron in the input layer brings the value of one 
independent variable into the network. Hidden layer(s), where the information is 
recognized, processed and interpreted, is always line in the middle of the network and may 
have more than one hidden layer. At the other end, the output layer, the network produces 
responses or outputs. Basically, one dependent variable is processed by one output node 
(see Figure 3.3). 
The way neurons are organized and connected is known as the network's architecture that 
can vary from a single hidden layer to a complex web of neurons' clusters. Hidden layers 
in a neural network are known as feature detectors and different transfer functions applied 
to hidden layer groups detect different features in a pattern processed through a network. A 
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network design may use, for example, linear function, logistic function and Gaussian 
function on three different hidden groups. The output layer will receive various views of 
the data and the mixture of the functions synchronizes in the output layer which may lead 
to better classification and prediction (Ward System Group Inc., 1993). 
Figure 3.3: The artificial neural network structure with two hidden layers 
Source: Coakley and Brown (2000) 
The use of the neural network model is similar to the process utilized in building the 
statistical model. However, the neural network must first be trained from a set of data. 
Training begins with random values assigned to the weights on the interconnections and 
proceeds iteratively. Weights can be adjusted after the network has processed each 
example (example-by-example learning), or after all the examples have been processed 
(epoch-base training). The later technique is commonly used. 
Thus, for a particular input, an output is produced from the network. The network then 
compares the network output to the actual output. The accuracy of this value is determined 
by the total mean square error (see equation 3.15) and back-propagation error correction 
method is used to reduce prediction errors; this is accomplished through the adjustment of 
the connection weights. As the iterative process of incremental adjustments continues, the 
weights gradually converge on the optimal set of values. Many epochs are required before 
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the training is completed. This estimation technique, so called "back-propagation" 
technique, is commonly used in many types of artificial neural networks. 
where 
INK( A\2 
E = 2" ~ t; Y ik - Yik} 
NK 
Yik is the kth actual output for the nth sample; 
Yik is the kth network output for the nth sample; 
N is the number of example in the data set; 
K is the number of outputs of the network; 
(3.15) 
Several criterions can be used to decide when to stop the training process. These include: 
stopping after a certain number of learning epochs; stopping when the error (difference 
between the network output and the actual value) reaches a certain level; stopping after a 
certain number of examples since the minimum error has exceeded a specified number 
(Ward System Group Inc., 1993). 
Generally, the number of dependent and independent variables determine the number of 
output and input neurons, respectively, while the number of hidden layers and nodes that 
are included in each hidden layer must be decided by the network developer. This decision 
determines the complexity of the mapping function and the performance of the network. If 
too many nodes are used, the network will tend to memorize the problem, and can not be 
generalized later. On the other hand, if too few nodes are used, the network will generalize 
well, but may not have enough power to learn the patterns adequately. Unfortunately, there 
is little theory to support the process for determining of the optimal number of hidden 
layers and nodes, and the optimal internal error threshold (Ward Systems Group Inc., 1993 
and Lenk et aI., 1997). Therefore, a trial-and-error process is usually applied to find the 
optimal artificial neural network model. 
3.3.1 Multi-layer feed-forward neural network (MLFN) 
The artificial neural network that is widely used is called the multi-layer feed-forward 
neural network (MLFN). The information in MLFN flows in the direction from the origin 
-53-
to the destination, one catmot return to the origin, and the computational units are grouped 
into 3 main layers (input, hidden, and output layers) (Hu et aI., 1999). Figure 3.4 shows the 
structure of the multi-layer feed-forward neural network with one hidden layer and one 
network output, that is the most frequently used structure in many literatures8. Since the 
output of one layer is an input to the following layer, the output of the network can be 
exhibited algebraically as shown in equation 3.16. 
where 
(3.16) 
o is the output of the network (i.e. bank's lending decision, volume of credit 
granted or loan price); 
F is the transfer function in the output node; 
Wi}') and WF) are connection weights from input layer (node i) to hidden layer 
(node j) and from hidden layer (node j) to output layer, respectively. 
Figure 3.4: MLFN structure with one hidden layer and one network output 
Input layer Pattern layer Output layer 
Source: Modified from West et al. (1997), and Gradojevic and Yang (2000) 
8 Ward Systems Group Inc. (1993) argues that the three-layer Back-propagation network with standard 
connections is suitable for almost all problems. 
-54-
3.3.2 Ward network (WN) 
Since the hidden layer(s) and the activation function(s) in a neural network detennine how 
well a problem can be learned, Ward Systems Group Inc. (1993) has invented the Back-
propagation network architectures with multiple hidden slaps in the hidden layer, so called 
Ward Networks. The networks allow the different hidden slaps to use different activation 
functions. For example, a network design may use a Gaussian function on one hidden slap 
to detect features in the mid-range of the data and use a Gaussian complement in another 
hidden slap to detect features from the upper and lower extremes of the data. Thus, the 
network is expected to provide a better prediction result, since it offers two way of viewing 
the data. 
The Ward network structure applied in this research includes the network with three 
hidden slabs (see Figure 3.5). The Ward network is a regular three-layer back-propagation 
network, but there are 3 slabs with 3 different activation functions in the hidden layer. 
Figure 3.5: Ward network (3 hidden slaps with different activation functions) 
(Slab 1) 
r----.. ~I0 1--------, 
o 
• • • o o • 
r---------i ... 1 • 1--+10 
o • • • o 
• o 
(Slab 3) 
'---.101--------' 
(Slab 2) 
Output 
Input layer Hidden layer Output layer 
Source: Modified from Ward Systems Group Inc. (1993) 
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3.3.3 Probabilistic neural network (PNN) 
The PNN originally proposed by Specht (1990) is basically a classification network. Its 
general stmcture consists of 4 layers - an input layer, a pattern layer (the first hidden layer), 
a summation layer (the second hidden layer) and an output layer (see Figure 3.6)9. 
PNN is conceptually based on the Bayesian classifier statistical principle. According to the 
Bayesian classification theorem, X will be classified into class A, if the inequality in 
equation 3.17 holds (Albanis and Batchelor, 1999): 
(3.17) 
where X is the input vector to be classified; 
hA and hB are prior probabilities for class A and B; 
CA and CB are costs ofmisclassification for class A and B; 
fA(X) and fB(X) are probabilities of X given the density function of class A and 
B, respectively. 
Figure 3.6: The probabilistic neural network (PNN) architecture 
Input units Pattern units Summation units Output unit 
Source: Modified from Specht (1990) 
9 Please note that PNN is not limited to the binary choice classification problem. It also can perform the multi 
level classifications. Since the bank lending decision is binary (accept or reject the loan application), the 
discussion in this research is based only on the binary-choice case. 
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To detennine the class, the probability density function is estimated by a non-parametric 
estimation method developed by Parzen (1962) and extended by Cacoulos (1966). The 
joint probability density function for a set of p variables can be expressed as follows (Chen 
et al., 2003): 
where 
(3.18) 
P is the number of variables in the input vector X; 
nA is the number of training samples which belongs to class A; 
UAj is the /h training sample in class A (the centre of the /h pattern unit of the A 
class); 
0' is a smoothing parameter lO• 
The working process of the PNN begins with the input layer, where the inputs are 
distributed to the pattern units. Then, the pattern unit, which is required for every training 
pattern, is used to memorize each training sample and estimate the contribution of a 
particular pattern to the probability density function (PDF). The summation layer 
comprises of a group of computational units with the number equal to the total number of 
classes. Each summation unit that delicate to a single class sums the pattern layer units 
corresponding to that summation unit's class. Finally, the output neuron(s), which is a 
threshold discriminator, chooses the class with the largest response to the inputs (Etheridge 
and Sriram, 1997; Albanis and Batchelor, 1999). 
Figure 3.7 provides an illustrative example of the PNN working principle. In Figure 3.7 A, 
there are four pattern units centred at four dots - A, B, C, and D. The black dots belong to 
class 'Y and the white dots belong to class u. The radii of the gray areas centred at these four 
dots are the square root of the variance, which is used to enhance the probability 
contribution from the samples of the same class and weaken the probability contribution 
from the sample of different classes. The square represents a testing sample, M. The PNN 
10 In equation 3.18 the probability density function (PDF) is estimated with the simple covariance matrix cr2I, 
where I is the identity matrix. However, for the Adaptive PNN, the PDF is estimated with a full covariance 
matrix. Therefore, a separate smoothing parameter is adapted for each measurement dimension. Adaptive 
PNN usually outperforms the basic PNN in term of generalization accuracy. The price paid for these 
improvements is increased training time (Specht, 1996). 
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calculates the probability contributions ofthis sample to the four pattern units and sums the 
probability density functions (PDFs) according to different class labels of the pattern units. 
As shown in Figure 3.7B, the test sample, M, is fed into the four pattern units - A, B, C, 
and D, respectively. Each of unit is an independent and identical Gaussian distribution, and 
each of them calculates a contribution from the testing sample, M, to its PDF. The filled 
rectangles to the left of the pattern units in Figure 3. 7B represent the contributions to the 
PDFs. The larger the contribution, the higher the rectangle. Then, the PDFs are summed to 
different class units a and 'Y, respectively. The results from the summation are called the 
conditional probability statistics. Because the testing sample has more contribution to class 
'Y than that to class a, the filled rectangle aside the class unit 'Y is larger than the aside class 
a. Thus, the testing pattern M belongs to 'Y (Yang et aI., 1999: p 69-70). 
Figure 3.7: An illustration of the working principle ofa simple PNN model 
(a) 
Source: Yang et al.(1999) 
decision = 'Y 
(b) 
From the above example, it can be seen that the PNN is simpler and more intuitive than the 
back-propagation neural networks and should not be regarded as a "black box". Further, it 
should be noted that there are two important factors determining the performance of a PNN 
model: the positions of the pattern units and smoothing parameter. The pattern units are 
usually set by the training samples, but the function of the smoothing parameter should be 
optimally selected to minimize the misclassification rate (Yang et aI., 1999). However, in 
practice, to choose an optimal smoothing parameter is not easy and straightforward, 
especially for the Adaptive PNN that needs to discover the best combination of a's. 
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Therefore, in order to obtain the optimal value for the smoothing parameter, the PNN 
networks in this research are trained by the genetic adaptive learning (genetic algorithm) II. 
3.3.4 General regression neural network (GRNN) 
The general regression neural network (GRNN) is a memory-based feed-forward network 
originally developed in the statistics literature by Nadaraya (1964) known as the Nadaraya-
Watson kernel regression. The GRNN is based on nonlinear (kernel) regression theory. As 
its name implies, GRNN can estimate any arbitrary function between input and output 
vectors, drawing the function approximation directly from the historical data. Furthermore, 
it is consistent; that is, the estimation error approaches zero when the sample size becomes 
large (Wassennan, 1993). 
The topology of the GRNN is shown in Figure 3.8. The network consists of four layers: the 
input layer, pattern layer (the first hidden layer), the summation layer (the second hidden 
layer), and the output layer. 
Figure 3.8: Topology of the general regression neural network 
Input units Pattern units Summation units Output unit 
Source: Modified from Specht (1991) 
II Iterative algorithm can be used to train the PNN networks and generally the training is faster than using the 
genetic adaptive option. However, the iterative option should be applied when all of the input variables have 
the same impact on the output prediction. Since the input variables are of different types and some of them 
may have more of an impact on predicting the output than the others, using genetic adaptive learning to train 
the network should be more appropriate. This is because the genetic algorithm has the ability to search for the 
appropriate individual smoothing factors for each input as well as an overall smoothing factor (Ward Systems 
Group Inc., 1993). 
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In the GRNN model, the estimation of a dependent variable y (output) with respect to a 
given vector of independent variables X (inputs) can be regarded as finding the conditional 
mean ofy given by X (also called the regression ofy on X)12. Equation 19 summarizes this 
statistical concept (Wasserman, 1993): 
where 
E[ylxJ= (yf(X,y)dy 
(f(X,y)dy 
y is the output value estimated by GRNN; 
X is the input vector for the estimation of y; 
(3.19) 
E [Y IX] is the conditional mean of the output y given by an input vector X; 
f(X, y) is the joint probability density function (PDF) of X and y. 
Specht (1991) shows that y can be estimated optimally as follows: 
where 
n 
LYj8j 
y=~i=:.!...~I __ (3.20) 
L8 j 
j=l 
-(X-Vj)'(X-Vj) 
8. =e 
I 
(or outputs of the pattern units) (3.21) 
Yi is the target (desired) output corresponding to input training vector Xi; 
X and Ui are the input vector and the training vector i (or the centre of the 
pattern unit i), respectively; 
0' is the smoothing parameter13 . 
From Figure 3.8, the input layer is responsible for the reception of information. The 
number of input units is equal to the number of input variables. Then, the inputs are 
12 Although the GRNN can provide a multivariate vector of outputs without loss of generality, the case of 
univariate output is described here for simplicity, 
13 Similar to the Adaptive PNN, the Adaptive GRNN is a separate smoothing parameter adapted for each 
measurement dimension. The adaptation can greatly improve the estimation accuracy of the model. 
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presented to the second layer of processing neurons called pattern units. There is a unique 
pattern unit for each of training pattern. A pattern unit is used to combine and process the 
data in a systematic fashion such that the relationship between the input and the proper 
response is memorized. The outputs of the pattern units, 8j (see equation 3.21), are 
subsequently fOlwarded to the summation layer. Theoretically, there are two different 
types of processing neurons in the summation layer. They are the weighted summation unit 
(or numerator neuron) and the simple arithmetic summation unit (or denominator neuron). 
After the sums are calculated, they are sent to the output unit. To obtain the GRNN 
regression output (y), the output unit performs a simple division of the signal coming from 
the weighted summation unit by the signal coming from the arithmetic summation unit (see 
equation 3.20) (Leung et aI., 2000; Amaral et aI, 2002; Chen and Leung, 2004)14. 
Similar to the PNN network, the GRNN reqmres supervised training. The network 
performs learning by examining the relationship between each pair of input vector X and 
the observed corresponding output y, and finally construes the underlying function by 
summarizing all of these relationships (Leung et aI., 2000). According to equation 3.21, the 
smoothing parameter is regarded as the crucial factor to the performance of the GRNN. 
Therefore, to search for the optimal smoothing parameter, which minimizes the mean 
squared error, the genetic adaptive learning (genetic algorithm) is applied on the network 
training process. 
3.3.5 Genetic algorithms (GAs) 
Genetic algorithms are a means by which machines can emulate the mechanisms of 
biological genetics and natural selection. This involves searching high-dimensional spaces 
for superior solutions, if they are not yet optimal. The algorithms are simple, robust, and 
general; no knowledge of the search spaces is assumed (Wasserman, 1993). Therefore, 
they are widely used in many applications requiring the optimization of a certain multi-
dimensional function, such as neural networks. 
14 In case of multivariate outputs, the number of weighted summation unit is always the same as the number 
of the GRNN output units. Each of the output units is connected only to its corresponding weighted 
summation unit and to the simple arithmetic summation unit. Thus, the output units divide its corresponding 
weighted summation unit by the arithmetic summation unit to obtain the network outputs 
(Yj = IYij8 j /I8 j ). 
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Genetic algorithms were first proposed by John Holland (1975) as an algorithmic concept 
based on a Darwinian-type survival-of-the fittest strategy with sexual reproduction, where 
stronger individuals in the population have a higher chance of creating offspring. A basic 
GA comprises three fundamental genetic operations found in natural genetics to guide their 
trek through the search space: selection, crossover, and mutation. These operations are 
used to modify the chosen solutions and select the most appropriate offspring to pass on to 
succeeding generations. GAs consider many points in the search space simultaneously and 
have been found to provide a rapid convergence to the global optimum solution in many 
types of problems; in other words, they usually exhibit a reduced chance of converging to 
local minima (Pham and Liu, 1995; Martin and Jain, 1999). 
In computing terms, a GA maps a problem onto a set of binary strings (zeros and ones), 
and each string signifying a possible solution. Various portions of the bit-stings represent 
the parameters in the search problem. Then, the GA manipulates the most promising string 
in searching for improved solutions. A GA operates typically through a simple cycle of 
four stages (May, 1996): 
1. Creation of population of strings. 
2. Evaluation of each string. 
3. Selection of best strings. 
4. Genetic manipulation, to create the new population of strings. 
In the first stage, the algorithm starts with generating an initial population of potential 
solutions for being a starting point for the search process. Each element in the population is 
encoded into a string (or chromosome), to be manipulated by the genetic operators. In the 
second stage, the performance or fitness of each individual string from the current 
population is evaluated. Then, pairs of individuals are selected to mate with each other to 
form the offspring, which then form the next generation. Selection is based on the survival-
of-the fittest strategy, where the strings with high fitness values (i.e. good solutions to the 
optimization problem under consideration) receive larger numbers of copies in the new 
population (May, 1996). The most commonly used strategy to select pairs of individuals is 
the method of roulette-wheel selection, in which every string is assigned a slot in a 
simulated wheel sized in proportionate to the string's relative fitness (Pj)lS. This ensures 
15 P j = F j / :E F j where F j is the fitness value of string i. 
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that highly fit strings have a greater probability to be selected to fonn the next generation 
through the genetic manipulation, crossover and mutation (Martin and Jain, 1999). 
The crossover operator takes two parent strings and swaps part of their genetic infonnation 
(bit-value) to produce two new strings (see Figure 3.9a). After the crossover point has been 
randomly chosen, portions of the parent strings are interchanged to produce the new 
offspring. The two individuals (children) resulting from each crossover operation will now 
be subjected to the mutation operator in the final step in fonning the new generation. The 
mutation operator reverses one or more bit values at randomly selected locations in 
randomly selected strings according to a specified mutation probability (see Figure 3.9b). 
This operation is inspired by the possibility that the initially defined population might not 
contain all the infonnation necessary to solve the problem. Thus, it forces the algorithm to 
search new areas, prevents the premature convergence and helps to find the global optimal 
solution (Pham and Liu, 1995). 
Figure 3.9: (a) Crossover operation; (b) Mutation operation 
(a) 
(b) 
In sum, GAs could surpass the other optimization techniques because they differ from the 
others in the following ways (Goldberg, 1989; Wassennan, 1993): 
1. GAs work with a coding of the parameter set, not the parameters themselves. 
2. GAs search from a population of the points, not a simple point. 
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3. Gas operate without any knowledge of the search space and mainly use payoff 
(objective function) information. No derivatives are calculated. 
4. GAs use probability transition rules, not deterministic rules. 
3.3.6 Applications of ANN in economics and finance 
The artificial neural networks (ANNs) have been successfully employed in many different 
disciplines, including biology, psychology, statistics, mathematics, medical science, and 
computer science. However, the ANNs have been gaining popularity as a standard 
analytical tool in business, economics, and finance recent year. For example, in economics 
and finance disciplines, the ANNs have been applied to generalization problems including 
classification and prediction problems (West et aI., 1997; Roa and Ali, 2002; DeTIENNE 
et aI., 2003). 
According to the literature, the ANNs have been successfully used for house price 
prediction (Tay and Ho, 1991; McCluskey, 1996; Limsombunchai et aI., 2004), commodity 
price prediction (Khozadi et aI., 1995), consumer choice prediction (West et aI., 1997; Gan 
et aI., 2005), bankruptcy prediction (Luther, 1998), credit evaluation (Altman et aI. 1994; 
Barneyet aI., 2000; Lee and Jung, 1999; Wu and Wang 2000) (see section 2.5), predicting 
insurance losses (Kitchens et aI., 2002), predicting bond ratings (Albanis and Batchelor, 
1999), forecasting returns on the stock markets (Shachmurove and Witkowska, 2000; Yim, 
2002), exchange rate forecasting (Gradojevic and Yang, 2000; Leung et aI., 2000), and 
macroeconomic forecasting (Gonzalez, 2000). 
Tay and Ho (1991) used a large sample data from the apartment sector in Singapore and 
found that a neural network model performs better than a multiple regression model in 
estimating the apartment value. The authors conclude that the neural network can generate 
valuation patterns for "true" open market sales in the presence of some "noise" as a way of 
establishing a robust estimator. Similar results can be found in MaCluskey (1996) and 
Limsombunchai et aI. (2004) studies. 
Kohzadi et al. (1995) compared the predictive power of the neural network model against 
the ARIMA model on the commodity price prediction. The weekly com closing futures 
prices (US centslbushel) from the Chicago Board of Trade from January 1974 to October 
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1993 were used in their analysis. The results showed the neural network model to be more 
accurate than the ARIMA. 
West et al. (1997) examined the predictive relationship between retail store image 
variables and consumer patronage behaviour toward three nationwide mass-merchandise 
retailers. The authors directly compared a neural network model with discriminant analysis 
and logistic regression. The authors concluded that the neural network models offer 
superior predictive capabilities over traditional statistic methods in predicting consumer 
choice. Gan et al. (2005) compared the performance of logistic regression against the 
neural network models with respect to their ability to identify consumer choice on banking 
channels. The authors found that the probabilistic neural network (PNN) was the best 
model for consumers' choices prediction. 
Luther (1998) developed a prediction model using artificial neural networks for predicting 
the outcome of bankruptcy, based on the firm's financial ratios at the time of filing for 
Chapter 11. The data set included 104 firms that filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 and 
had their case decided before December 1992. The authors argued that the ANNs model 
has significant higher prediction accuracy than the logit model in both training samples as 
well as the holdout samples at almost all cutoff points. In addition, the predictive accuracy 
of ANN was less sensitive to changes in the cutoff point in the model, thus making it a 
more robust technique than logit. 
Kitchens et al. (2002) utilized the artificial neural networks to predict automobile insurance 
losses. The data consisted of over 174,000 records from private passenger automobile 
policies in the United States. The authors found that the neural network was more 
successful in accurately categorizing a loss than the mUltiple regression and logit models, 
but it was less successful in categorizing the policies with no-losses. 
In Albanis and Batchelor (1999) study, the ability to classify long-term bond ratings of the 
linear discriminant analysis (LDA) and the probabilistic neural network (PNN) were 
compared and contrasted. The authors found that the PNN model classifies a number of 
bond issues into boundary rating groups significantly better than the LDA model while at 
the same time did not deviate from multivariate normality as opposed to the LDA model. 
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Shachmurove and Witkowska (2000) tested the dynamic interrelations among major world 
stock markets of Canada, France Gelmany, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States 
using the artificial neural networks. Their data was derived from daily stock market indices 
and covered the period from January 3, 1987 through November 28, 1994, with a total of 
2,064 observations per stock market. The authors concluded that the multi-layer feed-
forward neural network (MLFN) models were better able to foresee the daily stock returns 
than the traditional forecasting models, in term of low mean squared errors. 
Yim (2000) used the MLFN to predict Brazilian daily index returns. The predictive results 
from MLFN were compared with the structural time series models (STS) and the ARMA-
GARCH models. The author found that the MLFN is superior to ARMA-GARCH and STS 
models, and the volatility derived from the ARMA-GARCH model is useful as input to a 
neural network. 
In Gradojevic and Yang (2000) study, the ANNs were used to test for high-frequency 
Canada/U.S. dollar exchange rate forecasting. The authors reported that ANNs are 
consistently better in terms of the root mean squared error (RMSE) than random walk and 
linear models for the various out-of-sample set sizes. Moreover, the ANNs perform better 
than other models in terms of percentage of correctly predicted exchange rate changes. 
Leung et al. (2000) also used the ANNs to predict the monthly exchange rate of three 
currencies, British pound, Canadian dollar, and Japanese yen. The authors applied a 
specific neural network architecture called general regression neural network (GRNN) and 
compared its performance with the multi-layer feed-forward neural network and random 
walk models. The findings from their study showed that GRNN not only has a higher 
degree of forecasting accuracy but also performs statistically better than other evaluated 
models for different currencies. 
Gonzalez (2000) developed a prediction model using neural networks to forecast the 
Canada's real GDP growth. For both the in-sample and out-of-sample periods, the 
forecasting accuracy of the neural networks was found to be superior to a well-established 
linear regression model developed by the department of finance, with the error reduction 
ranging from 13 to 40 percent. However, various tests showed that there was little evidence 
that the improvement in forecasting accuracy was statistically significant. Therefore, the 
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authors argued that neural networks should complement standard econometric methods, 
rather than a substitute, since the method also presents various weaknesses. 
3.4 Data collection 
The data collection process turned out to be the greatest impediment because of the 
difficulty in accessing Thai banks data and information from their credit files. There are 
three major reasons why it is difficult to access the bank data completely. These are: 
1. According to the legislation on data and information, banks cannot release their 
customers' private information to the third party for any reason that is not related to 
the bank's business. 
2. Banks are afraid that if any data or information about their customers is made public, 
and someone could gain any private information advantage, they could be prosecuted 
by their customers. 
3. Banks fear that the results published from research could affect practices negatively. 
In December 2003, 8 banks that lend to the agricultural sector before and after the 1997 
financial crisis were approached to participate in this research. Only the Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) agreed to cooperate16 and allowed the 
researcher to disclose the bank's name. However, the researcher is not allowed to name the 
branches or provinces that are included in the sample and is not allowed to use the data set 
for any other research. Furthermore, only the credit files after the 1997 financial crisis are 
available and could be viewed. This is because the data files are retrieved from the "Credit 
BPR" (Credit Business Process Reengineering) database that was first implemented in 
1996 and they are incomplete17• 
To avoid the impact of the 1997 financial crisis on the bank business and to incorporate 
with non-agricultural lending which started in 199918, the data set included loans granted in 
2001 to 2003. About 3 to 5 provinces which had credit files available on Credit BPR 
16 56.10 percent of the total loan in the agricultural sector came fromBAAC, whereas 12.30, 10.80 and 9.40 
percent came from the village and city fund, commercial banks and agricultural co-operatives, respectively 
(OAE, 2003). 
17 In 1996, there were only 40 branches that were connected to and could access the Credit BPR database. 
The number of the connected branches increased from time to time and there were about 250 branches linked 
to the database in 2003. 
18 Prior to the year 1999, BAAC lending was in agriculture. Under the 1999 BAAC Act, BAAC was allowed 
to provide non-agricultural lending. 
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database during the predetermined 3 years period were randomly selected from each 
region. The data set was retrieved from between 99 to 136 braches in 17 provinces (see 
Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1: Number of provinces and branches included in the data set 
No. of 
No. of branches No. of branches 
Region (Agriculture} (Non-Agriculture} 
provmces 
2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 
1. Northern 4 33 34 34 24 34 32 
2. North-eastern 5 50 53 54 48 52 50 
3. Central and Eastern 5 29 30 25 13 24 21 
4. Southern and Western 3 18 19 16 14 17 14 
Total 17 130 136 129 99 127 117 
The total number of observations from the available data set was 242,168 samples, 
including 229,293 samples from agricultural lending and 12,875 samples from non-
agricultural lending (see Table 3.2). However, the data set contained missing data on many 
variables due to the recent implementation of the database system. As a result, the samples 
that have no personal details (such as age, education, home address, etc.), financial details 
(such ,as asset, farm income, expense, net income, etc.) and debt repayment history were 
discarded from the data set. The usable data set consists of 18,798 loan contracts with 
17,028 agricultural loan contracts and 1,770 non-agricultural loan contracts (see Table 3.3) 
All loans are credit services for individual borrowers and are under the normal loan scheme 
(excluding the government loans for specific projects). 
Table 3.2: The number of observations on the available data set 
Region 
Agriculture Non-Agriculture 
2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 
1. Northern 41,896 24,772 15,271 403 2,311 2,749 
2. North-eastern 63,402 20,540 15,675 725 1,456 2,481 
3. Central and Eastern 12,863 8,051 5,640 57 258 320 
4. Southern and Western 12,036 5,419 3,728 74 844 1,197 
Sum 130,197 58,782 40,314 1,259 4,869 6,747 
Total (N = 242, 168} NJ = 229,293 N2 = 12,875 
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Table 3.3: The number of observations on the usable data set 
Region 
Agriculture Non-Agriculture 
2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 
1. Northern 3,073 2,301 272 206 
2. North-eastern 325 1,836 1,918 168 337 
3. Central and Eastern 173 1,989 1,767 49 68 
4. Southern and Western 1,165 1,227 1,254 223 447 
Sum 1,663 8,125 7,240 712 1,058 
Total (N = 18,798) Nt = 17,028 N2 = 1,770 
3.5 BAAC and its role in rural financing 
The Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperative (BAAC) is a specialized bank. It 
was established by the 1966 BAAC Act, which has been amended several times, most 
recently in 1999, when lending mandate to former clients was expanded to cover non-farm 
activities. The BAAC's objective is to provide financial assistance to farmers, farmer 
associations, and agricultural cooperatives for the following purpose (ADB, 2002): 
1. To undertake farm and other farm-related activities. 
2. Other non-farm activities to increase income. 
3. To develop agricultural knowledge to increase income or improve the quality oflife of 
the farmers and their families. 
4. To carry out the project intended to promote or support agricultural activities in joint 
venture with the entrepreneur to increase income or improve quality of life of the 
farmers and their families. 
However, it should be noted that a limit of 20 percent is set on the total amount that BAAC 
may lend for items 3 and 4 above to ensure that sufficient funds are available for its main 
loan categories. 
Since its establishment in 1996, the founding statement on credit lending to farmers 
stipulated that there was no need to offer credit to every farmer in Thailand. ill the first 11 
year of its operation, the bank's rate of new clients was very low due to the limited capital 
(BAAC, 2002). In 1971, the bank started providing credit by group guarantee without 
collateral. Since then, the bank has expanded the credit services (Poramacom, 2000). Its 
main products during that time period include short-term and medium-term loans for 
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fanners and fanner institutions who used them as revolving credit for their production and 
agricultural investment. 
During 1976-1986 (the 2nd era) BAAC's capital increased as mandated by state policy, 
enabling the bank to grow at a fast pace. For example, one policy aimed at accelerating 
government agencies involvement in setting up fanning associations relied on BAAC to 
offer credit services to the newly established entities. The BAAC also took on the role in 
providing financial support services to projects set up under the government policy 
initiatives. These include the Crop Pledging Scheme, Long Tenn Loans for Agriculture for 
Fanner Project, and Long Tenn Loans for Investment in Fixed Assets for Fanner 
Institution Project (BAAC, 2002). 
The 3rd era of the bank (from 1987 to 2000) was marked by a recession in Thailand. Before 
1995, BAAC accelerated its effort to get more fanners as clients. The Entire Village 
Fanner Acceptance as Clients Scheme had been established and the bank increased the 
lending of long-tenn agriculture loans by cooperating with state agencies setting up special 
projects, which included the Beef Cow Raising Promotion and Dairy Cow Raising 
Promotion Project. In 1997, Thailand was hit by a severe financial and economic crisis. 
Most financial institutions faced liquidity problems and had a large volume of non-
productive loans due the effects of a change in the foreign exchange regime, wrong 
management policy and loose lending policy. Financial institutions involved in the 
agricultural were less affected than other banks but as time passed, the income of fanners 
began to suffer. During this period, BAAC began to target more deposits. The main 
deposits included Thaweechoke Savings Accounts and Thaweesin Savings Certificates. 
After 1997, the farmers joined in special government-assisted projects promoted by BAAC 
and state agencies to solve their huge debt problems (BAAC, 2002). 
In the 4th era (from 2001 to present), BAAC worked with state policy to help boost the 
grassroots economy and strengthen rural communities socially. These include setting up of 
the Debt Suspension and Debt Burden Reduction for Small-Scale Farmers Project, the 
Rural Village Fund Project, and the Community Enterprise Credit for One Tambon One 
Product Policy Support Project. During this period, BAAC changed its role to be a rural 
development bank as required by government policy (BAAC, 2002). 
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At the end of fiscal year 2002 (31 March 2003), the BAAC operating fund totalled 355.28 
billion baht. There were 4 major sources of operating fund; deposit from public, borrowing 
from local and overseas sources, shareholder's equity, and other liabilities. The percentage 
of the sources of fund included 79.85, 7.88, 7.79, and 4.48 of deposit, borrowing, 
shareholder's equity, and other liabilities, respectively (BAAC, 2002). Therefore, currently 
BAAC has funded its loan outreach through the savings mobilization. 
In the fiscal year 2002, BAAC provided credit services worth 120.62 billion baht to 
farmers and farmer institutions (including credit services for community enterprises but not 
loans extended under government policy project). Of this amount about 93.61 billion baht 
(77.61 percent) was lent directly to farmers, 26.97 billion baht (22.36 percent) to 
agricultural cooperatives, and 34 million baht (0.03 percent) to farmer associations. Credit 
services were classified by types of clients as follows (BAAC, 2002): 
1. Credit services for individual farmers 
In the fiscal year 2002, BAAC disbursed loans directly to individual farmers worth 
93.61 billion baht. During the year, repayments made to the bank amounted to 79.96 
billion baht or 80.79 percent of the matured principal. By the end of fiscal year 2002, 
the principal outstanding was 241.72 billion baht (including credit services for 
community enterprises but not the special projects). 
2. Credit services for community enterprises 
Credit services for community enterprises involved disbursing loans to BAAC client 
groups, groups or clubs of BAAC collective clients, farmers, members of farmer 
households or groups in general, which had at least 5 farmer members. These included 
collective groups or clubs for joint ventures, such as farm produce processing, 
activities involving agriculture, industry, commerce, services, artistry, handicrafts, 
knowledge and life quality development, vocation training and "micro-enterprises". 
The latter include BAAC clients who obtained loans for expenses either for 
agricultural-related or other activities to increase their income. 
BAAC promoted and supported operations of the community enterprises by the 
principle of "Give more than Credit Lending", for example, giving advice, suggestions 
and support on marketing, production, finance accounting, and management, etc. As a 
result, the operations in fiscal year 2002, a total of 191,224 people had access to credit 
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services from the bank worth some 11.426 billion baht. 
3. Credit services for farmer institutions 
The provision of credit services for farmer institutions is to make loans to agricultural 
cooperatives and farmer associations to use as a revolving fund so that farmers can 
more easily expand their operations. BAAC provided support in developing and 
strengthening farmer institutions in terms of skills, administration management and 
marketing. These include the following: 
a) Loans to agricultural cooperatives 
In fiscal year 2002, BAAC extended credit services to agricultural cooperatives 
worth 26.974 billion baht. During the year agricultural cooperatives repaid loans 
worth 26.88 billion baht to BAAC. By the end of 2002, the principal outstanding 
was 14.17 billion baht. 
b) Loans to farmer associations 
In fiscal year 2002, BAAC extended credit services to farmer associations worth 34 
million baht. During the year, farmer associations repaid 37 million baht to BAAC. 
By the end of the year, the principal outstanding was 93 million baht. 
4. Provision of credit services in the form ofprojects 
In addition to normal credit services, BAAC extended credit services to farmers in the 
form of projects, which concentrated mainly on supervised credit. In cooperation with 
public and private agencies, BAAC provided technical, marketing and infrastructure 
construction support to help farmers improve their agriculture production. This 
assistance helped farmers increase production efficiency. The bank also participated in 
a feasibility study for special projects, taking in account technical, economic and 
social issues, administration management and marketing and finance. Once the 
operation was in progress, meetings were conducted with the farmers to explain the 
project and help them decide whether they should join it. 
Credit operations in the form of projects are classified as projects under government 
policies and special projects ofBAAC. These include the following: 
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a) Government projects initiated by "set policy or special cabinet resolutions" 
provided credit under special relaxed conditions to help fanners who are facing 
occupational hazards. For example, damages from disasters or natural calamities, 
which decrease output or quality level below nonnal standards or falling fann 
prices. Government assistance may be included in the provision of loans provided 
from BAAC on relaxed conditions. For example, low interest rates or interest 
compensation. Most of these credits were for production or marketing. Examples 
include the Loans for Postponement of the Sale of Fann Produce Scheme, and the 
Revolving Fund to Help Heavily Indebted Govemment Teachers Project. 
By the end of 2002, BAAC extended credit servIces for the projects under 
government policies to some 2.72 million families of fanners who had joined the 
projects and the principal outstanding was 23.969 billion baht. 
b) BAAC special projects extended credits for costs of investment and expenses of 
farm operations. This included providing credit services for the purchase of 
sugarcane fee discounted checks (fee checks), in cooperation between BAAC and 
public and private agencies. For this account, BAAC's Board of Directors had to 
approve and relax the bank's criteria ofnonnalloan lending. 
By the end of 2002, BAAC had implemented a total of 168 projects of this nature 
and disbursed a total of 10.142 billion baht in loans to serve 133,810 fann families. 
Of these projects, 166 were set up before 2002 and the repayment period is still 
outstanding, which includes a total of 3.708 billion baht in loans to serve 78,058 
farm families. A total of 27 projects experienced operating problems, for example, 
lost output, marketing difficulties and low prices in dairy, para rubber, oil palm 
projects. BAAC restructured 17,664 farmers' debts worth 1.09 billion baht. 
BAAC has generally maintained a timely loan repayment rate of about 85% with much of 
the arrears balance repaid later. Net income has increased steadily from 1989 to 1994 with 
a return on equity of 6.9-14.9 percent. In 1995-96, return on equity (ROE) was 3.3-4.0 
percent; but during the 1997 financial crisis it dropped to 2.2 percent by end of June 1998. 
In 2003, the ROE of the bank was about 3.5 percent (Sakchuwong, 2004). Therefore, 
BAAC can be considered a unique rural credit institution since it has been operating 
-73-
profitably as a rural commercial bank (albeit lending only to farmers) and as an agency 
managing the implementation of a variety of directed credit rural development programs 
on behalf of government agencies (on an agency-fee basis) (ADB, 2002). 
3.6 Characteristics of borrowers and loans 
In this section, the information related to the borrowers and loans are discussed, including 
preliminary results and findings from the descriptive analysis (i.e. classification tables, 
compare means, correlation coefficients, etc.). There is no information about borrowers' 
current assets, current liabilities, and debt repayment available on the BAAC's Credit BPR 
database. As a result, Current ratio and Debt repayment ratio can not be calculated and are 
excluded from the research models. 
Table 3.4 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this research. The mean 
value of each variable is presented separately according to the lending sector. The t-test is 
used to test whether the mean values of two different sectors, agriculture and non-
agriculture, are statistically different, whereas X2 -test is for testing the relationship between 
the variables and lending sector. The statistical test results (both t-test and X2 -test) are 
statistically significant at the 5 or 10 percent level, except for the age of the borrower and 
the value of collateral pledged to the bank. 
Of the 18,798 new loans approved during 2001 to 2003, 16,202 (86.19 percent) can be 
considered as good loans. Since the loans are repaid, the borrowers can be regarded as 
good borrowers. The remaining, 2,596 (13.81 percent), are considered bad loans because 
the loans are default. The classification results indicate that non-agricultural loan has a 
higher default rate (20.40 percent) than agricultural loan (13.13 percent). Furthermore, on 
average, the amount of loan extended to the non-agricultural borrower is larger than the 
loan amount granted to the agricultural borrower. The non-agricultural loan is charged 
significantly lower than the agricultural loan (see Table 3.4). 
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Table 3.4: Characteristics ofbonowers and loans classified by lending sector 11 
Variable 
Lending sector 
Total Statistical tesf' 
Agriculture Non-agriculture 
Dependent variables 
- Loan repayment 
Good loan 86.87 79.60 86.19 X2 = 71.19" 
Bad loan 13.13 20.40 13.81 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
- Volume of credit granted 133,866.54 206,856.00 140,739.15 t = -10.39" 
- Interest rate charged 0.0749 0.0676 0.0742 t = 7.99" 
Borrower characteristics 
- Asset 1,089,389.19 1,226,055.03 1,102,257.50 t=-1.96· 
- Age 50.04 50.23 50.06 t = -0.72 
- Education 
~ Primary school 89.52 87.06 89.29 X2= 10.10"· 
> Primary school 10.48 12.94 10.71 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Credit risk proxies 
- Collateral 1,464,343.09 1,510,224.08 1,468,663.20 t = -1.06 
- Return on asseel 0.2709 0.3747 0.2808 t = -3.59" 
- Leverage ratio31 0.0422 0.0290 0.0410 t = 3.90" 
- Capital turnover ratio31 0.9000 1.1822 0.9269 t = -4.36" 
Relationship indicators 
- Borrowing from others 
Yes 17.91 13.39 17.48 X2 = 22.67" 
No 82.09 86.61 82.52 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
- Duration41 2.17 3.03 2.26 t = -10.82" 
Dummy variables 
- Province 
Province 1 18.41 7.29 17.36 X2= 1,226.87" 
Province 2 8.09 17.85 9.01 
Province 3 2.91 0.90 2.72 
Province 4 2.14 0.96 2.03 
Province 5 6.82 3.67 6.53 
Province 6 3.46 3.50 3.47 
Province 7 2.29 2.88 2.35 
Province 8 6.24 11.19 6.71 
Province 9 5.13 7.29 5.34 
Province 10 10.71 3.45 10.02 
Province 11 1.82 0.00 1.65 
Province 12 4.09 1.98 3.89 
Province 13 6.05 0.45 5.52 
Province 14 0.41 0.73 0.44 
Province 15 2.48 0.56 2.30 
Province 16 13.76 36.05 15.86 
Province 17 5.17 1.24 4.80 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table 3.4: Characteristics of borrowers and loans classified by lending sector 11 (Cont) 
Variable 
Lending sector 
Total Statistical test21 
Agriculture Non-agriculture 
- Major production 
Horticulture 38.70 78.64 42.46 X2 = 1,105.69" 
OrchardIV egetable 27.57 16.27 26.50 
Livestock! Aquaculture 28.05 4.92 25.87 
Others 5.68 0.17 5.17 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
- Loan type 
Cash credit loan 9.42 2.26 8.75 X2 = 396.99·· 
Short-tenn loan 8.69 0.11 7.88 
Medium-tenn loan 3.75 0.06 3.40 
Long-tenn loan 78.15 97.57 79.98 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
- Loan size 
Small loan 62.53 45.65 60.94 X2 = 259.92·· 
Medium loan 36.97 51.86 38.37 
Large loan 0.50 2.49 0.69 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
- Lending year 
2001 9.77 0.00 8.85 X2 = 300.15·· 
2002 47.72 40.23 47.01 
2003 42.52 59.77 44.14 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
No. of observations 17,028 1,770 18,798 
Note: 11 Classification results are in percentage and the results of the quantitative variables are mean values. 
2/ T -test and X2 -test are the equality test and test of independent, respectively. 
3/ No. of observations for agricultural and non-agricultural loan are 16,560 and 1,750 samples, 
respectively. There are 18,310 observations in total. 
4/ No. of observations for agricultural and non-agricultural loan are 3,974 and 479 samples, 
respectively. There are 4,453 observations in total. 
* and ** represent 10% and 5% significant level, respectively. 
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The average total asset value and age of the BAAC borrowers are about 1,102,257 baht 
and 50 years old, respectively. Furthermore, approximately 89.29 percent of the borrowers 
received only primary education or less. There is no difference between the average age of 
the agricultural borrower and non-agricultural borrower. However, the education level and 
the average total asset value (wealth) of the non-agricultural borrower are slightly higher 
than the agricultural borrower. 
All the loans in the usable data set are collateralized loans and the mean value of the 
collateral is about 1,468,663 baht. In addition, the mean value of collateral pledged to the 
bank is higher than the mean value of the borrower's total asset value. This is possible 
since the collateral include both "inside collateral" (assets of the borrower) and "outside 
collateral" (assets belong to another party). The mean value of the collateral is not 
significantly different according in the lending sector. However, on the average, the 
borrower who received non-agricultural loan is more profitable (0.37 versus 0.27 Return 
on asset), less leverage (0.03 versus 0.04 Leverage ratio), and high efficiency (1.18 versus 
0.90 Capital turnover ratio). 
Approximately 3,286 (17.48 percent) of the borrowers have outstanding debts with other 
lenders when they applied for a loan with BAAC. This implies that some borrowers have 
more than one debt. The mean value of Duration is 2.26 years. Thus, the average length of 
the bank-borrower relationship in the sample data is about 2 years 19. The borrower who 
received a non-agricultural loan has a significantly longer relationship with the bank (about 
3 years) and concentrated on one source of credit (only 13.39 percent has utilized more 
than one financial source). 
The frequency distribution on the province in Table 3.4 shows that 18.41, 13.76 and 10.71 
percent of the total observations on agricultural lending are in Province 1, 13, and 10, 
respectively, while 36.05, 17.85 and 11.19 percent of the total observations on non-
agricultural lending are in Province 16, 2, and 8, respectively. This distribution indicates 
that the number and the type of loan (agricultural and non-agricultural loan) are dominated 
by some provinces, and therefore, the relationship between province and lending sector is 
not independent. The borrower who has Horticulture as the major production is considered 
19 Although some borrowers have a longer relationship with the bank, the maximum length of the bank-
borrower relationship is only 7 years. 
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as a major borrower on both agricultural and non-agricultural lending. Furthermore, the 
samples on both lending sectors are dominated by Long-term loan. Overall, Small loan, 
Medium loan, and Large loan account for 60.94, 38.37, and 0.69 percent of the total 
number of loans, respectively. However, the majority of the non-agricultural loans is 
Medium loan (about 51.86 percent), whereas 62.53 percent of the agricultural loans is 
Small loan. 
Table 3.5 shows the characteristics of borrowers and loans classified by loan performance 
(good/bad loan). The mean values on the volume of credit granted and the interest rate 
charged show that the bad loan (default borrower) receives more credit and is charged 
slightly higher than the good loan. Furthermore, on average, the bad loan has a higher 
Return on asset and Capital turnover ratio (more profitable and efficiency) than the good 
loan. The average length of the bank-borrower relationship of the bad loan is longer than 
the good loan. However, the good loan has a higher asset value (wealth) than the bad loan 
and the collateral value pledged by the good loan is lower than the bad loan. In addition, 
the mean value of Leverage ratio for the good loan is lower than for the bad loan. 
The classification results and the x2-tests shown in Table 3.5 also indicate that Borrowing 
from others and the loan performance (good/bad loan) are independent. In contrast, the 
loan performance is not independent with Education, Province, Major production, Loan 
type, Loan size and Lending year, since the X2 -tests on these variables are all significant at 
the 5 percent level. The borrower with primary school or below has a higher probability to 
default on the loan repayment than the borrower who has a high school qualification and 
above (18.92 percent versus 13.20 percent). The borrower with Long-term loan and Large 
loan is more likely to default on the loan repayment. 
The mean values of the volume of credit granted (loan amount) and interest rate charged 
(loan price) are calculated and compared according to the groups of each variable 
presented in equation 3.1 (see Table 3.6). The independent-sample t-test and one-way 
ANOVA (F-test) are used to test the significant mean differences between two different 
groups and among multiple groups, respectively. The test results in Table 3.6 show that the 
loan amount and loan price vary with Education, Borrowing from others, Province, Major 
production, Loan type, Loan size, and Lending year. 
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Table 3.5: Characteristics of borrowers and loans classified by loan performance 11 
Variable 
Loan £erforrnance 
Total Statistical test21 
Good loan Bad loan 
Dependent variables 
Volume of credit granted 134,015.52 182,702.28 140,739.15 t = -9.68" 
Interest rate charged 0.0740 0.0755 0.0742 t = -1.66' 
Borrower characteristics 
Asset 1,112,507.60 1,038,285.20 1,102,257.50 t = 1.66' 
Age 50.20 49.15 50.06 t = 4.91" 
Education 
:s Primary school 81.08 18.92 100.00 X2 =49.44" 
> Primary school 86.80 13.20 100.00 
Total 86.19 13.81 100.00 
Credit risk proxies 
Collateral 1,458,804.85 1 ,530, 190.54 1,468,663.20 t = -1.72' 
Return on assee! 0.2595 0.4132 0.2808 t= -4.92" 
Leverage ratio3! 0.0374 0.0630 0.0410 t=-4.61" 
Capital turnover ratio3! 0.8240 1.5672 0.9269 t = -9.16" 
Relationship indicators 
Borrowing from others 
Yes 86.24 13.76 100.00 X2 = 0.01 
No 86.18 13.82 100.00 
Total 86.19 13.81 100.00 
Duration4! 2.17 2.69 2.26 t = -8.38" 
Dummy variables 
Province 
Province 1 95.19 4.81 100.00 X2 = 912.09" 
Province 2 96.22 3.78 100.00 
Province 3 82.23 17.77 100.00 
Province 4 75.13 24.87 100.00 
Province 5 87.94 12.06 100.00 
Province 6 76.07 23.93 100.00 
Province 7 84.58 15.42 100.00 
Province 8 85.25 14.75 100.00 
Province 9 86.54 13.46 100.00 
Province 10 90.50 9.50 100.00 
Province 11 70.00 30.00 100.00 
Province 12 75.00 25.00 100.00 
Province 13 87.86 12.14 100.00 
Province 14 91.46 8.54 100.00 
Province 15 66.97 33.03 100.00 
Province 16 79.20 20.80 100.00 
Province 17 83.92 16.08 100.00 
Total 86.19 13.81 100.00 
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Table 3.5: Characteristics of borrowers and loans classified by loan performance 11 (Cont) 
Variable Loan Eerformance Total Statistical test21 
Good loan Bad loan 
Major production 
Horticulture 87.89 12.11 100.00 X2 = 264.94" 
OrchardIV egetable 88.26 11.74 100.00 
Livestock! Aquaculture 84.54 15.46 100.00 
Others 69.93 30.07 100.00 
Total 86.19 13.81 100.00 
Loan type 
Cash credit loan 92.58 7.42 100.00 X2 = 171.05" 
Short-term loan 93.99 6.01 100.00 
Medium-term loan 89.05 10.95 100.00 
Long-term loan 84.60 15.40 100.00 
Total 86.19 13.81 100.00 
Loan size 
Small loan 88.87 11.13 100.00 X2 = 184.77" 
Medium loan 82.16 17.84 100.00 
Large loan 73.64 26.36 100.00 
Total 86.19 13.81 100.00 
Lending year 
2001 88.27 11.73 100.00 X2 = 27.38" 
2002 84.83 15.17 100.00 
2003 87.23 12.77 100.00 
Total 86.19 13.81 100.00 
No. of observations 18,798 
Note: 11 Classification results are in percentage and the results of the quantitative variables are mean values. 
2/ The t-test and X2 -test are the equality test and test of independent, respectively. 
3/ No. of observations is 18,310. 
4/ No. of observations is 4,453. 
* and ** represent 10% and 5% significant level, respectively. 
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Table 3.6: The mean values of volume of credit granted and interest rate charged 
Variable Volume of credit granted Interest rate charged 
Education 
:s Primary school 133,738.19 0.0733 
> Primary school 199,082.82 0.0816 
t-test -11.27** -10.61'* 
Borrowing from others 
Yes 117,864.11 0.0712 
No 145,584.91 0.0748 
t-test -7.79** -5.75** 
Province 
Province 1 71,408.85 0.0693 
Province 2 93,614.83 0.0734 
Province 3 104,992.36 0.0687 
Province 4 120,947.58 0.0715 
Province 5 86,574.12 0.0709 
Province 6 111,596.37 0.0683 
Province 7 73,997.71 0.0770 
Province 8 78,148.86 0.0678 
Province 9 81,296.34 0.0670 
Province 10 195,807.71 0.0817 
Province 11 276,429.14 0.0848 
Province 12 171,975.73 0.0648 
Province 13 217,487.16 0.0801 
Province 14 243,182.21 0.0796 
Province 15 196,100.24 0.0828 
Province 16 238,878.20 0.0791 
Province 17 154,221.02 0.0829 
F-test 165.64** 43.97** 
Major production 
Horticulture 113,211.55 0.0692 
OrchardIV egetable 173,244.77 0.0805 
Livestock! Aquaculture 140,051.90 0.0780 
Others 202,846.99 0.0638 
F-test 107.53** 153.71** 
Loan type 
Cash credit loan 97,594.80 0.0835 
Short-term loan 32,781.40 0.0743 
Medium-term loan 114,820.19 0.0841 
Long-term loan 156,803.42 0.0727 
F-test 177.46** 64.66** 
Loan size 
Small 52,962.23 0.0685 
Medium 253,888.21 0.0831 
Large 1,609,175.49 0.0888 
F-test 191433.04** 529.71** 
Lending year 
2001 170,225.63 0.0837 
2002 128,966.19 0.0765 
2003 147,367.45 0.0699 
F-test 42.10** 184.51** 
Note: * and ** represent 10% and 5% significant level, respectively. 
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The borrower who borrows only from BAAC and who has a higher education could obtain 
a larger amount ofloan from the bank (see Table 3.6). However, they are charged a higher 
rate. Thus, the result on the loan price contradicts the hypothesis. This is because the 
average values of the interest rate charged are calculated without controlling for the 
impacts of the other factors that might influence the loan rate. 
The correlation matrix in Table 3.7 illustrates the volume of credit granted has a positive 
relationship with Asset, Collateral, Capital turnover ratio and Duration. In contrast, it is 
negatively related to Age. The low and insignificant correlation coefficients between the 
volume of credit granted and Return on asset (r = 0.00), and between the volume of credit 
granted and Leverage ratio (r = -0.01) imply that both variables (Return on asset and 
Leverage ratio) do not have a linear association with the amount of credit granted. The 
results do not mean that they are independent, since they might have a non-linear 
relationship with the loan amount. 
The correlation coefficients also show that Age, Return on asset, Capital turnover ratio 
and Duration are negatively related to the loan price (see Table 3.7). However, it is found 
that Asset and Collateral are positively related to the interest rate charged, whereas the 
Leverage ratio shows a negative relationship. The correlation coefficient does not control 
for the other factors' influences, and further investigation should be conducted to examine 
these relationships. 
Table 3.7: Correlation matrix 
Volume Interest Asset 
Volume 1.00 
Interest 0.19" 1.00 
Asset 0.36" 0.04" 1.00 
Age -O.oC· -0.09" 0.11" 
Collateral 0.49" 0.08" 0.50" 
ROA 0.00 -0.04" -O.ot· 
LR -0.01 -0.03"' -0.06" 
CTR 0.02" -0.04" -0.09" 
Duration 0.06" -0.39" 0.12" 
Note: Volume = Volume of credit granted. 
Interest = Interest rate charged. 
ROA = Return on asset. 
LR = Leverage ratio. 
CTR = Capital turnover ratio. 
Age Collateral ROA 
1.00 
0.07" 1.00 
-0.06" -0.02" 1.00 
-0.03"' -0.01 0.03" 
-0.10" 0.01 o.n" 
0.10" 0.08" 0.11" 
* and ** represent 10% and 5% significant level, respectively. 
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LR CTR Duration 
1.00 
0.03"' 1.00 
0.02 O.lt· 1.00 
CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
This chapter discusses the empirical results on the bank lending decision model, credit 
availability model and loan pricing model, and the critical factors affecting the lending 
decision, amount of credit and loan price. The estimated results are expected to reflect the 
borrower's risk level, and the bank-borrower relationship should not dominate the bank 
lending decision, the amount of credit availability, and the lending rate. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 discusses the estimated results on the bank 
lending decision model. In addition, both the logistic regression and the artificial neural 
networks classification outputs are computed and compared. Section 4.2 and 4.3 discuss 
the estimated results on credit availability models and loan pricing models, respectively. 
The predictive power of the multiple regression analysis technique and the artificial neural 
networks on both the credit availability and the loan pricing model are also evaluated. 
Section 4.4 summarizes the findings. 
4.1 Bank lending decision model 
The bank lending decision models are estimated using the logistic regression via the 
maximum likelihood estimation technique. The estimated results of the bank lending 
decision models are presented in Table 4.1. In general, both models (with and without 
Duration variable) fit the data quite well. The coefficients in both models are significantly 
different from zero at the 10 percent level. The chi-square statistic using a likelihood ratio 
test on both models fail to accept the null hypothesis that the parameter estimates for the 
models are equal to zero. Model 1 (without Duration) and Model 2 (with Duration) 
correctly predict bank lending decision 86.51 and 84.29 percent, respectively. However, it 
should be noted that Modell and 2 have produced a 93.61 and 89.52 percent Type I error 
(wrongly reject Ho or accepting a bad loan as a good loan), and 0.61 and 1.08 percent Type 
II error (wrongly accept Ho or rejecting a good loan as a bad loan), respectively. Although 
Model 1 has a higher overall percentage correct and a lower percentage of Type II error, 
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Model 2 can predict the bad loan group better than Model 1 and has a lower percentage of 
Type I error20. 
The significant positive sign on Sector dummy variable indicates that the agriculturalloan 
has a higher probability of a good loan than the non-agricultural loan, holding other factors 
constant, and this could lead BAAC to have a higher preference to lend to the agricultural 
sector than the non-agricultural sector21 (see Table 4.1). In contrast, the significant 
negative coefficients on Medium-term loan, Long-term loan, Medium loan and Large loan 
dummy variables show that default risk on the loan increases with the size and the period 
of loan, since a higher negative value indicates a higher default risk on the loan or a lower 
probability of a good loan. Furthermore, the dummy variables on the major production 
show that the borrowers who have a cash crop (Horticulture) as a major production 
crop have a higher probability of a good loan. This is because horticultural productions 
involve a small amount of credit and mainly are short-term loans, unlike livestock and 
aquaculture productions, which are medium-term or long-term investments requiring a 
relatively high investment funding. 
The estimated coefficients of the province dummy variables are significant different from 
zero. A negative (or a positive) value implies of a decrease (or an increase) in the 
probability of a good loan relative to the other provinces. For example, in Table 4.1, Model 
2, Province 4 (coefficient value = -3.0082) has a lower probability of a good loan than 
Province 5 (coefficient value = -1.2678) on the average, assuming other factors are held 
constant. The results show the effect of provincial differences on the loan performance and 
the probability of a good loan. Therefore, it is necessary for the bank to use the different 
lending criteria on the different provinces, and this should not be claimed as a provincial 
discrimination. This is because different provinces have different economic, social, 
environmental, physical, and biological conditions, and there are also differences in the 
production system and risk, which all influence the loan performance and the default risk. 
20 It is generally accepted that the misclassification cost of Type I error is more costly than Type II error. For 
Type I error, the lending bank may not lose only the principal but also the interest on the principal. On the 
other hand, for Type II error, the lending bank loses only the interest and expected profit that may be 
obtained from lending to the borrower. 
21 It should be noted here that BAAC is considered as a government bank specifically for agriculture 
borrowing. BAAC is also involved in non-agricultural loan since 2001. 
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Table 4.1: Bank lending decision models 
Coefficients27 
Independent variables 11 
Model 1 Model 2 
Borrower Characteristics 
Log(asset) 
Age 
Education 
Credit risk proxies 
Log( collateral) 
Return on asset 
Leverage ratio 
Capital turnover ratio 
Relationship indicators 
Borrowing from others 
Duration 
Dummy variables31 
Sector 
(Province) 
Province 2 
Province 3 
Province 4 
Province 5 
Province 6 
Province 7 
Province 8 
Province 9 
Province 10 
Province 11 
Province 12 
Province 13 
Province 14 
Province 15 
Province 16 
Province 17 
. -85-
0.3005>1<· 
-0.0019 
0.1372"'* 
-0.0278 
0.0510· 
-0.8957>1<· 
-0.0734"" 
0.0928 
0.4620"* 
0.3612** 
-1.2037>1<* 
-1.8634** 
-1.2186** 
-1.5655"* 
-0.9760** 
-1.1367>1<* 
-1.1047>1<* 
-1.1636"· 
-2.9225"* 
-1.8796"* 
-1.1986"· 
-0.9118"* 
-2.2798 .... 
-1.8834** 
-1.5190>1<* 
0.3568** 
-0.0021 
0.1268 
-0.0741 
0.0516 
-0.3424 
-0.0802** 
-0.0784 
-0.1555 .... 
0.7978** 
-0.4844 
-0.8204* 
-3.0082** 
-1.2678*" 
-2.2047** 
-0.7551"· 
-1.1496"* 
-1.4100"* 
-1.8059** 
-2.7329"* 
-0.7683 
-1.4572** 
-2.0319** 
-2.3291 ** 
-1.9453** 
-1.7594** 
Table 4.1: Bank lending decision models (Cont) 
Coefficients27 
Independent variables l ! 
Modell Model 2 
(Major production) 
Horticulture 0.8285>1<>1< 0.8033>1<>1< 
OrchardN egetable 0.8682>1<>1< 0.5804>1<* 
Livestock! Aquaculture 0.7163>1<>1< 0.3850" 
(Loan type) 
Short-term loan -0.2112 -0.3968 
Medium-term loan -0.2018 -0.8016>1<>1< 
Long-term loan -0.7279*>1< -1.1433*>1< 
(Loan size) 
Medium loan -0.3695*>1< -0.2855>1<>1< 
Large loan -0.4836*>1< -0.7328>1< 
(Lending year) 
2001 0.3243*>1< 0.0117 
2002 -0.4195** -0.3729** 
Constant -0.6233 0.1901 
No. of Observations 18,310 4,444 
Log likelihood -6,510.05 -1,755.37 
LR statistic 1,710.00*>1< 475.59** 
df 35 36 
McFaddenR2 0.1161 0.1193 
Classification table4! 
Modell Model 2 
BL GL Overall BL GL Overall 
Correct 162 15,678 15,840 77 3,669 3,746 
6.39% 99.39% 86.51% 10.48% 98.92% 84.29% 
Incorrect 2,374 96 2,470 658 40 698 
93.61 % 0.61% 13.49% 89.52% 1.08% 15.71% 
Note: 11 Dependent variable is bank lending decision (goodlbad loan). 
2/ Maximize using logistic likelihood function and quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) standard 
errors and covariance. 
3/ To avoid singularity problem, a dummy variable is dropped from each group. 
4/ BL and GL stand for bad loan and good loan, respectiVely. 
*, ** represent 10% and 5% significant level, respectively. 
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In 2001, the Thai government under Prime Minister Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai 
Rak Thai Party (TRT) implemented a three-year debt suspension programme. Under the 
program, fanners with debt of up to 100,000 baht did not need to repay their BAAC debts 
and interest for three years. They were also given training in marketing, diversifying and 
finding supplemental income sources. However, they could not borrow more from the 
BAAC during this period (Bangkok Post, 2000 and 2002). There were about 2.19 million 
fanners (holding about 74 percent of the BAAC's debts) with debts totalling 87.70 billion 
baht participated in the programme. About 1.14 million fanners with debts totalling 51.11 
billion baht were in the debt suspension programme and another 1.05 million fanners with 
36.59 billion baht debt in the debt-reduction scheme. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
dummy variable for the 2002 lending year on both Model 1 and 2 are negative, since some 
previous good debtors were encouraged to default on debt repayments in anticipation of 
the three-year debt moratorium programme (see Table 4.1). 
In Modell (without Duration), only Asset, Education, Return on asset, Leverage ratio and 
Capital turnover ratio are significant at the 10 percent level (see Table 4.1). As expected, 
the probability of a good loan increases with increased Asset, Education and Return on 
asset. However, the probability of a good loan does not decrease with only increased 
Leverage ratio but also Capital turnover ratio. The findings contradict the hypothesis on 
Capital turnover ratio showing that the borrower who has a higher gross income to total 
assets has a higher probability of defaulting on debt repayment. It implies that when the 
borrower has earned more, they prefer to spend their money for other activities or purposes 
rather than repaying their debt. The estimated signs on Age and Borrowing from others 
contradict the hypothesised signs, but they are not significantly different from zero. In 
addition, the results from Model 1 show that Collateral has no significant impact on the 
bank lending decision. 
When Duration is included in the Model 2, the estimated results showed Asset and Capital 
turnover ratio, are significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level, while 
Education, Return on asset and Leverage ratio are insignificant (see Table 4.1). 
Furthennore, the estimated coefficient on Capital turnover ratio is negative which is 
consistent with the estimated result in Modell. However, the relationship between 
Duration and the bank lending decision contradict the postulated hypothesis. The estimated 
coefficient is negative and significant at the 95 percent confident level. This suggests that 
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the borrower who has a longer relationship with the bank has a higher probability of 
defaulting on debt repayment and the bank should cautiously deal with this group of 
borrowers. The coefficient of Borrowing from others is negative in Model 2 and not 
significant. Consequently, the results imply that multiple financial source have no 
influence on the bank lending decision. 
In this research, Duration is restricted to a maximum of 7 years. Some borrowers may have 
a longer relationship with the bank, but there is no available information to estimate the 
length of the relationship. Therefore, Duration is a censoring variable and it may induce 
inconsistent estimates of the length of the bank-borrower relationship (Ongena and Smith, 
2000). 
The results in Table 4.1 are consistent with Cole (1998) findings who argued that the bank 
is more likely to extend credit to large borrowers than small borrowers. The estimated 
coefficients on Borrowing from others showed that borrowing from other sources of funds 
does not have a significant impact on the bank lending decision. This finding contradicts 
Cole (1998) and Harhoff and Korting (1998) findings, who concluded that the multiple 
source borrowings are less likely to get credit. The Duration has a negative impact on the 
bank lending decision, which contradicts the postulated hypothesis. Cole (1998) and 
Bodenhom (2003) found a positive relationship between the length of relationship and 
probability of loan approval. However, the empirical result supports the theory that the 
bank-borrower relationship generates private information useful for the lender in assessing 
the borrower's creditworthiness. 
4.1.1 Bank lending decision models for agricultural and non-agricultural lending 
Agricultural lending and non-agricultural lending differ in their lending behaviours. Most 
of the agricultural products are seasonal, perishable, and difficult to store. Moreover, the 
production depends on the natural environment condition. Thus, agricultural lending can 
be considered risky, compared to non-agricultural lending, and the banks may apply 
different lending decision criterion on agricultural lending versus non-agricultural lending. 
The Sector coefficient is found to be positive and significant at the 5 percent level (see 
Table 4.1). This implies that the bank lending decision is impacted by the lending sectors. 
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The estimated results on bank lending decision models for agricultural lending are shown 
in Table 4.2. Sector is discarded from the model because the model is segregated according 
to the lending sectors. The chi-square tests on both Model 1 and 2 strongly reject the 
hypothesis of no explanatory power and the models accurately predict 87.19 and 85.30 
percent of the total observations, respectively. Model 1 (without Duration) has a higher 
overall percentage correct classification, but it has a larger Type I error than Model 2 (with 
Duration). In addition, the overall percentage correct classification of both models (with 
and without Duration) improved slightly when compare to the estimated results of the 
aggregate lending (both agricultural and non-agricultural lending information) (see Table 
4.1). 
The estimated results on the bank lending decision models for agricultural lending (see 
Table 4.2) yield similar outcomes and conclusions as the models for aggregate lending (see 
Table 4.1). The results indicate that horticultural production, short-term loan, and small 
borrowing are more stable and have a lower default risk. Furthermore, the estimated 
coefficients of the provinces show that the probability of a good loan differ according to 
the residential province. The significant negative sign on the year 2002 dummy variable 
signals an abnormal default rate on debt repayment from the farmers, since the introduction 
of the debt moratorium programme in 2002. 
In Modell, only 4 variables from Borrower characteristics, Credit risk proxies and 
Relationship indicators are significant at the 5 percent level of significance (see Table 4.2). 
They are Asset, Education, Leverage ratio, and Capital turnover ratio. The estimated 
coefficients exhibit that both Asset and Education have a positive relationship with the 
bank lending decision, while Leverage ratio and Capital turnover ratio are negatively 
correlated with the bank lending decision. When Duration is added to the model (see 
Model 2), the estimated outputs reinforce the imperative of Asset, Capital turnover ratio 
and Duration. The estimated sign is positive on Asset but negative on Capital turnover 
ratio and Duration, and all of them are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
level of significance. 
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Table 4.2: Bank lending decision models for agricultural lending 
Coefficients27 
Independent variables l ! ~odel 1 ~ode12 
Bon'ower Characteristics 
Log(asset) 
Age 
Education 
Credit risk proxies 
Log( collateral) 
Return on asset 
Leverage ratio 
Capital turnover ratio 
Relationship indicators 
Borrowing from others 
Duration 
Dummy variables3! 
(Province) 
Province 2 
Province 3 
Province 4 
Province 5 
Province 6 
Province 7 
Province 8 
Province 9 
Province 10 
Province 11 
Province 12 
Province 13 
Province 14 
Province 15 
Province 16 
Province 17 
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0.3197** 
-0.0009 
0.1686** 
-0.0339 
0.0383 
-0.9629*" 
-0.0634** 
0.1081 
0.3397>1< 
-1.2561>1<* 
-1.8665** 
-1.2657>1<* 
-1.5949** 
-1.0039** 
-1.2343** 
-1.1283** 
-1.1496>1<* 
-2.7958** 
-1.9438** 
-1.1482** 
-0.8085* 
-2.2483** 
-1.6257'''* 
-1.5205"'>1< 
0.3719·* 
-0.0016 
0.1769 
-0.0689 
0.0050 
-0.8326 
-0.0596>1<" 
0.0329 
-0.1915"· 
-0.1766 
-0.8480* 
-2.6726"'>1< 
-1.2191** 
-2.110l ** 
-0.7339* 
-1.1030>1<>1< 
-1.4990*>1< 
-1.6164>1<>1< 
-2.4990** 
-0.6575 
-1.2083>1<>1< 
-2.4747>1<>1< 
-2.1955>1<>1< 
-1.7089>1<* 
-1.6943** 
Table 4.2: Bank lending decision models for agricultural lending (Cont) 
Independent variablesJl 
Coefficients27 
Modell Model 2 
(Major production) 
Horticulture 0.8767** 0.8959** 
OrchardN egetable 0.8425** 0.4711 ** 
Livestock! Aquaculture 0.6909** 0.3031 
(Loan type) 
Short-term loan -0.2789* -0.4525 
Medium-term loan -0.2832 -0.8265** 
Long-term loan -0.7631>1<'" -1.1379** 
(Loan size) 
Medium loan -0.4016>1<* -0.3559*>1< 
Large loan -0.6262>1<>1< -1.7228>1<>1< 
(Lending year) 
2001 0.1507 -0.0585 
2002 -0.3757>1<>1< -0.3479** 
Constant -0.4007 0.6708 
No. of Observations 16,560 3,965 
Log likelihood -5,720.45 -1,489.09 
LR statistic 1,446.85** 398.97*>1< 
df 34 35 
McFadden R2 0.1123 0.1182 
Classification table4/ 
Modell Model 2 
BL GL Overall BL GL Overall 
Correct 131 14,308 14,439 56 3,326 3,382 
6.02% 99.48% 87.19% 9.30% 98.90% 85.30% 
Incorrect 2,046 75 2,121 546 37 583 
93.98% 0.52% 12.81% 90.70% 1.10% 14.70% 
Note: 1/ Dependent variable is bank lending decision (goodlbad loan). 
2/ Maximize using logistic likelihood function and quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) standard 
errors and covariance. 
3/ To avoid singularity problem, a dummy variable is dropped from each group. 
4/ BL and GL stand for bad loan and good loan, respectively. 
*, ** represent 10% and 5% significant level, respectively. 
-91-
The results in Model 2 (see Table 4.2) suggest that Age, Education, Collateral, Return on 
asset, Leverage ratio and Borrowing from others have no significant impact on the bank 
lending decision for agricultural lending. Since agricultural lending accounts for 90.44 and 
89.22 percent of the total observations in Model 1 and 2 of the aggregate lending, 
respectively, the estimated outputs on the bank lending decision models for the aggregate 
and agricultural lending yield almost identical conclusions. 
Table 4.3 presents the estimated results on the bank lending decision models for non-
agricultural lending. Sector, Province 11 and the 2001 lending year are excluded from the 
model because the model is segregated according to the lending sectors, and there is no 
information available either on Province 11 or the 2001 lending year. The dummy variable 
for long-term loan is included in the loan type group, since the majority of non-agricultural 
lending is long-term loan. There are only 3 different types of the borrower major 
production on non-agricultural lending. They are Horticulture, Orchard/Vegetable, and 
LivestockiAquaculture22 • The Horticulture dummy variable is removed from the major 
production group to avoid the dummy trap problem. 
The overall percentage correct prediction of Model I and 2 are 81.14 and 76.62 percent, 
respectively (see Table 4.3). However, the predictive powers are low when compared to 
the lending decision models for aggregate lending (see Table 4.1) and agricultural lending 
(see Table 4.2). However, the lending decision model for non-agricultural lending can 
detect a Type I error relatively better than the models for aggregate lending and 
agricultural lending. 
The likelihood ratio (LR) on both Model 1 and 2 fail to accept the null hypothesis at the 5 
percent level of significance (see Table 4.3). It can be concluded that both models have 
significant explanatory power and they can be used to explain the bank lending decision 
for non-agricultural loans. 
22 There were only 3 observations in "Others" category or about 0.17 percent of the total observations on 
non-agricultural lending. 
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Table 4.3: Bank lending decision models for non-agricultural lending 
Coefficients2! 
Independent variables 11 
Model 1 Model 2 
Bon'ower Characteristics 
Log(asset) 
Age 
Education 
Credit risk proxies 
Log( collateral) 
Return on asset 
Leverage ratio 
Capital turnover ratio 
Relationship indicators 
Borrowing from others 
Duration 
Dummy variables31 
(Province) 
Province 1 
Province 2 
Province 3 
Province 4 
Province 5 
Province 6 
Province 7 
Province 8 
Province 9 
Province 10 
Province 12 
Province 13 
Province 14 
Province 15 
Province 17 
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0.2308 ... • 
-0.0027 
-0.0605 
-0.0635 
0.1657· 
-0.1484 
-0.1537"'* 
-0.1003 
2.5775** 
2.7023** 
1.9517*· 
0.2169 
1.8097** 
1.2126*· 
2.1108*· 
1.8403** 
1.7263** 
2.1065·· 
2.1261** 
0.6784 
1.3843 
0.7552 
1.8678** 
0.2009 
0.0021 
-0.1084 
0.0076 
0.3395** 
0.1706 
-0.2333*· 
-0.1489 
0.0661 
2.8699** 
1.2465** 
34.0266 
-33.7642 
0.6444 
0.3365 
2.2376** 
1.3142** 
1.9697** 
0.2664 
1.5666 
-0.2011 
33.4604 
0.9524 
1.0726 
Table 4.3: Bank lending decision models for non-agricultural lending (Cont) 
Coefficients27 
Independent variables II 
Model 1 Model 2 
(Major production) 
Orchard/Vegetable 
Livestock! Aquaculture 
(Loan type) 
Long-term loan 
(Loan size) 
Medium loan 
Large loan 
(Lending year) 
2002 
Constant 
No. of Observations 
Log likelihood 
LR statistic 
df 
McFadden R2 
Classification table41 
BL 
Correct 66 
18.38% 
Incorrect 293 
81.62% 
Modell 
GL 
1,354 
97.34% 
37 
2.66% 
Overall 
-0.5669** 
0.3045 
0.8353* 
-0.1650 
0.1225 
-0.7444** 
-1.8880 
1,750 
-735.61 
306.10** 
29 
0.1716 
BL 
1,420 31 
81.14% 23.31% 
330 102 
18.86% 76.69% 
Note: 11 Dependent variable is bank lending decision (goodlbad loan). 
Model 2 
GL 
336 
97.11% 
10 
2.89% 
0.1145 
0.4481 
0.3219 
-0.0233 
0.1664 
-0.6047** 
-2.5336 
479 
-240.85 
84.28** 
30 
0.1488 
Overall 
367 
76.62% 
112 
23.38% 
2/ Maximize using logistic likelihood function and quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) standard 
errors and covariance. 
3/ To avoid singularity problem, a dummy variable is dropped from each group. 
4/ BL and GL stand for bad loan and good loan, respectively. 
*, ** represent 10% and 5% significant level, respectively. 
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The estimated coefficients in Modell are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
level, while only some variables are significant in Model 2 (see Table 4.3). The 
insignificant variables in Model 2 may be caused by the small sample size, since there are 
only 479 observations on non-agriculture lending. The results in Model 1 show the 
significant impacts of Asset, Return on asset and Capital turnover ratio on non-agricultural 
lending decision. 
When Duration is included in the model (see Model 2 in Table 4.3), Asset becomes 
insignificant, and only Return on asset and Capital turnover ratio have a significant 
influence on the bank lending decision. However, it is found that Duration is not 
significantly different from zero. The positive sign on Return on asset indicates that the 
probability of a good loan for non-agricultural loan increases with increased Return on 
asset. Capital turnover ratio, in contrast, has a negative sign. The result implies that the 
borrowers with a higher Capital turnover ratio are more likely to default on debt 
repayment, and therefore, the probability that their loan contact will be approved would be 
lower or decreased. Although the estimated coefficient on Capital turnover ratio 
contradicts the priori hypothesized sign, the result are consistent with the lending decision 
models for aggregate lending (see Table 4.1) and agricultural lending (see Table 4.2). 
Table 4.4 presents the marginal effects of the bank lending decision models. The marginal 
effect of Sector in Model 2 shows the probability of a good loan on agricultural loan 
increases by 11.33 percent. The result indicates that the borrower can access agricultural 
credit from BAAC easier than non-agricultural credit. Furthermore, it also implies that the 
default probability of the agricultural loan contract is lower than non-agricultural loan 
contract by 11.33 percent on average. 
The marginal effects for agricultural lending show that a 1 percent increases in Asset and 
Capital turnover ratio would change the probability of a good loan by 0.0387 and -0.0062 
percent, respectively (see Table 4.4, Model 2). Furthermore, the marginal effect on 
Duration shows that, when the relationship between the bank and the borrower increase by 
I year, the probability of a good loan (or default) would decrease (or increase) by 1.99 
percent on the average. 
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Table 4.4: Marginal effects of bank lending decision models 
Marginal Effects27 
Independent Variables I! Aggregate Agriculture Non-agriculture 
Modell Model 2 Modell Model 2 Modell Model 2 
Borrower Characteristics 
Log(asset) 0.0285 0.0406 0.0289 0.0387 0.0313 0.0302 
Age -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0003 
Education 0.0136 0.0147 0.0161 0.0190 -0.0081 -0.0161 
Credit risk proxies 
Log( collateral) -0.0026 -0.0084 -0.0030 -0.0072 -0.0086 0.0011 
Return on asset 0.0045 0.0059 0.0030 0.0005 0.0226 0.0511 
Leverage ratio -0.0851 -0.0389 -0.0874 -0.0868 -0.0193 0.0257 
Capital turnover ratio -0.0073 -0.0091 -0.0060 -0.0062 -0.0208 -0.0351 
Relationship indicators 
Borrowing from others 0.0086 -0.0091 0.0095 0.0034 -0.0138 -0.0232 
Duration -0.0177 -0.0199 0.0099 
Dummy variables3! 
Sector 0.0512 0.1133 
(Province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Major production) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Loan type) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Loan size) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Lending year) 
2001 0.0279 0.0013 0.0132 -0.0062 
2002 -0.0413 -0.0443 -0.0352 -0.0377 -0.1054 -0.0998 
No. of observations 18,310 4,444 16,560 3,965 1,750 479 
Note: 1/ Dependent variable is bank lending decision (goodlbad loan). 
2/ Marginal effect is at the mean value. For dummy variable, marginal effect is PII - PIO. 
3/ See Appendix I for the marginal effects on province, major production, loan type, and loan size 
dummy variables. 
Bold and italic represent 10% significant level or below. 
The marginal effects for non-agricultural lending show in Table 4.4 (see Model 2) indicate 
that if Return on asset increases by 1 percent, the probability of a good loan would increase 
by 0.0511 percent. On the other hand, the probability of a good loan would decrease by 
0.0351 percent if the Capital turnover ratio increases by 1 percent. 
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In summary, the results from the logistic regression models reveal that the factors 
determining bank lending decision are influenced by lending sectors (agriculture or non-
agriculture). Bon-owing for agricultural production or bon-owing related to agriculture 
activities would have a higher probability of a good loan. Both Asset and Capital turnover 
ratio playa very crucial role on the bank lending decision models for both agricultural and 
non-agricultural lending. Furthermore, Duration has a significant impact on the bank 
lending decision only on agricultural lending, while Return on asset is significant only on 
non-agricultural lending decision. This suggests that the bank places heavy emphasis on 
Return on asset only on non-agricultural lending, but not on agricultural lending. However, 
both Capital turnover ratio and Duration are negatively con-elated with the bank lending 
decision, which contradict the hypotheses. The estimated parameter on the 2002 lending 
year dummy variable indicates that the default risk in 2002 is higher than other years. The 
higher default risk in 2002 on both agricultural and non-agricultural lending might be 
partly instigated by the debt suspension programme ofthe Thai government. 
4.1.2 Artificial neural networks and bank lending decision models 
In this research, four different types of the artificial neural networks (ANN) are applied to 
model the bank lending decision. This includes multiple-layer feed-forward neural network 
(MLFN), Ward network (WN), general regression neural network (GRNN) , and 
probabilistic neural network (PNN). These networks are considered supervised networks. 
The first network, MLFN with one hidden layer is the fundamental network in the family 
of the ANN and has been widely used in many disciplines, including biology, psychology, 
statistics, mathematics, medical science, and computer science. Recently, networks have 
been applied to a variety of business areas such as accounting and auditing, finance, 
management, marketing, and production. The second network, WD (multiple hidden slabs 
with different activation functions) was invented by Ward Systems Group Inc (1993). The 
logistic function is used as the activation functions for all MLFN models and WN uses the 
3 hidden slabs structure that has Gaussian, Tanh, and Gaussian Complement as the 
activation functions for 3 hidden slabs. The last two networks, GRNN and PNN, are 
special class of the ANN invented by Specht (1990 and 1991). The first two networks, 
MLFN and WD can handle both classification and prediction problems. The PNN is 
normally applied to classification problem. However, instead of producing continuous 
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valued outputs, GRNN can categorise data like PNN. The networks can be used to model 
the bank lending decision. 
Since the neural network model is nonlinear and their training process is always regarded 
as a black-box, it is very difficult to write out the algebraic relationship between a 
dependent. variable and an independent variable. Furthermore, the learned outputs, 
connection weights or coefficients, can not be interpreted and tested. Therefore, only the 
classification results of the models, and the relative contribution factors of some selected 
methods, are presented in this research. 
The ANN models will use the same data set and the same set of independent variables used 
in the logistic regression models. The number of hidden neurons on both MLFN and WD is 
set up to the default value given by the NeuroShe1l2 package, which can be computed with 
the following formula23 : 
No. of hidden neurons = 1:.. (Inputs + Outputs) + (No. of training patterns)li (4.1) 
2 
In case of WN, which has 3 hidden slabs, the number of hidden neurons in each slab is 
equal to the number given by equation 4.1 divided by the number of hidden slabs (Ward 
System Group Inc., 1993). For GRNN and PNN, the networks require that the number of 
pattern units (the first hidden layer) must be at least equivalent to the number of training 
patterns, while the number of summation units (the second hidden layer) must equal to 2 
for GRNN24 and equal to the number of classes for PNN25 • 
Table 4.5 shows the classification results of the neural networks on the bank lending 
decision models for the aggregate lending. The classification results show the neural 
networks, PNN and GRNN, exhibit a superior ability to learn and memorize the patterns 
corresponding to the borrower default risk (see Model 1 and 2). The overall percentage 
23 Since there is no science to determine the number of hidden neurons, getting the right number of hidden 
neurons is a matter or trial and error. However, the defaults are usually reliable (Ward Systems Group Inc., 
1993). 
24 Theoretically, there are two different types of summation units. They are simple arithmetic summations 
and weighted summations. 
25 Since there are only two types of borrowers, good and bad borrower, the number of summation unit is two 
forPNN. 
-98-
correct of PNN and GRNN, for both Modell and 2, are about 96 and 92 percent, 
respectively. Both networks offer a better classification results than the logistic regression. 
Similarly the WN and MLFN yield almost the same level of correctness as the logistic 
regreSSIOn. 
Between the PNN and the GRNN classification, the PNN has a lower Type I error than 
GRNN on both Model 1 and 2, but the GRNN Type II error on both models is slightly 
lower than the PNN (see Table 4.5). The results indicate that the PNN can predict the bad 
loan group better than the GRNN, but the GRNN is more accurate in detecting the good 
loan than the PNN, since it has 99 percent predictive power. However, the PNN is 
considered to be the best classification technique since it has the highest overall percentage 
correct in both Modell and 2. 
When Duration is introduced into the models, the results in Table 4.5 also show that both 
the PNN and the GRNN Type I error reduced from 11.65 to 10.20 percent and 54.18 to 
46.26 percent, respectively,. Therefore, the bank-borrower relationship can be considered 
as an important factor that would help to improve the classification capability of the bank 
lending decision models. 
The classification results of the neural networks on the bank lending decision models for 
agricultural lending and non-agricultural lending are shown in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7, 
respectively. The classification results provide similar findings and conclusions as the 
models for aggregate lending (see Table 4.5). Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 suggest that the 
PNN and the GRNN are superior classification techniques, since both networks have a 
higher overall percentage correct prediction than the logistic regression models. In 
contrast, the WN and the MFLN produce almost identical results found in the logistic 
regression models. Therefore, the WN and the MFLN do not outperform the logistic 
regression. 
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Table 4.5: Classification tables ofthe neural networks on the bank lending decision models 
Model 1 11 Model 227 
BL GL Overall BL GL Overall 
Logistic Regression (Logit) 
Correct 162 15,678 15,840 77 3,669 3,746 
6.39(X) 99.39(10 86.Sl(!() 10.48% 98.92% 84.29% 
Incorrect 2,374 96 2,470 658 40 698 
93.61% 0.61% 13.49% 89.52(!() 1.08% 15.71 % 
Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN) 
Correct 2,238 15,369 17,607 660 3,632 4,292 
88.35% 97.48% 96.16% 89.80% 97.92% 96.58% 
Incorrect 295 397 692 75 77 152 
11.65% 2.52% 3.84% 10.20% 2.08% 3.42% 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 
Correct 1,162 15,723 16,885 395 3,698 4,093 
45.82% 99.68% 92.22% 53.74% 99.70% 92.10% 
Incorrect 1,374 51 1,425 340 11 351 
54.18% 0.32% 7.78% 46.26% 0.30% 7.90% 
Ward Network (WN) 
Correct 413 15,524 15,937 88 3,662 3,750 
16.29% 98.42% 87.04% 11.97% 98.73% 84.38% 
Incorrect 2,123 250 2,373 647 47 694 
83.71% 1.58% 12.96% 88.03% 1.27% 15.62% 
Multiple-layer Feed-forward Neural Network (MLFN) 
Correct 289 15,546 15,835 83 3,670 3,753 
11.40% 98.55% 86.48% 11.29% 98.95% 84.45% 
Incorrect 2,247 228 2,475 652 39 691 
88.60% 1.45% 13.52% 88.71 % 1.05% 15.55% 
No. ofInputs 35 36 
No. of Observations 18,310 4,444 
Note: 11 without Duration. 
21 with Duration. 
BL and GL stand for bad loan and good loan, respectively. 
Among the four different networks, the PNN is the best classification technique in terms of 
overall accuracy. Although the GRNN can be regarded as a superior technique when 
compared to the logistic regression, it does not outperform the PNN. Furthermore, not all 
the artificial neural networks are able to deal with the classification problem better than the 
logistic regression. 
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Table 4.6: Classification tables of the neural networks on the bank lending decision models 
for agricultural lending 
Model 117 Model 227 
BL GL Overall BL GL Overall 
Logistic Regression (Logit) 
Correct 131 14,308 14,439 56 3,326 3,382 
6.02% 99.48(% 87.19% 9.30% 98.90% 85.30(% 
Incorrect 2.046 75 2,121 546 37 583 
93.98% 0.52% 12.81% 90.70% 1.10% 14.70%1 
Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN) 
Correct 1,905 14,227 16,132 532 3,295 3,827 
87.51% 98.92% 97.42% 88.37% 97.98% 96.52% 
Incorrect 272 156 428 70 68 138 
12.49% 1.08% 2.58% 11.63% 2.02% 3.48% 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 
Correct 807 14,357 15,164 297 3,353 3,650 
37.07% 99.82% 91.57% 49.34% 99.70% 92.06% 
Incorrect 1,370 26 1,396 305 10 315 
62.93% 0.18% 8.43% 50.66% 0.30% 7.94% 
Ward Network (WN) 
Correct 322 14,229 14,551 15 3,355 3,370 
14.79% 98.93% 87.87% 2.49% 99.76% 84.99% 
Incorrect 1,855 154 2,009 587 8 595 
85.21% 1.07% 12.13% 97.51% 0.24% 15.01% 
Multiple-layer Feed-forward Neural Network (MLFN) 
Correct 315 14,224 14,539 51 3,339 3,390 
14.47% 98.89% 87.80% 8.47% 99.29% 85.50% 
Incorrect 1,862 159 2,021 551 24 575 
85.53% 1.11% 12.20% 91.53% 0.71% 14.50% 
No. oflnputs 34 35 
No. of Observations 16,560 3,965 
Note: 11 without Duration. 
21 with Duration. 
BL and GL stand for bad loan and good loan, respectively. 
Table 4.8 shows the relative contribution factors of the PNN models. The mean value of 
the contribution factor is presented at the end of Table 4.8. It shows on the average how 
much an input can contribute to the model. For example, if the model consists of 35 inputs, 
an input can contribute about 0.0286 (1/35 = 0.0286) or 2.86 percent to the model. Thus, a 
higher (or a lower) input contribution value which is above (or below) the mean value of 
0.0286 is considered as an (or less) important input. 
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Table 4.7: Classification tables of the neural networks on the bank lending decision models 
for non-agricultural lending 
Model1l7 Model 227 
BL GL Overall BL GL Overall 
Logistic Regression (Logit) 
Correct 66 1,354 1,420 31 336 367 
18.38% 97.34% 81.14(Yo 23.31 % 97.11% 76.62% 
rncorrect 293 37 330 102 10 112 
81.62%) 2.66% 18.86(1<) 76.69°A, 2.89%1 23.38%) 
Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN) 
Correct 325 1,317 1,642 123 339 462 
90.53% 94.68% 93.83% 92.48% 97.98% 96.45% 
Incorrect 34 74 108 10 7 17 
9.47% 5.32% 6.17% 7.52% 2.02% 3.55% 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 
Correct 103 1,383 1,486 105 340 445 
28.69% 99.42% 84.91% 78.95% 98.27% 92.90% 
Incorrect 256 8 264 28 6 34 
71.31% 0.58% 15.09% 21.05% 1.73% 7.10% 
Ward Network (WN) 
Correct 113 1,323 1,436 22 341 363 
31.48% 95.11% 82.06% 16.54% 98.55% 75.78% 
Incorrect 246 68 314 111 5 116 
68.52% 4.89% 17.94% 83.46% 1.45% 24.22% 
Multiple-layer Feed-forward Neural Network (MLFN) 
Correct 65 1,357 1,422 23 340 363 
18.11 % 97.56% 81.26% 17.29% 98.27% 75.78% 
Incorrect 294 34 328 110 6 116 
81.89% 2.44% 18.74% 82.71% 1.73% 24.22% 
No. of Inputs 29 30 
No. of Observations 1,750 479 
Note: 1/ without Duration. 
2/ with Duration. 
BL and GL stand for bad loan and good loan, respectively. 
The relative contribution factors in Table 4.8 show that Asset, Age, Collateral and Capital 
turnover ratio are important variables in explaining the aggregate lending decision models. 
Education and Return on asset are important only in Model 1 and the relative contribution 
of Duration in Model 2 verifies the essential of the bank-borrower relationship in the bank 
lending decision model. In contrast, Sector contributes to the models less than 1 percent 
and much lower than the mean values of the contribution factor, which implies that it is not 
an important factor in the PNN models. 
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Table 4.8: Relative contribution factors ofPNN on bank lending decision models 
Relative Contribution 
Independent variables II Aggregate Agriculture Non-agriculture 
Modell Model 2 Modell Model 2 Modell Model 2 
Borrower Characteristics 
Log(asset) 0.0639 0.0567 0.0567 0.0571 0.0703 0.0293 
Age 0.0526 0.0377 0.0364 0.0544 0.0126 0.0053 
Education 0.0360 0.0110 0.0034 0.0418 0.0249 0.0139 
Credit risk proxies 
Log( collateral) 0.0506 0.0570 0.0476 0.0376 0.0880 0.0549 
Return on asset 0.0548 0.0108 0.0115 0.0036 0.0058 0.0253 
Leverage ratio 0.0158 0.0087 0.0567 0.0409 0.0072 0.0562 
Capital turnover ratio 0.0465 0.0583 0.0115 0.0155 0.0188 0.0301 
Relationship indicators 
Borrowing from others 0.0174 0.0268 0.0009 0.0342 0.0725 0.0029 
Duration 0.0325 0.0355 0.0091 
Dummy variableil 
Sector 0.0013 0.0018 
(Province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Major production) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Loan type) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Loan size) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Lending year) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of inputs 35 36 34 35 29 30 
No. of observations 18,310 4,444 16,560 3,965 1,750 479 
Mean value of the 
0.0286 0.0278 0.0294 0.0286 0.0345 0.0333 
contribution factor31 
Note: 1/ Dependent variable is bank lending decision (good/bad loan). 
2/ See Appendix 2 for the relative contribution on province, major production, loan type, loan size 
and lending year dummy variables. 
3/ Equal to lover the number of inputs used in the model. 
Bold and italic indicate that the relative contribution is above the mean value of contribution factors. 
For the agricultural lending decision models, the relative contribution factors of Model 1 
and 2 show Asset, Age, Collateral and Leverage ratio as important factors in determining 
the bank lending decision (see Table 4.8). In Model 2, Education and Borrowing from 
others also have a relatively high contribution to the model. The relative contribution of 
Duration illustrates a significant role of the bank-borrower relationship on the bank 
lending decision. 
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In case of non-agricultural lending decision models, only Collateral has a high 
contribution above the relative contribution mean value and can be regarded as a crucial 
factor in explaining thebank lending decision in both Model 1 and 2. Asset and Borrowing 
from others have a high contribution to the bank lending decision only in Model 1, while 
Leverage ratio has a high contribution to the bank lending decision only in Model 2. The 
relative contribution of Duration in Model 2 is 0.0091 which is much lower than the 
relative contribution mean value of 0.0345. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
Duration does not have a significant influence on the bank lending decision for non-
agricultural lending. 
Some of the results from the relative contribution factors of the PNN models are similar to 
those in the logistic regressions. These include: 1) Asset as a key factor for the bank 
lending decision models in both the PNN and the logistic regressions, and 2) Duration has 
a significant role only in the models for aggregate lending and agricultural lending, but not 
for non-agricultural lending. 
In contrast, some of the findings are inconsistence across the estimation techniques. For 
example, 1) Sector is not an important factor in the PNN model but is highly significant in 
the logistic regressions; 2) The relative contribution factors of the PNN models show that 
Collateral is an imperative input for all the models, particularly for the non-agricultural 
lending decision models, but it is not significant in the logistic regressions; 3) Age is 
insignificant in all the logistic models, however, it is an important factor on the PNN 
aggregate and agricultural lending decision models; 4) the PNN emphasized Leverage 
ratio rather than Capital turnover ratio in the agricultural lending decision models, but 
Leverage ratio is significant only in the Model 1 where Capital turnover ratio is 
significant in both Model 1 and 2 of the logistic regression models; and 5) The logistic 
regression results show that Return on asset has a significant impact on non-agricultural 
lending decision models. Conversely, its contributions on the PNN models are lower than 
the mean values on both Model 1 and 2. 
The comparative results between the logistic regression and the PNN suggest that both 
estimation techniques pay attention to the different sets of independent variables. As a 
result, they yield different in-sample classification results. The PNN does not only pay 
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attention to the value of Asset, but also to the value of Collateral, compared to the logistic 
regression. FurthelIDore, Age is also taken into account in the PNN for the aggregate 
lending and the agricultural lendin'g decision models. Unlike the logistic regression, the 
PNN puts more weight on the Leverage ratio than Capital turnover ratio or Return on 
asset on the agricultural lending decision models. 
There are no assumptions about the functional form and the distributions of the variables 
on the PNN model. Thus the PNN allows for nonlinear relationship and complex 
classification equations. In addition, the model is estimated via the genetic adaptive 
learning process, not the one-shot estimation process. Therefore, it has a higher ability to 
learn and memorize a complex non-linear relationship than the logistic regression26• As a 
result, the PNN generates an excellent in-sample classification results and becomes the 
superior classification model for the bank lending decision model. 
4.1.3 Out-of-sample forecast 
It is generally accepted that the within-sample forecast always yields an upward bias, since 
the model predicts well only in the in-sample forecast but its performance may be 
relatively poor on the out-of-sample forecast. Hence, to examine the future classification 
power of the model, the out-of-sample forecasting technique is more appropriate. 
To perform the out-of-sample forecast, the data set is randomly divided into 2 sub-samples: 
a training (or estimation) sample and a forecast sample. The training sample and the 
forecast sample contain 80 and 20 percent of the total observations, respectively. To 
evaluate the forecast accuracy of the model, the classification rates (percentage correct and 
percentage incorrect classifications) are computed and compared. 
The classification results of out-of-sample prediction for the logistic regression and the 
artificial neural networks on the aggregate lending decision models are presented in Table 
4.9. The results show that the PNN and the GRNN models are overfitting to the training 
sample. The overall percentage correct on out-of-sample forecasting is relatively lower 
than in-sample forecasting in most cases. In contrast, the logistic regression, the WN, and 
26 The genetic adaptive leaming process usually provides the global optimum solution in many types of 
problems. However, the estimation process is very time consuming. 
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the MLFN are not overfitting to the training sample, as the percentage correct of the 
models on both in-sample and out-of-sample forecasting are more likely the same27. 
However, the oyerfitting model can still be regarded as superior for future prediction, if it 
can perform better than the other models on out-of-sample forecasting. Further 
investigations need to be carried out to verify the best prediction model for the bank 
lending decision. 
The results in Table 4.9 show that the GRNN has the highest overall percentage correct on 
both Model 1 and 2, while the overall percentage correct of the PNN model is better than 
the logistic regression only in Model 2. Furthermore, both the WN and the MLFN models 
yield almost the same overall percentage correct as the logistic regression models. 
Therefore, the accuracy of the 3 models is similar to each other. In term of the correctness, 
only the GRNN can predict the bank lending decision more accurately than the logistic 
regression (see Table 4.9). The major finding on out-of-sample forecasting is quite 
different from the in-sample forecasting, where the PNN is considered the best 
classification model. 
A closer examination of the logistic regression performance, however, indicates that the 
logistic regression can predict well only on the good loan group. An examination of the 
Type I error rate shows that the logistic regression is unable to predict the bad loan group, 
as it has more than 90 percent of Type I error. The Type I error of the PNN is smaller than 
both the GRNN and the logistic regression, especially when Duration is introduced into the 
lending decision model (Model 2). The results show the PNN has the highest percentage 
correct when predicting the bad loan group and its performance is fairly well on predicting 
the good loan group. This suggests that the PNN can be used to predict both good and bad 
loan groups, because it strikes a balance between Type I and Type II error. 
27 Model "overfitting" can be quantified by contrasting the within-sample accuracy (where overfitting to the 
training sample may be present) with the out-of-sample accuracy (which is an unbiased assessment of the 
model's performance). In the absence of over fitting, the within-sample and out-of-sample accuracy would 
coincide (West and et aI., 1997: p387). 
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Table 4.9: Classification results of out-of-sample forecasting on the bank lending decision 
models 
Model 117 Model 227 
BL GL Overall BL GL Overall 
Logistic Regression (Logit) 
Correct 33 3,117 3,150 14 731 745 
6.30% 99.33% 86.02% 9.46% 98.78% 83.90% 
Incorrect 491 21 512 134 9 143 
93.70% 0.67% 13.98% 90.54% 1.22% 16.10% 
Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN) 
Correct 226 2,817 3,043 73 675 748 
43.38% 90.00% 83.10% 49.32% 91.22% 84.23% 
Incorrect 295 313 608 75 65 140 
56.62% 10.00% 16.90% 50.68% 8.78% 15.77% 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 
Correct 105 3,097 3,202 34 731 765 
20.04% 98.69% 87.44% 22.97% 98.78% 86.15% 
Incorrect 419 41 460 114 9 123 
79.96% 1.31% 12.56% 77.03% 1.22% 13.85% 
Ward Network (WN) 
Correct 75 3,085 3,160 13 728 741 
14.31% 98.31% 86.29% 8.78% 98.38% 83.45% 
Incorrect 449 53 502 135 12 147 
85.69% 1.69% 13.71% 91.22% 1.62% 16.55% 
MUltiple-layer Feed-forward Neural Network (MLFN) 
Correct 55 3,090 3,145 12 730 742 
10.50% 98.47% 85.88% 8.11% 98.65% 83.56% 
Incorrect 469 48 517 136 10 146 
89.50% 1.53% 14.12% 91.89% 1.35% 16.44% 
No. of Observations 3,662 888 
Note: II without Duration. 
21 with Duration. 
BL and GL stand for bad loan and good loan, respectively. 
Although the GRNN has the highest overall percentage correct and a very low Type II 
error on both Model 1 and 2, it is not reasonable to conclude that the GRNN is a superior 
model for the bank lending decision model. This is because the GRNN Type I error is 
higher than the PNN, and the overall percentage correct is calculated under the assumption 
that the misclassification costs of both Type I and Type II errors are identical. Since it is 
generally accepted that Type I error (accepted a bad loan as a good loan) has a higher 
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misclassification cost, the overall percentage correct may be misleading in this case, as it 
ignores the relative cost difference between Type I and Type II error28 . 
Table 4.10 presents the out-of-sample forecast results on the bank lending decision models 
for agricultural lending. The results show that the logistic regression, the WN, and the 
MLFN have the same level of prediction accuracy. The GRNN has the highest overall 
prediction accuracy with a relatively small Type II error on both Modell and 2. The PNN 
is more accurate than the logistic regression only in Modell. However, the PNN Type I 
error is lower than the logistic regression on both models, particularly Model 2. 
The results in Table 4.10 also show that the logistic regression can predict the good loan 
group slightly better than the GRNN and the PNN, but it can correctly predict the bad loan 
group only about 4 and 5 percent on Modell and 2, respectively. Although the PNN is not 
the best model in term of overall prediction accuracy, it has the lowest Type I error (59.83 
percent) in Model 2 and its Type I error is marginally higher than the GRNN in Modell. 
The results in Table 10 are similar to the findings and conclusions in the aggregate lending 
decision models. 
The out-of-sample forecast classification results of the non-agricultural lending decision 
models are shown in Table 4.11. The results indicate that both the PNN and the GRNN 
perform better than the logistic regression on out-of-sample forecasting. Furthermore, the 
PNN has the highest overall prediction accuracy and the lowest Type I error on both Model 
I and 2. Even though the PNN has a relatively high Type II error when compare to the 
other models, the percentage correct prediction on the good loan group is higher than 90 
percent. Therefore, the PNN can be considered as the superior model in predicting the bank 
lending decision for non-agricultural lending. 
28 If the misclassification cost of Type I enor is significantly greater than Type II enor, then a large overall 
accuracy rate with a large Type I enor rate would be costlier than a small overall accuracy rate with a small 
Type I error rate (Etheridge and Sriram, 1996). 
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Table 4.10: Classification results of out-of-sample forecasting on the bank lending decision 
models for agricultural lending 
Model1l7 Model 227 
BL GL Overall BL GL Overall 
Logistic Regression (Logit) 
Correct 18 2,851 2,869 6 670 676 
4.05% 99.41% 86.62% 5.13% 99.11% 85.25% 
Incorrect 426 17 443 111 6 117 
95.95% 0.59% 13.38% 94.87% 0.89% 14.75% 
Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN) 
Correct 49 2,846 2,895 47 619 666 
11.04% 99.23% 87.41% 40.17% 91.57% 83.98% 
Incorrect 395 22 417 70 57 127 
88.96% 0.77% 12.59% 59.83% 8.43% 16.02% 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 
Correct 69 2,849 2,918 18 667 685 
15.54% 99.34% 88.10% 15.38% 98.67% 86.38% 
Incorrect 375 19 394 99 9 108 
84.46% 0.66% 11.90% 84.62% 1.33% 13.62% 
Ward Network (WN) 
Correct 47 2,838 2,885 1 674 675 
10.59% 98.95% 87.11% 0.85% 99.70% 85.12% 
Incorrect 397 30 427 116 2 118 
89.41 % 1.05% 12.89% 99.15% 0.30% 14.88% 
Multiple-layer Feed-forward Neural Network (MLFN) 
Correct 47 2,843 2,890 5 671 676 
10.59% 99.13% 87.26% 4.27% 99.26% 85.25% 
Incorrect 397 25 422 112 5 117 
89.41 % 0.87% 12.74% 95.73% 0.74% 14.75% 
No. of Observations 3,312 793 
Note: 1/ without Duration. 
21 with Duration. 
BL and GL stand for bad loan and good loan, respectively. 
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Table 4.11: Classification results of out-of-sample forecasting on the bank lending decision 
models for non-agricultural lending 
Model 117 Model 227 
BL GL Overall BL GL Overall 
Logistic Regression (Logit) 
Correct 6 271 277 5 57 62 
8.22% 97.83% 79.14% 17.24% 86.36% 65.26% 
Incorrect 67 6 73 24 9 33 
91.78% 2.17% 20.86% 82.76% 13.64% 34.74% 
Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN) 
Correct 39 253 292 19 62 81 
53.42% 91.34% 83.43% 65.52% 93.94% 85.26% 
Incorrect 34 24 58 10 4 14 
46.58% 8.66% 16.57% 34.48% 6.06% 14.74% 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 
Correct 10 270 280 13 64 77 
13.70% 97.47% 80.00% 44.83% 96.97% 81.05% 
Incorrect 63 7 70 16 2 18 
86.30% 2.53% 20.00% 55.17% 3.03% 18.95% 
Ward Network (WN) 
Correct 18 261 279 3 66 69 
24.66% 94.22% 79.71% 10.34% 100.00% 72.63% 
Incorrect 55 16 71 26 26 
75.34% 5.78% 20.29% 89.66% 0.00% 27.37% 
Multiple-layer Feed-forward Neural Network (MLFN) 
Correct 8 269 277 3 64 67 
10.96% 97.11% 79.14% 10.34% 96.97% 70.53% 
Incorrect 65 8 73 26 2 28 
89.04% 2.89% 20.86% 89.66% 3.03% 29.47% 
No. of Observations 350 95 
Note: II without Duration. 
21 with Duration. 
BL and GL stand for bad loan and good loan, respectively. 
The results in Modell (without Duration) in Table 4.11 show that the overall percentage 
correct of the GRNN, the WN, and the MLFN are very close to the overall percentage 
correct of the logistic regression, but the GRNN, the WN, and the MLFN Type I errors are 
lower than the logistic regression. In contrast, all 3 models perform much better than the 
logistic regression when the Duration is included (see Model 2). The 3 models have higher 
overall prediction accuracy and lower Type II error than the logistic regression. However, 
the WN and the MLFN Type I errors are larger than the logistic regression. Therefore, the 
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WN and the MLFN might not outperform the logistic regression on the out-of-sample 
forecasting. 
4.1.4 Expected misclassification loss of the qlodels 
The misclassification costs of Type I and Type II errors must be differentiated and 
accounted for when interpreting the results (Anandarajan et aI., 2001, and Etheridge and 
Sriram, 1997). The expected loss of misclassification on out-of-sample forecasting must be 
estimated. The bank lending decision model that offers the smallest expected loss IS 
considered the most preferable model. 
According to Koh (1992), the expected misclassification loss (EL) of the model can be 
calculated by using the following equation: 
where 
EL = (PB) (PI) (CI) + (PG) (PlI) (ClI) 
PB = prior probability of being bad loan, 
PO = prior probability of being good loan, 
(4.2) 
PI = conditional probability of Type I error (= No. of Type I errors given by the 
model! No. of bad loans), 
PII = conditional probability of Type II error (= No. of Type II errors given by 
the model! No. of good loans), 
CI = misclassification costs of Type I error, 
CII = misclassification costs of Type II error. 
It is important to differentiate between Type I and Type II error costs, because the 
misclassification loss to the bank from Type I error is generally greater than Type II error. 
The consequences of incorrect classification are intangible and immeasurable, such as loss 
of existing and potential clients, loss of depositor's trustworthy, etc. Thus, CI and CII are 
not quantified in this research. However, to overcome the misclassification costs dilemma, 
the relative misclassification costs of Type I and Type II errors are used. The relative cost 
ratios are assumed to vary accordingly from 1:1,2:1,3:1,4:1 and 5:1, with the relatively 
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higher misclassification cost on Type I error where a bad loan is classified as a good 10an29 
(Koh, 1992; Novak and LaDue, 1999). 
Table 4.12 summanzes the model expected misclassification loss on out-of-sample 
forecasting at different relative cost ratios. For aggregate lending, the GRNN with 
Duration (Model 2) has the lowest expected loss of misclassification when the relative cost 
ratio of Type I and Type II errors is 1: 1. Although the PNN with Duration (Model 2) has 
lower overall percentage correct than the GRNN (Model 2) on out-of-sample forecasting, 
when the cost ratio is 2: 1 or higher, the PNN becomes the top perfonner since it has the 
lowest expected loss. 
The PNN and the GRNN give lower expected cost than the logistic regression at all levels 
of relative cost ratio, except the PNN at 1: 1 cost ratio. The logistic regression with 
Duration (Model 2) has lower expected cost of misclassification than the Model 2 of WN 
and MLFN at all relative cost ratios (see Table 4.12). However, when the cost ratio is 3:1 
or higher, the logistic regression without Duration should not be used to predict the bank 
lending decision for the aggregate lending because it has the highest expected cost. 
The expected loss results on out-of-samp1e prediction for agricultural lending in Table 4.12 
show that the GRNN (Model 1 without Duration) offers the lowest misclassification cost 
at 1: 1 relative cost ratio. When the relative cost ratio increases, the PNN (Model 2 with 
Duration) generates the minimum relative error costs. Thus, the PNN and the GRNN can 
perfonn better than the logistic regression, excluding the Model 2 PNN at 1: 1 relative cost 
ratio. However, the Model 2 logistic regression has lower expected loss than the WN and 
the MLFN in most cases, but not Model 1 where the logistic regression is relatively more 
costly than the WN and the MLFN. 
29 According to BAAC annual report (2003), doubtful accounts are estimated at 40, 70 and 100 percent of the 
loan principal overdue for less than 1 year, 1 year or more but not exceeding 2 years, and more than 2 years, 
respectively. Furthermore, the uncollected due interest payments are recorded in full amount as doubtful 
accounts. Thus, the relative cost ratio between Type I and Type II errors should be much greater than 1: 1. 
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Table 4.12: Expected loss ofmisc1assification on out-of-sample forecasting 
Model Cost Ratio eCI : CII} 
1:1 2:1 3:1 4:1 5:1 
Aggregate lending 
Logistic Regression (Logit) 
Modell 0.1355 0.2653 0.3951 0.5249 0.6547 
Model 2 0.1359 0.2613 0.3867 0.5121 0.6375 
Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN) 
Modell 0.1646 0.2430 0.3214 0.3998 0.4783 
Model 2 0.1459 0.2160 0.2862 0.3564 0.4266 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 
Modell 0.1220 0.2328 0.3435 0.4543 0.5650 
Model 2 0.1172 0.2238 0.3305 0.4372 0.5439 
Ward Network (WN) 
Modell 0.1332 0.2519 0.3706 0.4893 0.6079 
Model 2 0.1403 0.2666 0.3930 0.5193 0.6457 
Multiple-layer Feed-forward Neural Network (MLFN) 
Modell 0.1371 0.2611 0.3851 0.5090 0.6330 
Model 2 0.1389 0.2662 0.3935 0.5207 0.6480 
Agricultural lending 
Logistic Regression (Logit) 
Modell 0.1313 0.2574 0.3835 0.5097 0.6358 
Model 2 0.1324 0.2571 0.3819 0.5066 0.6313 
Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN) 
Modell 0.1236 0.2406 0.3575 0.4745 0.5914 
Model 2 0.1519 0.2305 0.3092 0.3878 0.4665 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 
Modell 0.1168 0.2278 0.3388 0.4499 0.5609 
Model 2 0.1228 0.2340 0.3453 0.4565 0.5677 
Ward Network (WN) 
Modell 0.1266 0.2442 0.3617 0.4793 0.5968 
Model 2 0.1329 0.2632 0.3936 0.5239 0.6543 
Multiple-layer Feed-forward Neural Network (MLFN) 
Modell 0.1251 0.2427 0.3602 0.4778 0.5953 
Model 2 0.1323 0.2581 0.3840 0.5098 0.6356 
Non-agricultural lending 
Logistic Regression (Logit) 
Modell 0.2055 0.3938 0.5821 0.7703 0.9586 
Model 2 0.2782 0.4479 0.6177 0.7875 0.9573 
Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN) 
Modell 0.1644 0.2600 0.3555 0.4511 0.5466 
Model 2 0.1189 0.1897 0.2604 0.3311 0.4019 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 
Modell 0.1971 0.3742 0.5512 0.7283 0.9053 
Model 2 0.1373 0.2505 0.3636 0.4768 0.5900 
Ward Network (WN) 
Modell 0.2005 0.3550 0.5096 0.6642 0.8187 
Model 2 0.1839 0.3678 0.5518 0.7357 0.9196 
Multiple-layer Feed-forward Neural Network (MLFN) 
Modell 0.2056 0.3883 0.5709 0.7536 0.9363 
Model 2 0.2080 0.3919 0.5759 0.7598 0.9437 
Note: Model 1 and 2 are without and with Duration, respectively. 
Bold and italic indicate the minimum expected loss. 
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In case of non-agricultural lending, the PNN with Duration (Model 2) yields the lowest 
expected misclassification loss consistently for all the levels of relative cost ratios (see 
Table 4.12). In addition, all the artificial neural networks models (PNN, GRNN, WN and 
MLFN) perform better than the logistic regression models when compared in terms of 
relative error costs, except for the MLFN (Modell) when the relative cost ratio is 1: 1. The 
Model 2 logistic regression grants the highest misclassification cost for all relative cost 
ratios, except at a 5: 1 cost ratio, where the Modell logistic regression has the highest 
expected cost of incorrect classification. 
In summary, in terms of prediction accuracy, the PNN can be considered as the best 
prediction model for in-sample forecasting (see Table 4.5,4.6, and 4.7). However, for out-
of-sample forecasting, the overall percentage correct of the GRNN is the highest on 
aggregate and agricultural lending, while the PNN is still the best prediction model for 
non-agricultural lending (see Table 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11). The GRNN and the PNN perform 
better than the logistic regression on out-of-sample forecasting. In most cases, the logistic 
regression performances are quite similar to the WN and the MLFN on both in-sample and 
out-of-sample forecast. Therefore, the results suggest that in term of precision, only some 
types of neural networks can predict the bank lending decision better than the logistic 
regressIon. 
To account for misclassification costs, the expected loss is calculated at various cost ratios. 
The results in Table 4.12 show that when the relative cost between Type I and Type II 
errors is 2: 1 or higher, the PNN with Duration (Model 2) proposes the lowest 
misclassification costs. Therefore, it can be concluded that the PNN (Model 2) is the 
superior model in predicting the bank lending decision, since the Type I error (classifying a 
bad loan as a good loan) is more costly than the Type II error (classifying a good loan as a 
bad loan). 
4.2 Credit availability model 
The estimated results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the credit 
availability models are shown in Table 4.13. The estimated results in Modell and 2 
(without and with Duration) show that all explanatory variables can explain for 74.10 and 
75.76 percent of the total variation in credit availability, respectively. Furthermore, the null 
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hypothesis that all explanatory variable coefficients are jointly zero can be rejected, since 
the F-statistics on both models are highly significant. Therefore, the results indicate that 
both models fit the data quite well. However, the coefficient of determination (R2) and 
Root Mean Squares Error (RMSE) of Model 2 are slightly higher and lower than Model 1, 
respectively. Therefore, the result implies that the model that includes Duration might 
explain the variation of credit availability slightly better than the model without Duration. 
The dummy variables for Sector, Provinces, Major productions, Loan types, Loan sizes 
and Lending years in both models are highly significant in explaining credit availability. 
The estimated results are consistent with the financial theory. For example, the positive 
coefficient of Long-term loan, compared to the other dummy variables in the same group, 
suggests that long-term loan is normally granted a larger amount of credit than short-term 
loan and medium-term loan. Furthermore, the borrowers who have livestock or aquaculture 
as the major production received a bigger amount of credit from the bank when compared 
to the other types of production. 
The negative sign on Sector implies that agricultural loans generally obtained a lower 
amount of credit than non-agricultural loans. This is because an agricultural loan is more 
risky in nature and has a higher operating cost than non-agricultural loan. The result is 
consistent with the standard practice of the commercial bank. 
The positive and negative coefficients of the province dummy variables are indicative of 
an increase or decrease in the amount of credit granted on the loan contract in a specific 
province relative to the other provinces. For instance, the volume of credit for the loan 
agreement in Province 15, which is in the irrigation area and a major tourist province, is 
higher than Province 9, which is in the rainy area and has paddy rice as a major crop, by 
24.41 percent on the average (the coefficient of Province 9 is not significantly different 
from zero) (see Table 4.13, Model 2). Since the credit risk and the credit worthiness of the 
borrower might differ from province to province, the availability of credit varies in 
accordance with the province risk. 
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Table 4.13: Credit availability models 
Independent variables 11 
Coefficients27 
Modell Model 2 
Borrower Characteristics 
Log(asset) 0.0515*'" 0.0651 ** 
Age -0.0026*'" -0.0014 
Education -0.0351'"'' -0.0633'* 
Credit risk proxies 
Log( collateral) 0.1587*" 0.1711** 
Return on asset -0.0053 0.0010 
Leverage ratio 0.0145 0.0747 
Capital turnover ratio 0.0081 ** 0.0092** 
Relationship indicators 
Borrowing from others -0.0393*" -0.0593** 
Duration -0.0229** 
Dummy variables31 
Sector -0.1211 ** -0.0800** 
(Province) 
Province 2 0.0580** 0.1412** 
Province 3 0.0576** 0.1195** 
Province 4 0.0616** 0.1143 
Province 5 0.0116 0.1048* 
Province 6 -0.0115 0.1224** 
Province 7 0.1191** 0.1459"" 
Province 8 -0.0551 *" 0.0452 
Province 9 -0.0166 0.0660 
Province 10 0.2224** 0.1948** 
Province 11 0.1612** 0.1796** 
Province 12 0.0665** -0.1128 
Province 13 0.2513** 0.1878** 
Province 14 0.2277** 0.1710* 
Province 15 0.2797** 0.2441 ** 
Province 16 0.1463** 0.1308"" 
Province 17 0.1714** 0.1248** 
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Table 4.13: Credit availability models (Cont) 
Independent variables 11 
Coeffici ents27 
Modell Model 2 
(Major production) 
Horticulture 0.0180 -0.0455 
OrchardN egetable 0.0529** 0.0224 
Livestock! Aquaculture 0.1396*'" 0.0831 ... 
(Loan type) 
Short-term loan -0.1666 ... • -0.187i" 
Medium-term loan 0.1725*'" 0.1132** 
Long-term loan 0.3684** 0.2678*" 
(Loan size) 
Medium loan 1.2116** 1.1832*" 
Large loan 2.7777"'" 2.7331** 
(Lending year) 
2001 0.0387* 0.0222 
2002 -0.0087 0.0341 ** 
Constant 7.8563** 7.6453"" 
R-squared 0.7410 0.7576 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7405 0.7556 
RMSE 0.5007 0.4774 
F -statistic 1493.69** 382.58** 
No. of Observations 18,310 4,444 
Note: 1/ Dependent variable is log(volume of credit). 
2/ White adjustment for estimation a heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix. 
3/ To avoid singularity problem, a dummy variable is dropped from each group. 
*, ** represent 10% and 5% significant level, respectively. 
The results in Model 1 and 2 also demonstrate that Asset, Collateral and Capital turnover 
ratio have a positive impact on the availability of credit as hypothesised. From Model 2, 
the estimated coefficients indicate that a 1 percent increased in Asset, Collateral and 
Capital turnover ratio would increase the amount of credit granted by 0.0651, 0.1711 and 
0.0092 percent, respectively (see Table 4.13). Thus, the results show that bank places a 
high emphasis on the value of collateral pledged when determining the volume of credit. 
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The results in Table 4.13 show that Education, Borrowing from others, and Duration have 
a negative impact on the credit availability. Only Borrowing from others is found as 
hypothesised and is consistent with Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Angelini et al. (1998) 
findings 30. The estimated coefficient on Borrowing from other in Model 2 suggests that if 
the borrowers have an outstanding debt with other financial sources, the amount of credit 
on the loan agreement would be reduced by 5.93 percent on the average. 
Although the estimated coefficient of Duration is negative and contradicts with the 
hypothesised sign3!, the effect of the bank-borrower relationship on credit availability 
could not be rejected, because the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5 
percent level (see Tab Ie 4.13, Model 2). The result shows that an additional year of the 
bank-borrower relationship would decrease the amount of credit granted to the borrower by 
2.29 percent. This implies that a longer relationship between the bank and the borrower 
enables the bank to be a more efficient lender. The bank would utilize the information and 
monitors the lending risk by the use of credit availability channel (controlling the loan 
amount). 
Education and Age are expected to have a positive relationship with the amount of credit 
granted. However, the estimated results in Table 4.13 provide evidences of negative 
relationships on both variables. The negative sign on Age is consistent with Petersen and 
Rajan (1994), Angelini et al. (1998), and Harhoff and Korting (1998) findings. However, 
Age is eliminated when the Duration is introduced into the model. Therefore, the result 
confirms the influence of the bank-borrower relationship on the credit availability. The 
negative sign on Education implies that the borrower whose education level is higher than 
primary school is more likely to receive less credit from the bank. This implies that an 
educated borrower is a rational borrower and borrows only the required amount from the 
bank to minimize the interest expense. 
In Table 4.13, Modell, the effect of Return on asset and Leverage ratio on the amount of 
credit granted is found to be negative and positive, respectively. The results are not 
30 Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Angelini et al. (1998) concluded that those firms that maintain multiple-
bank relationships are more credit constrained than single-bank firms. 
31 Petersen and Rajan (1994), Burger and Udell (1995) and Akhavein et al. (2004) found that the duration of 
the relationship has a positive relationship to the credit available to borrowers. Therefore, the result found on 
this research is not consistent with them. 
-118-
consistent with the financial theory. The estimated sign on Return on asset is positive when 
Duration is introduced into the model (see Model 2) but Leverage ratio is positive and 
inconsistence with the hypothesised sign. However, the t-statistic shows that both Return 
on asset and Leverage ratio do not have a significant impact on the volume of credit 
granted. 
The results in Table 4.13 show that Asset, Education, Collateral, Capital turnover ratio are 
the key factors affecting the amount of credit granted to the borrower in rural lending. Age, 
Return on asset and Leverage ratio, on the other hand, do not have a significant impact on 
the amount of loan granted. Furthermore, the significant of Borrowing from others and 
Duration confirms the important of relationship lending in the rural financial market. The 
negative relationship between Duration and the availability of credit, which contradict the 
hypothesis, signifies that the bank uses the information obtained from the relationship to 
monitor the lending risk through credit availability. 
4.2.1 Credit availability models for agricultural and non-agricultural lending 
The estimated coefficients of Sector are significant at the 5 percent level, implying that the 
amount of credit provided to the borrower would depend upon the Sector (see Table 4.13). 
Thus, the factors affecting the volume of credit may not have the same influence on the 
different lending sectors. 
To estimate the credit availability models for agricultural lending and non-agricultural 
lending, Sector is excluded from the models because the model is segregated according to 
the lending sectors. For non-agricultural lending, Province 11 and the year 2001 dummy 
variables are removed from the models, due to insufficient information. Furthermore, to 
avoid the singularity problem when the non-agricultural lending models are estimated, 
Horticulture, Short-term loan, and Medium-term loan dummy variables are also excluded 
from the models. This is because most of the non-agricultural loans are Long-term loan 
and there are only three different groups found on the borrower's major production. 
The results in Table 4.14 (Modell) confirm the important of Asset, Age, Education, 
Collateral, Capital turnover ratio and BorrOWing from others as important factors in 
determining the credit availability for agricultural lending. The effects of Age and 
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Education to the volume of credit are negative and consistent with the results in the 
aggregate model discussed previously (see Table 4.13). 
When Duration is included into the credit availability model, Age and Capital turnover 
ratio become insignificance (see Table 4.14, Model 2). Only Asset, Education, Collateral, 
Borrowing from others and Duration are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
level. The effects of Asset and Collateral are both uniformly positive, while the effects of 
Education, Borrowing from other and Duration are negative. Furthermore, the bank relies 
on the borrower characteristics (Asset and Education) rather than financial performance 
(Return on asset, Leverage ratio, and Capital turnover ratio) when determining the amount 
of credit for an agricultural loan. 
The province, major production, loan type, loan size and lending year dummy coefficients 
on both models are significant at the 5 percent level. The estimated results show that the 
volume of credit granted on the agricultural loan is partially determined by province, loan 
type, loan size and lending year. However, the amount of credit funding might not 
necessarily be determined by farm type or the borrower major production. This is because 
the coefficients of major production dummy variables in Model 2 are not significantly 
different from zero (see Table 4.14). The borrower may borrow the money from the bank 
for investing in other agricultural production in addition to their major production. 
Table 4.15 shows the estimated results of the credit availability models for non-agricultural 
lending. Overall, the results are quite different from the models for aggregate lending and 
agricultural lending. In Model 1, apart from the dummy variables which are used as control 
variables, only Asset and Collateral have significant influence on the availability of credit 
on non-agricultural loan contract. The variables such as Age, Education, Capital turnover 
ratio and Borrowing from others are significant in the credit availability models for 
aggregate lending and agricultural lending but insignificant in the non-agricultural lending 
models. Both Return on asset and Leverage ratio do not impact the volume of credit 
granted, and the results are similar to the aggregate lending and agricultural lending 
models. 
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Table 4.14: Credit availability models for agricultural lending 
Independent variables ll 
Coefficients27 
Model 1 Model 2 
Borrower Characteristics 
Log(asset) 0.0533*'" 0.0651 ** 
Age -0.0027** -0.0011 
Education -0.0401 ** -0.0735** 
Credit risk proxies 
Lo g( co llateral) 0.1574** 0.1718** 
Return on asset -0.0064 0.0067 
Leverage ratio 0.0154 0.0529 
Capital turnover ratio 0.0082** 0.0068 
Relationship indicators 
Borrowing from others -0.0396** -0.0541 * 
Duration -0.0251 ** 
Dummy variables31 
(Province) 
Province 2 0.0622** 0.1372** 
Province 3 0.0543*'" 0.1013* 
Province 4 0.0679** 0.1924 
Province 5 0.0131 0.1132* 
Province 6 -0.0172 0.1276** 
Province 7 0.0929** 0.0922** 
Province 8 -0.0771 ** 0.0185 
Province 9 -0.0216 0.0395 
Province 10 0.2339** 0.2061 ** 
Province 11 0.1663** 0.1842** 
Province 12 0.0921** -0.0099 
Province 13 0.2588** 0.2036** 
Province 14 0.2556** 0.1934* 
Province 15 0.2873** 0.2501 ** 
Province 16 0.1565** 0.1348** 
Province 17 0.1810** 0.1325** 
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Table 4.14: Credit availability models for agricultural lending (Cont) 
Independent variables 11 
(Major produ~tion) 
Horticulture 
Orchard/Vegetable 
Li vestockJ Aquaculture 
(Loan type) 
Short-term loan 
Medium-term loan 
Long-term loan 
(Loan size) 
Medium loan 
Large loan 
(Lending year) 
2001 
2002 
Constant 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
RMSE 
F -statistic 
No. of Observations 
Coefficients21 
Model 1 Model 2 
0.0127 
0.0461* 
0.1408*'" 
-0.1525 .... 
0.1806** 
0.3831 ...... 
1.2032** 
2.7930 .... 
0.0342* 
-0.0094 
7.7337** 
0.7384 
0.7379 
0.4992 
1371.85** 
16,560 
Note: 11 Dependent variable is log(volume of credit). 
-0.0543 
0.0096 
0.0795 
-0.1859*'" 
0.1221 ** 
0.2887** 
1.1430** 
2.6529** 
0.0248 
0.0335* 
7.5617** 
0.7564 
0.7542 
0.4645 
348.54** 
3,965 
2/ White adjustment for estimation a heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix. 
3/ To avoid singularity problem, a dummy variable is dropped from each group. 
*, ** represent 10% and 5% significant level, respectively. 
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Table 4.15: Credit availability models for non-agricultural lending 
Independent variables \I 
Coefficients27 
Modell Model 2 
Borrower Characteristics 
Log(asset) 0.0433*'" 0.0604* 
Age -0.0012 -0.0029 
Education 0.0030 0.0067 
Credit risk proxies 
Log( collateral) 0.1679** 0.1803*'" 
Return on asset 0.0026 -0.0214 
Leverage ratio 0.0304 0.0840 
Capital turnover ratio 0.0063 0.0177** 
Relationship indicators 
Borrowing from others -0.0497 -0.0539 
Duration 0.0009 
Dummy variables3/ 
(Province) 
Province 1 -0.0550 -0.1539 
Province 2 -0.0782* 0.0124 
Province 3 0.1839* 0.5132** 
Province 4 -0.0993 -0.5705** 
Province 5 -0.0738 -0.1415 
Province 6 -0.0809 -0.1434 
Province 7 0.1704** 0.2820** 
Province 8 -0.0850* 0.0091 
Province 9 -0.1398** 0.1295 
Province 10 0.0014 0.1524 
Province 12 -0.5053** -0.7273** 
Province 13 -0.0501 -0.3462 
Province 14 0.0059 0.0085 
Province 15 -0.0349 0.0940 
Province 17 -0.0992 -0.1501 
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Table 4.15: Credit availability models for non-agricultural lending (Cont) 
Independent variables}/ 
(Major production) 
Orchard/Vegetable 
Livestock! Aquaculture 
(Loan type) 
Long-term loan 
(Loan size) 
Medium loan 
Large loan 
(Lending year) 
2002 
Constant 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
RMSE 
F -statistic 
No. of Observations 
Modell 
Note: 11 Dependent variable is log(volume of credit). 
Coefficients27 
0.0104 
-0.0476 
0.0591 
1.2336** 
2.7624** 
-0.0144 
8.1851*'" 
0.7416 
0.7372 
0.5017 
170.22"* 
1,750 
Model 2 
0.0984 
0.2277** 
0.2180 
1.4383** 
2.9618** 
-0.0201 
7.4837*· 
0.7715 
0.7562 
0.5379 
50.43 ** 
479 
2/ White adjustment for estimation a heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix. 
3/ To avoid singularity problem, a dummy variable is dropped from each group. 
*, ** represent 10% and 5% significant level, respectively. 
The estimated results of Model 2 in Table 4.15 show that Capital turnover ratio is 
significant after Duration is included in the model. There are 3 major variables (Asset, 
Collateral and Capital turnover ratio) which can be used to resolve the volume of credit 
supply to the non-agricultural loan contract. The significant of Capital turnover ratio in 
Model 2 implies that the bank does not consider only the borrower characteristic (Asset), 
but also concern about the borrower's financial performance (efficiency) on the volume of 
credit granted to non-agricultural lending. The result is quite different from agricultural 
lending where only the borrower characteristics are considered when the volume of credit 
is determined. 
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The estimated signs of Borrowing from others and Duration are negative and positive, 
respectively, and consistent with the expected signs (see Table 4.15). However, they are 
not significantly different from zero. The results indicate that the bank-borrower 
relationship does not have an impact on the availability of credit for non-agricultural 
lending. As a result, it can be concluded that the relationship lending is not a crucial factor 
in determining the amount of credit granted for a non-agricultural loan. 
In Modell, there are only 5 out of the 15 provinces that are significant at the 10 percent 
level, whilst only 4 provinces are significant in Model 2 (see Table 4.l5). The estimated 
results show that on average, some provinces could receive a larger volume of credit than 
the others. Therefore, the impact of province on the availability of credit still exists. There 
is no evidence that the amount of credit granted is influenced by the types of loans. This is 
because most of the non-agricultural loans are long term loans and the coefficients of 
Long-term loan are insignificant in both models. Alternatively, the significance of 
Livestock/Aquaculture dummy variable in Model 2 implies that the borrower who has an 
animal farm would be able to receive more financial support from the bank on their non-
agricultural loan contract. The insignificance of many variables on both models could be 
partly caused by the small number of observations in non-agricultural lending. 
In summary, Table 4.l3, 4.14, and 4.15 suggest that the factors determining the credit 
availability are influenced by lending sectors. In Table 4.13, the negative signs on Sector 
demonstrate that on the average, borrowing for investing in agricultural productions would 
receive a smaller amount of credit from the bank than borrowing for non-agricultural 
productions. Furthermore, the results from Table 4.14 and 4.15 indicate that the bank pays 
more attention to the borrower characteristics (Asset and Education) when determining the 
amount of credit for an agricultural loan. For the non-agricultural loan, the bank does not 
consider only the borrower characteristic (Asset), but they are also concerned about the 
borrower's financial performance (Capital turnover ratio) when determining that amount 
of credit. Collateral may be considered a very important factor influencing the availability 
of credit for both agricultural and non-agricultural lending, because the bank could make a 
claim over it in case of default. There is also no evidence of relationship lending found on 
the credit availability models for non-agricultural lending. In addition, for agricultural 
lending, the negative sign shown on Borrowing from others and Duration suggest that the 
bank manages the lending risk by controlling the amount of credit granted. 
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4.2.2 Artificial neural networks and credit availability models 
The artificial neural networks technique is employed to model the bank's decision on the 
quantity of loan to the borrower in the rural area. Three different forms of the artificial 
neural networks, including general regression neural network (GRNN), Ward network 
(WN) and multi-layer feed-forward neural network (MLFN), are conducted. Because the 
probabilistic neural network (PNN) is a specific network for a classification problem, it is 
inappropriate to apply the pNN on the prediction problem where the output is a continuous 
value. The data set, input, and output variables used for the neural networks models are 
identical to the data set and variables used for the multiple regression models in the 
previous subsection. The number of hidden neurons used on each network is set as the 
default value provided by Neuroshe112 (see Subsection 5.1.2 for details). 
The results show that both the GRNN and the WN, can estimate the amount of credit 
granted more precisely than the regression model (see Table 4.16). However, it is 
inconclusive whether that the artificial neural networks technique outperforms the 
regression technique, since the results from the MLFN models are better than the 
regression models in some cases only. In addition, the results imply that the information 
gain from the bank-borrower relationship would help to improve the model performance. 
Furthermore, the results in Table 4.16 also show that the GRNN is the best model in 
assessing the volume of credit granted, since it yields the highest R2 and the lowest RMSE 
on both aggregate and segregated models. 
However, the results do not provide a strong and conclusive evidence of superiority in tetID 
of prediction capability as shown by the sample results. The out-of-sample forecast and 
forecast evaluation are conducted in the next section to explore the predictive power of the 
artificial neural networks models and the regression models. 
The GRNN is considered as the best network for in-sample forecast and only the relative 
contribution factor from the GRNN on the credit availability models are presented in Table 
4.17. The mean value of the contribution factor is used as an indicator to specify the 
relative important of the factors because the connection weights of the neural networks can 
not be tested directly. 
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Table 4.16: Neural Networks R-squared (R2) and Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) on 
credit availability models 
Type of networks 
Aggregate lending 
Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 
Ward Network (WN) 
Multi-layer Feed-forward Network (MLFN) 
No. of Observations 
Agricultural lending 
Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 
Ward Network (WN) 
Multi-layer Feed-forward Network (MLFN) 
No. of Observations 
Non-agricultural lending 
MUltiple LiJ1ear Regression (MLR) 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 
Ward Network (WN) 
Multi-layer Feed-forward Network (MLFN) 
No. of Observations 
Note: II without Duration. 
21 with Duration. 
Model 117 
R2 RMSE 
0.7410 0.5007 
0.7911 0.4497 
0.7430 0.4990 
0.7358 0.5060 
18,310 
0.7384 0.4992 
0.7924 0.4447 
0.7472 0.4909 
0.7318 0.5060 
16,560 
0.7416 0.5017 
0.8572 0.3728 
0.8004 0.4405 
0.7545 0.4889 
1,750 
Bold and italic indicate (alternatively) the highest R2 or the lowest RMSE. 
Model 227 
R2 RMSE 
0.7576 0.4774 
0.8325 0.3967 
0.7897 0.4450 
0.7872 0.4472 
4,444 
0.7564 0.4645 
0.8386 0.3781 
0.7855 0.4359 
0.7608 0.4604 
3,965 
0.7715 0.5379 
0.8696 0.4062 
0.7897 0.5158 
0.7676 0.5422 
479 
The relative contribution factor of the GRNN on credit availability models in Table 4.17 
shows that Asset and Collateral are important factors in granting credit. Their contributions 
to the model are higher than the mean value of the contribution factor in all models. The 
borrower characteristics such as Age and Education are considered imperative factors only 
in Model 1 (non-agricultural lending). Therefore, the results show that the bank mainly 
focuses on the borrower's Asset and Collateral when approving the amount of credit. 
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Table 4.17: Relative contribution factor of GRNN on credit availability models 
Relative Contribution 
Independent variables!/ Aggregate Agriculture Non-agriculture 
Modell Model 2 Modell Model 2 Modell Model 2 
Borrower Characteristics 
Log(asset) 0.0482 0.0421 0.0514 0.0447 0.0469 0.0412 
Age 0.0086 0.0117 0.0081 0.0035 0.0356 0.0005 
Education 0.0076 0.0081 0.0021 0.0232 0.0477 0.0000 
Credit risk proxies 
Log( collateral) 0.0639 0.0546 0.0541 0.0555 0.0671 0.0593 
Return on asset 0.0134 0.0458 0.0131 0.0356 0.0040 0.0070 
Leverage ratio 0.0129 0.0137 0.0500 0.0103 0.0369 0.0090 
Capital turnover ratio 0.0330 0.0214 0.0023 0.0152 0.0108 0.0007 
Relationship indicators 
Borrowing from others 0.0231 0.0222 0.0032 0.0110 0.0137 0.0169 
Duration 0.0123 0.0333 0.0245 
Dummy variablei/ 
Sector 0.0348 0.0161 
(Province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Major production) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Loan type) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Loan size) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Lending ~ear) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of inputs 35 36 34 35 29 30 
No. of observations 18,310 4,444 16,560 3,965 1,750 479 
Mean value of the 
0.0286 0.0278 0.0294 0.0286 0.0345 0.0333 contribution factor3/ 
Note: 1/ Dependent variable is log(volume of credit). 
2/ See Appendix 3 for the relative contribution of province, major production, loan type, loan size 
and lending year dummy variables. 
3/ Equal to 1 over the number of inputs used in the model. 
Bold and italic indicate that the relative contribution is above the mean value of contribution factors. 
In addition, the relative contribution of relationship indicators (Borrowing from others and 
Duration) are quite low in all the models, except in Model 2 (agricultural lending), while 
the relative contribution of Duration is higher than the mean value of the contribution 
factor (see Table 4.17). Therefore, the results signify that Duration has a significant role in 
determining the volume of credit for agricultural lending. There is no evidence of 
relationship lending in the credit availability models for non-agricultural lending. 
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In the credit availability models for aggregate lending (Modell), the relative contribution 
of Sector is about 3.48 percent and is relatively higher compared to the contribution factors 
mean value of 2.86 percent (see Table 4.17). However, in Model 2, its contribution is only 
about l.61 percent. The results show that Sector might not be a key factor affecting the 
amount of credit granted in the rural lending. This is because its contribution to the model 
is eliminated when Duration is included in the model. 
The results from both the regression and the GRNN models reveal the robust influence of 
Asset and Collateral on the amount of credit granted. Furthermore, the results indicate that 
Duration has a significant impact on the credit availability only on agricultural lending. 
However, the effect of Sector on the volume of credit granted is significant only in the 
regression models. The regression results indicate that the bank concentrates more on the 
borrower characteristics when making decisions on the quantity of loan for an agricultural 
loan. The relative contribution factors of the GRNN models show a relatively low 
contribution from the borrower characteristics, except on the Asset. Furthermore, the 
regression results suggest that the borrower characteristics (Age and Education) do not 
affect the volume of credit for a non-agricultural loan, but the contribution factors of the 
GRNN model provide evidence that they might be important factors. Therefore, only Asset 
and Collateral are found significant in all the models. For the remaining variables their 
effects on credit availability are ambiguous depending on the estimation techniques. 
4.2.3 Out-of-sample forecast 
The predictive power of the regression and the artificial neural networks models (GRNN, 
WN, and MLFN) are examined via the out-of-sample forecasting technique. The sample is 
randomly separated into two different sets. The estimation set consists of 80 percent of the 
total sample and 20 percent is the forecasting set. To evaluate the forecasting accuracy of 
the models, only the sample data in the estimation set is used to estimate the models, and 
the out-of-sample forecasting is conducted over the forecasting set. 
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Table 4.18 presents the out-of-sample forecast results of the regression and the artificial 
neural networks models on the credit availability for aggregate lending, agricultural 
lending, and non-agricultural lending. The out-of-sample forecast R2 and RMSE reported 
on Table 4.18 are not significantly different from the R2 and RMSE of the in-sample 
forecast results shown in Table 4.16. Thus, there is no evidence of overfitting problem. 
The predictive results of the models for aggregate lending indicate that the GRNN can 
predict the amount of credit granted better than the regression and the other two neural 
networks models (WN and MLFN). Furthermore, the results also show that, in Modell, 
both the WN and the MLFN yield the same level of accuracy as the regression model. In 
Model 2, however, all the neural networks models can predict the amount of credit granted 
better than the regression model (see Table 4.18). 
For agricultural lending, the forecast results illustrate that the GRNN and the WN are 
superior predictive model for Model 1 (without Duration) and Model 2 (with Duration), 
respectively (see Table 4.18). Furthermore, Modell results indicate that the regression 
model can predict the volume of credit slightly better than the MLFN. Although the 
predicted results demonstrate that the WN is more precise than GRNN in Model 2, the R2 
and RMSE of both the GRNN and the WN are not significantly different from each other. 
In term of prediction accuracy, all the neural networks models in Model 2 outperform the 
regression model. 
The out-of-sample forecast results of the credit availability models for non-agricultural 
lending are presented in the last section of Table 4.18. The results clearly demonstrate that 
the R2 and RMSE from the neural networks models are better than the R2 and RMSE of the 
regression models. The results suggest that the GRNN should be considered as the 
outstanding prediction model, since its R2 and RMSE are, correspondingly, higher and 
lower than the other models. 
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Table 4.18: Out-of-sample forecast results on credit availability models 
Type of networks 
Model II? Model 227 
R2 RMSE R2 RMSE 
Aggregate lending 
Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) 0.7396 0.5099 0.7467 0.5022 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 0.7581 0.4915 0.7707 0.4777 
Ward Network (WN) 0.7392 0.5099 0.7666 0.4817 
Multi-layer Feed-forward Network (MLFN) 0.7322 0.5167 0.7704 0.4785 
No. of Observations 3,662 888 
Agricultural lending 
Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) 0.7358 0.5096 0.7675 0.4542 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 0.7574 0.4884 0.7825 0.4393 
Ward Network (WN) 0.7444 0.5010 0.7869 0.4347 
Multi-layer Feed-forward Network (MLFN) 0.7296 0.5158 0.7743 0.4472 
No. of Observations 3,312 793 
Non-agricultural lending 
Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) 0.7509 0.4993 0.6956 0.5689 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 0.8042 0.4427 0.8345 0.4195 
Ward Network (WN) 0.7972 0.4506 0.7992 0.4626 
Multi-layer Feed-forward Network (MLFN) 0.7628 0.4868 0.7813 0.4827 
No. of Observations 350 95 
Note: 11 without Duration. 
21 with Duration. 
Bold and italic indicate (alternatively) the highest R2 or the lowest RMSE. 
The out-of-sample forecast results reveal the prediction capability of the neural networks 
models, especially GRNN. The results show that the neural networks models provide a 
better predictive result than the regression model, or are at least equivalent to the 
regression result. Furthermore, the results also show the important of the bank-borrower 
relationship, since Model 2, which includes Duration, can predict the credit availability 
more accurately than Model 1. Finally, to predict the amount of credit granted, the models 
for agricultural and non-agricultural lending should be employed instead of utilizing the 
aggregate model. This is because the R2 and RMSE of the aggregate models are, 
correspondingly, lower and higher than the R2 and RMSE of the segregated models 
(agricultural and non-agricultural models). 
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4.3 Loan pricing model 
Multiple linear regression and artificial neural networks are used to estimate the loan 
pricing models. The results of the four regression loan pricing models are presented in 
Table 4.19. Modell and 2 are the models without and with Duration, respectively. The 
volume of credit is not included in the loan pricing models, since it is assumed to be an 
endogenous variable. In Model 3 and 4, however, the volume of credit is assumed to be 
determined before the loan price (or interest rate charge). As a result, it is considered as an 
exogenous variable. In Model 3 and 4 (without and with Duration, respectively) the 
dummy variables on loan size (Small Loan, Medium Loan, and Large Loan) are excluded 
and replaced by the volume of credit in natural logarithmic form32 . 
The results in Table 4.19 show that the models can explain only 13 to 31 percent of the 
total variation in loan price. This indicates that there are a number of unobservable factors 
that may be correlated with the loan price. This includes the borrower's credit history and 
the use of BAAC as the main channel for governmental interference in the rural financial 
market. 
The estimated coefficients of the loan pricing models in Table 4.19 show that the value of 
asset and collateral are negatively correlated with the loan price. Both variables are 
negative and statistically significant in three of the four models. The effects of Asset and 
Collateral on the loan price are consistent with Strahan (1999), Degryse and Cayseele 
(2000), Goodwin and Mishra (2000), and Keasey and Watson (2000) findings. From 
Model 4, a 1 percent increased in value of asset and collateral would reduce the interest 
rate charge (or loan price) by 0.0012 and 0.0055 percent, respectively. The higher the value 
of asset and collateral, generally, would represent a safer loan contract and the borrower 
would be charged a lower loan rate. 
32 Bodenhom (2003) argues that the loan amount might account for the economy of scale in lending. That is 
whether lower rates were paid on the larger loan. Furthermore, it may also be correlated with unobserved 
credit risks, if the bank allowed safer borrowers larger lending limits. 
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Table 4.19: Loan pricing models 
Independent variables}/ Coefficients
27 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Borrower Characteristics 
Log(asset) -0.0011 ** -0.0002 -0.0017** -0.0012** 
Age -0.0002** 0.0000 -0.0002** 0.0000 
Education -0.0044** 0.0008 -0.0040** 0.0017 
Credit risk proxies 
Log(collateral) -0.0003 -0.0031>1<* -0.0022** -0.0055** 
Return on asset -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0004 0.0002 
Leverage ratio -0.0039 -0.0102 -0.0042 -0.0120 
Capital turnover ratio -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0003** 0.0000 
Log(volume of credit) 0.0129** 0.0132** 
Relationship indicators 
Borrowing from others 0.0017** 0.0018 0.0022** 0.0027 
Duration -0.0070** -0.0067** 
Dummy variables3/ 
Sector 0.0060** 0.0110** 0.0075** 0.0123** 
(Province) 
Province 2 0.0073 ** 0.0137** 0.0066** 0.0119** 
Province 3 0.0007 0.0023 0.0001 0.0007 
Province 4 0.0017 0.0004 0.0011 -0.0011 
Province 5 0.0010 0.0080** 0.0009 0.0068** 
Province 6 0.0021 0.0106** 0.0023* 0.0091 ** 
Province 7 0.0092** 0.0037 0.0076** 0.0017 
Province 8 0.0026** 0.0166** 0.0031 ** 0.0162** 
Province 9 0.0003 0.0077** 0.0004 0.0070** 
Province 10 0.0051 ** 0.0097** 0.0024** 0.0070** 
Province 11 0.0044** 0.0114** 0.0021 0.0087** 
Province 12 -0.0072** 0.0104** -0.0078** 0.0118'"* 
Province 13 0.0015* 0.0048* -0.0014 0.0022 
Province 14 0.0022* 0.0093** -0.0007 0.0069** 
Province 15 0.0058** 0.0094** 0.0025 0.0062" 
Province 16 0.0030** 0.0078** 0.0012 0.0060" 
Province 17 0.0094** 0.0100** 0.0075** 0.0083" 
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Table 4.19: Loan pricing models (Cont) 
Independent variables ll 
Coefficients27 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Major production) 
Horticulture 0.0094** 0.0135** 0.0091 ** 0.0142** 
Orchard/Vegetable 0.0158** 0.0205*'" 0.0151 ** 0.0204** 
Livestock! Aquaculture 0.0160** 0.0198** 0.0142** 0.0188** 
(Loan type) 
Short-term loan -0.0028** -0.0070*'1< -0.0007 -0.0046* 
Medium-term loan -0.0017* -0.0008 -0.0037** -0.0024 
Long-term loan -0.0109** -0.0066** -0.0153** -0.0103** 
(Loan size) 
Medium loan 0.0170** 0.0149** 
Large loan 0.0290** 0.0295** 
(Lending year) 
2001 0.0072** 0.0029* 0.0067** 0.0026* 
2002 0.0080** 0.0058*'1< 0.0080** 0.0053** 
Constant 0.0857** 0.1090** -0.0172** 0.0111 
R-squared 0.1380 0.2669 0.1756 0.3147 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1363 0.2609 0.1740 0.3092 
RMSE 0.0289 0.0261 0.0283 0.0252 
F -statistic 83.55** 44.56** 114.45** 57.83** 
No. of Observations 18,310 4,444 18,310 4,444 
Note: 1/ Dependent variable is loan price (interest rate). 
2/ White adjustment for estimation a heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix. 
3/ To avoid singularity problem, a dummy variable is dropped from each group. 
*, ** represent 10% and 5% significant level, respectively. 
In Modell and 3, both Age and Education are negatively significant at the 5 percent level, 
but when Duration is introduced into the models (see Model 2 and 4), both variables 
become positive but insignificant. The results imply that the influences of some of the 
borrower characteristics could be eliminated by the length of the bank-borrower 
relationship33. 
33 Angelini et al. (1998) found no relationship between age of the borrowing firm and the borrowing cost. In 
contrast, both Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Degryse and Cayseele (2000) studies show the negative 
relationship between the age of firm and the loan price. 
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Return on asset, Leverage ratio and Capital turnover ratio coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level in all the models, except Capital 
turnover ratio in Model 3 (see Table 4.19). Thus, the borrower financial performance 
appears to have no significant impact on the loan price. Furthermore, the estimated results 
show that Volume of credit has a positive significant influence on the interest rate charge, 
where a 1 percent increased in the volume of credit would increase the loan price by 
0.0132 percent (see Model 4). This result supports the study of Goodwin and Mishra 
(2000) who found a positive relationship between loan size and loan price. 
Borrowing from others has positive signs in all the models. However, the significant 
impact of Borrowing from others on the loan price is eliminated when Duration is included 
into the model (see Table 4.19). The estimated coefficients of Duration on both Model 2 
and 4 are negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This shows that the 
borrower who maintains a longer relationship with the bank would have a lower borrowing 
cost34. The results in this research are consistent with the findings of Berger and Udell 
(1990), Berger and Udell (1995), and Bodenhom (2003). 
The results show Sector is positive and significantly influence the loan rate in all four 
models (see Table 4.19). The result suggests that agricultural loan is charged higher than 
non-agricultural loan. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients of the dummy variables on 
major production and loan type reveal that the borrowing cost for horticultural production 
is lower than the other production types and the Long-term loan is fairly cheaper than the 
other types of loans. The results of Medium loan and Large loan in Model 1 and 2 also 
confirm that loan size has a positive influence on the loan price, as Large loan is charged 
more than 1 percent higher than Medium loan. In addition, the coefficients of provinces 
exhibit the province effect on the loan price, where some provinces are charged higher and 
some provinces are charged lower. 
The results confirm that the volume of credit (loan size) is positively related to the credit 
risk and loan price. The borrower with higher level of wealth, as reflected in the value of 
asset, appears to have lower lending rate. Furthermore, a higher value of collateral pledged 
can command a lower loan rate. The loan price varies significantly across the provinces, 
34 Angelini et al. (1998) argue that close relation helps the bank to overcome information asymmetry 
problem, consequently, the bank shares this gain with the borrower by lower lending rate. 
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major productions, loan types and lending years. Since Duration is found to be negative 
and highly significant, it can be concluded that the relationship lending exists and is 
important to the borrower. 
4.3.1 Loan pricing models for agricultural and non-agricultural lending 
The results of loan pricing models for agricultural lending are shown in Table 4.20. The 
results are quite similar to the loan pricing models for aggregate lending in Table 4.19. The 
results show that Asset, Age and Education have a negative relationship with the loan price 
(see Table 4.20, Models 1 and 3). However, their influences are eliminated and become 
insignificant when Duration is included into the model (see Model 2 and 4). All the 
financial performance indicators, Return on asset, Leverage ratio and Capital turnover 
ratio, are not significant in all the models, except Capital turnover ratio in Model 3. 
Although the estimated coefficients of Borrowing from others have the hypothesised signs, 
only one of the four models is significant at the 5 percent level. Therefore, the loan price 
for an agricultural loan is primarily determined by Collateral, Volume of credit and 
Duration, regardless of the impacts of control variables such as province, loan type, etc. 
As hypothesised, the results show that both Collateral and Duration are negatively related 
to the loan price, while the Volume of credit is positively related to the loan price. The 
impact of Collateral on the loan price is much smaller than the Volume of credit, as shown 
in Model 4 (see Table 4.20), where a 1 percent increased in Volume of credit would 
increase the interest rate by 0.0095 percent, but a 1 percent increased in value of Collateral 
would decrease the loan price by only 0.0042 percent. The results show that Duration is 
negatively significant at the 5 percent level in Model 2 and 4, and the effect of the 
relationship lending on the loan pricing process is validated. 
The results of the control variables in Table 4.20 disclose that the bank offers different 
lending rates to different provinces, as the credit risk of each province is different. 
Furthermore, the results also suggest that horticultural production is less risky and is priced 
slightly lower than the other agricultural productions. In addition, long-term loan is 
relatively cheaper than other types of loans. In addition, the results from the control 
variable groups (province, major production, loan type, and loan size dummy variables) are 
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similar to the findings found on the loan pricing models for aggregate lending in Table 
4.19. 
Table 4.21 presents the results of loan pricing models for non-agricultural lending. The 
results are quite similar to the finding in Table 4.19 and 4.20. However, only Asset and Age 
are negative and significant in Modell and 3, but not Education. Therefore, the Education 
level of the borrower has no impact on the interest rate charged for non-agricultural 
lending, compared to the agricultural lending. All variables (Asset, Age and Education) 
become insignificant in Model 2 and 4 when Duration is included into the models. The 
results suggest that both Asset and Age are important factors and have a significant 
influence on the loan price, but both variables are dominated by Duration. 
In addition, Collateral, Volume of credit and Duration have the hypothesised signs and are 
highly significant in all the models (see Table 4.21). The coefficients of Borrowing from 
others are positiVely significant only in Modell and 3, and its impact on the loan price is 
deleted with the addition of Duration (see Models 2 and 4). 
The result from cross comparison between agricultural and non-agricultural lending clearly 
indicates that the interest rate charge on non-agricultural lending is more responsive to the 
loan size (amount of credit) than agricultural lending. The estimated coefficients of Volume 
of credit on Model 4 in Table 4.20 and 4.21 show that a 1 percent increased in the loan 
amount would increase the lending rate for non-agricultural and agricultural loan by 
0.0312 and 0.0095 percent, respectively. Furthermore, Collateral indicates that a 1 percent 
increased in value of collateral would decrease the borrowing cost for non-agricultural loan 
and agricultural loan by 0.0141 and 0.0042 percent, respectively. It can be concluded that 
Collateral has a stronger impact on the loan price for non-agricultural lending. In terms of 
the borrowing cost, the influence of the relationship lending is more important for 
agricultural lending than non-agricultural lending (see Table 4.20 and 4.21). 
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Table 4.20: Loan pricing models for agricultural lending 
fudependent variables!1 Coefficients
27 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Borrower Characteristics 
Log(asset) -0.0007** 0.0001 -0.0013** -0.0007 
Age -0.0002** 0.0000 -0.0002"'* 0.0000 
Education -0.0051 ** 0.0000 -0.0047** 0.0007 
Credit risk proxies 
Log(collateral) -0.0002 -0.0023** -0.0019** -0.0042** 
Return on asset -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0002 
Leverage ratio -0.0024 -0.0068 -0.0026 -0.0082 
Capi tal turnover ratio -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0003** 0.0000 
Log(volume of credit) 0.0114** 0.0095** 
Relationship indicators 
Borrowing from others 0.0013 0.0015 0.0017** 0.0020 
Duration -0.0072** -0.0069** 
Dummy variables31 
(Province) 
Province 2 0.0063** 0.0126** 0.0057** 0.0114** 
Province 3 0.0000 0.0028 -0.0005 0.0018 
Province 4 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0018 
Province 5 0.0012 0.0055 0.0011 0.0047 
Province 6 0.0012 0.0114** 0.0014 0.0103*' 
Province 7 0.0094** 0.0031 0.0083** 0.0023 
Province 8 0.0011 0.0158** 0.0018' 0.0159** 
Province 9 -0.0013 0.0071 ** -0.0011 0.0069** 
Province 10 0.0074** 0.0142** 0.0049** 0.0121 ** 
Province 11 0.0088** 0.0166** 0.0066** 0.0142** 
Province 12 -0.0082** 0.0108** -0.0091** 0.0109** 
Province 13 0.0041 ** 0.0097** 0.0015 0.0075*' 
Province 14 0.0015 0.0126** -0.0016 0.0106** 
Province 15 0.0077** 0.0132** 0.0046** 0.0107** 
Province 16 0.0107** 0.0139** 0.0090** 0.0124** 
Province 17 0.0105** 0.0125** 0.0086** 0.0112*' 
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Table 4.20: Loan pricing models for agricultural lending (Cont) 
Independent variables Il 
Coefficients27 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Major production) 
Horticulture 0.0106** 0.0154** 0.0105** 0.0162** 
Orchard/Vegetable 0.0140** 0.0179** 0.0136** 0.0181** 
Livestock! Aquaculture 0.0154** 0.0183** 0.0139** 0.0179** 
(Loan type) 
Short-term loan -0.0022** -0.0067** -0.0006 -0.0049* 
Medium-term loan -0.0019* 0.0001 -0.0039** -0.0011 
Long-tenn loan -0.0094*'" -0.0041 ** -0.0136** -0.0012** 
(Loan size) 
Medium loan 0.0145** 0.0097** 
Large loan 0.0219** 0.0213** 
(Lending year) 
2001 0.0023* 0.0005 0.0019 0.0004 
2002 0.0081 ** 0.0052** 0.0082** 0.0049** 
Constant 0.0847** 0.1052** -0.0037 0.0381 ** 
R-squared 0.1382 0.2522 0.1706 0.2835 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1364 0.2456 0.1689 0.2773 
RMSE 0.0282 0.0239 0.0277 0.0233 
F -statistic 77.91 ** 37.86** 102.99** 45.74 ** 
No. of Observations 16,560 3,965 16,560 3,965 
Note: 11 Dependent variable is loan price (interest rate). 
2/ White adjustment for estimation a heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix. 
3/ To avoid singularity problem, a dummy variable is dropped from each group. 
*, ** represent 10% and 5% significant level, respectively. 
In summary, the regression results confirm the significant impacts of Collateral, Volume of 
credit and Duration on the loan price. Asset, Age and Education also have an impact on the 
loan rate, but their influences are overlooked when Duration is included in the model. 
Thus, the effect of relationship lending on the loan price is imperative, especially in 
agricultural lending. In addition, the lending rate for non-agricultural lending is quite 
sensitive to the value of Collateral and Volume of credit. 
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Table 4.21: Loan pricing models for non-agricultural lending 
Independent variables II 
Coefficients27 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Borrower Characteristics 
Log(asset) -0.0024" -0.0011 -0.0034** -0.0033 
Age -0.0002** 0.0002 -0.0001 u 0.0002 
Education 0.0014 0.0049 0.0012 0.0051 
Credit risk proxies 
Log( collateral) -0.0033** -0.0089** -0.0071** -0.0141** 
Return on asset -0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0006 
Leverage ratio -0.0133 -0.0176 -0.0144 -0.0224* 
Capital turnover ratio 0.0000 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0000 
Log(volume of credit) 0.0254** 0.0312** 
Relationship indicators 
Borrowing from others 0.0057"* 0.0059 0.0069** 0.0075 
Duration -0.0038** -0.0038** 
Dummy variables31 
(Province) 
Province 1 0.0185** 0.0227"* 0.0191 ** 0.0267** 
Province 2 0.0216** 0.0208** 0.0234** 0.0212** 
Province 3 0.0221** 0.0070 0.0173** -0.0106 
Province 4 0.0330** 0.0051 0.0351** 0.0252** 
Province 5 0.0190** 0.0226** 0.0201 ** 0.0273** 
Province 6 0.0233** 0.0182** 0.0250** 0.0232** 
Province 7 0.0224** 0.0124** 0.0182** 0.0032 
Province 8 0.0238** 0.0320** 0.0254** 0.0309** 
Province 9 0.0238** 0.0256** 0.0268** 0.0202** 
Province 10 0.0198** 0.0241'"* 0.0193** 0.0199** 
Province 12 0.0339** 0.0373** 0.0460** 0.0572** 
Province 13 0.0260** 0.0136 0.0278** 0.0258* 
Province 14 0.0249** 0.0088 0.0251 ** 0.0096 
Province 15 0.0266** 0.0133* 0.0270** 0.0099* 
Province 17 0.0285** 0.0145* 0.0309** 0.0197"* 
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Table 4.21: Loan pricing models for non-agricultural lending (Cont) 
Independent variables!/ Coefficients
27 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Major production) 
Orchard/Vegetable 0.0054** 0.0146** 0.0057** 0.0120** 
Livestock! Aquaculture 0.0062** 0.0155** 0.0080** 0.0081 ** 
(Loan type) 
Long-term loan -0.0088** -0.0087 -0.0104** -0.0152*" 
(Loan size) 
Medium loan 0.0348** 0.0510 .... 
Large loan 0.0682** 0.0837** 
(Lending year) 
2002 0.0059"* 0.0048 0.0061** 0.0051 
Constant 0.1221 ** 0.1689 .... -0.0901"* -0.0617** 
R-squared 0.2703 0.3961 0.3645 0.5101 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2580 0.3557 0.3542 0.4785 
RMSE 0.0316 0.0347 0.0295 0.0313 
F -statistic 21.98** 9.80"* 35.25** 16.12** 
No. of Observations 1,750 479 1,750 479 
Note: 11 Dependent variable is loan price (interest rate). 
2/ White adjustment for estimation a heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix. 
3/ To avoid singularity problem, a dummy variable is dropped from each group. 
*, ** represent 10% and 5% significant level, respectively. 
4.3.2 Artificial neural networks and loan pricing models 
Table 4.22 presents the neural networks R2 and RMSE on loan pricing models. The in-
sample estimation results indicate that the GRNN is the best network for loan pricing 
because it has the highest R2 and lowest RMSE on both Modell and 2 (with and without 
Duration) of aggregate lending, agricultural lending, and non-agricultural lending. 
Furthermore, the R 2 and RMSE of the neural networks models are, correspondingly, higher 
and lower than the R2 and RMSE of the regression models (see Table 4.22). 
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Table 4.22: Neural Networks R squared (R2) and Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) on 
loan pricing models 
Type of networks 
Modell l! Model22! 
R2 RMSE 
Aggregate lending 
Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) 0.1756 0.0283 0.3147 0.0252 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 0.3752 0.0246 0.5297 0.0209 
Ward Network (WN) 0.3066 0.0259 0.5100 0.0213 
Multi-Ia~er Feed-forward Network (MLFN) 0.2649 0.0267 0.4807 0.0219 
No. of Observations 18,310 4,444 
Agricultural lending 
Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) 0.1706 0.0277 0.2835 0.0233 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 0.5300 0.0208 0.6069 0.0173 
Ward Network (WN) 0.2920 0.0256 0.4249 0.0209 
Multi-layer Feed-forward Network (MLFN) 0.2542 0.0262 0.3903 0.0215 
No. of Observations 16,560 3,965 
Non-agricultural lending 
Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) 0.3645 0.0295 0.5101 0.0313 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 0.6035 0.0233 0.9698 0.0078 
Ward Network (WN) 0.4704 0.0270 0.6338 0.0270 
Multi-layer Feed-forward Network (MLFN) 0.4790 0.0267 0.5871 0.0287 
No. of Observations 1,750 479 
Note: 11 and 2/ are the models without and with Duration, respectively, assuming that volume of credit is 
determined before the loan price. Therefore, dummy variables on the loan size are excluded and 
replaced by log(volume of credit). 
Bold and italic indicate (alternatively) the highest R2 or the lowest RMSE. 
Since the performance of Model 2 (with Duration) is better than the Modell (without 
Duration), it can be concluded that the length of the bank-borrower relationship is an 
important factor in determining the lending rate. Furthermore, a cross comparison between 
the loan pricing models for agricultural lending and non-agricultural lending illustrates the 
neural networks models could recognize the pattern and the variation of the loan rate in 
non-agricultural lending much better than in agricultural lending. The result implies that 
the interest rate charge on non-agricultural loan contract is more uniformity. 
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Table 4.23: Relative contribution factor of GRNN on loan pricing models 
Relative Contribution 
Independent variablesJ/,2/ Aggregated Agriculture Non-agriculture 
Modell Model 2 Modell Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Borrower Characteristics 
Log(asset) 0.0466 0.0100 0.0136 0.0101 0.0495 0.0459 
Age 0.0278 0.0135 0.0187 0.0060 0.0108 0.0364 
Education 0.0027 0.0046 0.0088 0.0345 0.0210 0.0045 
Credit risk proxies 
Log( collateral) 0.0369 0.0254 0.0324 0.0467 0.0361 0.0379 
Return on asset 0.0082 0.0086 0.0445 0.0009 0.0077 0.0058 
Leverage ratio 0.0103 0.0073 0.0171 0.0170 0.0011 0.0184 
Capital turnover ratio 0.0203 0.0168 0.0196 0.0400 0.0011 0.0324 
Log(volume of credit) 0.0483 0.0549 0.0667 0.0582 0.0720 0.0571 
Relationship indicators 
Borrowing from others 0.0228 0.0071 0.0139 0.0203 0.0003 0.0232 
Duration 0.0409 0.0555 0.0297 
Dummy variables3/ 
Sector 0.0411 0.0303 
(Province) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Major production) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Loan type) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(Loan size) No No No No No No 
(Lending year) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of inputs 34 35 33 34 28 29 
No. of observations 18,310 4,444 16,560 3,965 1,750 479 
Mean value of the 
0.0294 0.0286 0.0303 0.0294 0.0357 0.0345 
contribution factor4/ 
Note: 11 Dependent variable is loan price (interest rate). 
2/ Assume that volume of credit is determined before the loan price. Therefore, dummy variables on 
the loan size are excluded and replaced by log(volume of credit). 
3/ See Appendix 4 for the relative contribution of province, major production, loan type and lending 
year dummy variables. 
4/ Equal to lover the number of inputs used in the model. 
Bold and italic indicate that the relative contribution is above the mean value of the contribution 
factors. 
Table 4.23 shows the relative contribution factor of the neural networks on loan pricing 
models. However, only the results from the GRNN are shown because it is considered as 
the superior network. To verify which factor has a significant impact on the loan price, the 
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relative contribution of each factor is compared with the model's relative contribution 
mean value. 
The relative contribution factors shown in Table 4.23 confirm the important role of the 
Volume of credit and Collateral in determining the loan price, since both factors contribute 
to the model more than the mean value of the relative contribution factors. Furthermore, 
the contribution values of Duration on the loan pricing models for agricultural lending and 
non-agricultural lending suggest that the length of the bank-borrower relationship has a 
stronger influence on the agricultural lending rate. The value of Asset has a significant 
influence only on the non-agricultural lending. In addition, the high relative contribution of 
Sector indicates that Sector has a significant impact in determining the loan price. 
The impact of Age and Education on the loan price is not obvious in the GRNN models, 
compared to the regression models (see Table 4.23). The considerable effect of Return on 
asset, Leverage ratio and Capital turnover ratio to the borrowing cost can not be detected 
on the loan pricing models for aggregate lending and non-agricultural lending. 
Nevertheless, a strong influence of Return on asset and Capital turnover ratio on the loan 
price is noticeable only in Modell and 2 of the agricultural lending, respectively. 
The results from the regression models and the GRNN models reveal that there are three 
major factors influencing the loan pricing. They are Collateral, Volume of credit and 
Duration (see Table 4.19, 4.20, 4.21 and 4.23). Despite Age and Education having a 
significant impact on the lending rate in the regression models (but their influences can be 
purged by Duration), the relative contributions of both factors are lower than the 
contribution factors mean values in most of the GRNN models (see Table 4.23). The effect 
of Return on asset, Leverage ratio and Capital turnover ratio on the interest rate charged 
are not significant in the regression and the GRNN models. It can be concluded that these 
variables have no impact on the loan pricing. The relative contributions of Borrowing from 
others are lower than the mean value of the relative contribution factors in all the GRNN 
models and its estimated coefficients are significant only in 3 regression models (see Table 
4.19 and 4.20), but the relationship lending is still important because the robust influence 
of the Duration on the loan price could be detected on both the regression and the GRNN 
models. 
-144-
4.3.3 Out-of-sample forecast 
The out-of-sample forecast evaluation results of the loan pricing models are shown in 
Table 4.24. The R2 and RMSE of all neural networks models are, respectively, higher and 
lower than the R2 and RMSE of the regression models. Therefore, the results suggest that 
the artificial neural networks models can predict the loan price more accurately than the 
regression models. Furthermore, the results also indicate that Model 2 which includes 
Duration yields a higher R2 and lower RMSE than Modell. Hence, it can be concluded 
that the length of the bank-borrower relationship plays an important role in the loan pricing 
model as it can improve the models' predictive power significantly. 
Table 4.24: Out-of-sample forecast results of loan pricing models 
Type of networks 
Model 111 Model 221 
Aggregate lending 
Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) 0.1602 0.0282 0.2942 0.0264 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 0.2617 0.0265 0.3475 0.0254 
Ward Network (WN) 0.2606 0.0265 0.4231 0.0239 
Multi-layer Feed-forward Network (MLFN) 0.2416 0.0268 0.4233 0.0239 
No. of Observations 3,662 888 
Agricultural lending 
Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) 0.1726 0.0282 0.2355 0.0236 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 0.2616 0.0266 0.3289 0.0221 
Ward Network (WN) 0.2614 0.0266 0.3062 0.0225 
Multi-layer Feed-forward Network (MLFN2 0.2379 0.0270 0.3021 0.0226 
No. of Observations 3,312 793 
Non-agricultural lending 
Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) 0.3218 0.0302 0.4950 0.0314 
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) 0.4234 0.0278 0.8448 0.0174 
Ward Network (WN) 0.3994 0.0284 0.6668 0.0255 
Multi-layer Feed-forward Network {MLFN2 0.4015 0.0284 0.6584 0.0258 
No. of Observations 350 95 
Note: 11 and 21 are the models without and with Duration variable, respectively, assuming that volume of 
credit is determined before the loan price. Therefore, dummy variables on the loan size are excluded 
and replaced by log(volume of credit). 
Bold and italic indicate (alternatively) the highest R2 or the lowest RMSE. 
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However, it should be noted that, in most cases, the out-of-sample forecast R2 is lower than 
the in-sample R2 (see Table 4.21 and 4.23). The results highlight the overfitting problem on 
both the regression and the aliificial neural networks models. In addition, it appears that 
the overfitting problem is enOllliOUS using the GRNN model, which is regarded as the 
superior model for in-sample forecast. Despite the overfitting problem on the GRNN 
models, the models have the highest R2 and lowest RMSE in most cases of the out-of-
sample forecasting, except on the Model 2 of aggregate lending (see Table 4.24). 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the GRNN is the superior model for loan price 
prediction. 
4.4 Summary of findings 
In summary, the results show that Sector has a significant impact on the bank lending 
decision, the volume of credit granted, and the interest rate charged. The agricultural 
borrowers have a higher probability of a good loan compared to non-agricultural 
borrowers. This implies that they have a higher probability in obtaining a loan from 
BAAC. However, they are charged at a higher loan rate and receive a smaller amount of 
loan than the non-agricultural borrowers. The influence of the relationship lending on the 
bank lending decision, the credit availability and the loan price is imperative, especially on 
agricultural lending. The results of the agricultural lending show that BAAC utilizes the 
information obtained from the relationship to monitor the borrower's credit risk through 
the bank lending decision and the credit availability. However, a long term relationship 
with the bank benefits the borrower via loan pricing. 
The total asset value and the value of collateral are also important in explaining the bank 
lending decision, credit availability, and loan price. The results indicate that the probability 
of a good loan increases with increased in the total asset value. Furthermore, the amount of 
credit granted is increased with increased in the total asset value and the value of collateral, 
while the loan price is decreased with increased value of collateral. The results also show 
that loan price is positively related to the volume of credit. For the rest variables (Age, 
Education, Return on asset, Leverage ratio, and Capital turnover ratio) their effects on the 
bank lending decision, credit availability, and loan price are ambiguous. 
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The forecast results of both the in-sample and the out-of-sample on the bank lending 
decision, credit availability, and loan price show that most of the artificial neural networks 
models outperform the logistic and multiple regression analysis techniques. In addition, the 
results indicate that the PNN models can be successfully implemented to screen the 
bon'owers, and the GRNN models can be employed to determine the volume of credit 
granted and the interest rate charged. 
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CHAPTERS 
SUMMARY AND CONCULSIONS 
This chapter summarizes the research. Section 5.1 presents a summary of the research 
objectives, data and methodology, and major findings. The implications of the research 
findings are discussed in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 discuses the research limitations and 
section 5.4 provides recommendations for further research. 
5.1 Summary and major findings 
Rural financing in Thailand is heavily dependent on bank lending. However, banks prefer 
to lend to large commercial fanners rather than to small~scale peasant fanners who are 
poor and lack investment funds. Thus understanding the bank lending process for the rural 
sector is an important element for promoting the development of credit accessibility to 
Thai fanners in rural regions. Thus, appropriate bank lending decisions would reduce 
lending costs and increase repayment rate and operating profits to the banks. As a 
consequence, a well-developed rural financial market would lead to a sustainable 
development in the rural sector. 
The purpose of this research is to identify critical factors in the bank lending decision 
process and to investigate factors affecting the amount of credit granted and interest rate 
charged for rural lending in Thailand. This research also investigates the impact of the 
relationship between the lender and the borrower on the lending decision, credit 
availability and credit price. Furthennore, it examines the predictive power among the 
different estimation techniques in predicting the bank lending decision, amount of credit 
granted, and interest rate charged. 
The data used in this research are obtained from the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperative (BAAC), a major lender in Thailand agricultural sector. During the period of 
2001 to 2003, a total of 18,798 credit files under the nonnalloan scheme (excluding the 
government loans for specific projects) from between 99 to 136 branches in 17 provinces 
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are made available. The credit scoring model is analyzed using the logistic regression 
(Logit) and four different types of the artificial neural network, namely multi-layer feed-
forward neural network (MLFN), Ward network (WD), general regression neural network 
(GRNN) , and probabilistic neural network (PNN). The credit availability and loan pricing 
models are estimated by multiple linear regression (MLR) and three artificial neural 
network models, including MLFN, WD, and GRNN. 
Table 5.1 summarizes the estimated results of all the models and Table 5.2 presents the 
models' ranking in telm of predictive accuracy. In summary, the results show that: 
• Relationship lending in agricultural lending is important in explaining the bank 
lending decision, credit availability, and loan price. 
• On agricultural lending, the length of the bank-borrower relationship (Duration) has 
a negative impact on the bank lending decision, volume of credit, and loan price. 
This implies that the bank utilizes information of the borrowers and monitors the 
lending risk via lending decision and credit availability. However, banking 
relationships benefit the borrowers via loan pricing since the borrowers with a long 
term relationship with the bank commands a lower borrowing rate. In contrast, for 
non-agricultural lending, Duration influences only loan price and has no impact on 
lending decision or volume of credit. 
• If the borrower has an outstanding debt with other creditors, it would reduce the 
amount of credit granted (particularly for the agriculture borrowers) and increase the 
lending rate, but it has no significant impact on the bank lending decision. 
• Total asset value (Asset) has a positive impact on lending decision and credit 
availability. On the other hand, it has a negative impact on credit price, but the 
impact is significant only in the models without Duration. The relative contribution 
factors of the GRNN models show that Asset has a strong influence on loan pricing. 
• Age of borrower (Age) and borrower's education level (Education) have no 
significant effect on all the models including Duration, except on the credit 
availability model for agricultural lending, where Education shows a signific'ant 
negative relationship. The results imply that the influence on some of the borrower 
characteristics could be eliminated by the bank-borrower relationship. Furthermore, 
the results shows that the borrower who has higher education tend to borrow smaller 
amount. 
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Table 5.1: Factors affecting the bank lending decision, credit availability, and loan price 
Factors Lending decision Volume of credit Loan 2rice 
Borrower characteristics 
Asset (+) (+) • (-) only in the 
model without 
Duration . 
• High contribution 
on GRNN model 
Age (0) • (-) only in the model • (-) only in the model 
• High contribution in without Duration. without Duration 
PNNmodel • (0) on non-ago 
lending 
Education • (+) only in the (-) • (-) only in the model 
models without • (0) on non-ago without Duration 
Duration lending • (0) on non-ago 
• (0) on non-ago lending 
lending 
Credit risk proxies 
Collateral • Negative in most (+) (-) 
cases but not sig. 
• High contribution in 
PNNmodels 
Return on asset • (+) only on non-ago (0) (0) 
lending 
Leverage ratio • (-) only in the model (0) (0) 
without Duration 
Capital turnover ratio (-) (+) (0) 
• But not sig. in some 
models 
Volume of credit (+) 
Relationship indicators 
Borrowing from (0) (-) • (+) only in the 
others • (0) on non-ago model without 
lending Duration 
Duration (-) (-) (-) 
• (0) on non-ago • (0) on non-ago 
lending lending 
Dummy variables 
Sector (+) (-) (+) 
Province ./ Province effect ./ Province effect ./ Province effect 
Major production • Horticulture> • (0) (ag. lending) • Orchard> 
Orchard> Livestock • Livestock> Hort., Livestock> 
(ag. lending) Orchard (non-ag.) Horticulture 
Loan type • Short> Medium> • Long> Medium> • Medium, Short > 
Long (ag. lending) Short (ag. lending) Long 
Loan size • Small> Medium> • Large> Medium> • Large> Medium> 
Large (ag. lending) Small Small 
Lending year • High default risk in • 2002 > 2001, 2003 
2002 {ago lending~ 
Note: (+), (-), and (0) represent positive, negative, and no significant impact, respectively. 
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Table 5.2: Ranking of the prediction models based on prediction accuracy of the model 
Lending decision Volume of credit Loan price 
In-sample forecast I.PNN 1. GRNN 1. GRNN 
2. GRNN 2. WN 2. WN 
3. WN,MLFN, and 3.MLFN 3.MLFN 
Logit 4. MLR2/ 4.MLR 
Out-of-sample Aggregate and 1. GRNN 1. GRNN 
forecast Agricultural lending 2. WN 2.WN 
1. GRNN 3.MLFN 3. MLFN 
2 11 .PNN, WN, 4. MLR2/ 4.MLR 
MLFN, and Logit 
Non-agricultural 
lending 
I.PNN II 
2. GRNN 
3. WN, MLFN, and 
Logit 
Note: 11 PNN (with Duration) yields the lowest misclassification cost in most cases and can be considered 
as the superior model in term of relative error cost. 
2/ WN and MLFN provide the same accuracy level as MLR in some models. 
• Value of collateral (Collateral) has a positive and a negative influence on credit 
availability and loan pricing models, respectively, but it has no impact on the bank 
lending decision model. However, it should be noted that most of the Collateral 
coefficients on the bank lending decision models are negative, but they are not 
significantly different from O. This indicates that higher collateral pledged means a 
risky loan with a high default risk. In addition, the relative contribution factors of the 
PNN models show that Collateral has a strong influence on the bank's lending 
decision. 
• There is a reverse relationship between Capital turnover ratio and lending decision. 
This result suggests that the borrower who has a higher income to assets tend to 
default on debt repayment compared to the borrower who has a lower income to 
assets. Generally, the borrower who has a relatively high income may prefer to spend 
his or her money on other activities rather than repaying the debt. 
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• Return on assets has significant impact only on the lending decision model for non-
agricultural lending. 
• Agricultural lending has a lower default risk (a higher probability of good loan) 
compare to non-agricultural lending. However, the borrower in the agricultural sector 
is charged higher interest rates and receives a smaller amount of credit due to higher 
risk in the agricultural sector. 
• Bank lending decision, credit availability, and loan price differ according to the 
provinces. The results suggest that there is a province effect on the bank lending 
decision, the volume of credit granted, and the interest rate charged. The results can 
not explain the discrimination on the bank lending policy, since different provinces 
have different levels of risk. 
• . Horticulture farm in general has a lower default risk and receives a lower interest rate 
compared to other types of farm and farming activities. Nevertheless, the amount of 
credit granted is not significantly different according to the farm type and the major 
production of the farm, since the borrower may need a credit for other farming 
activities apart from the major production. 
• For non-agricultural lending, if the borrower's major production is livestock or 
aquaculture, the borrower receives a larger amount of loan in terms of non-
agricultural borrowing. 
• Long-term loan and Large loan on agricultural lending have a higher default risk. 
Large loan is charged a higher interest rate. However, Long-term loan is charged a 
lower interest rate. This is because most of the long-term loans are for purchasing 
long-term asset that can be pledged as collateral to secure the loan. 
• The default risk in 2002 is higher than in other years, due to the implementation of 
the debt suspension programme of the Thai government in 2001. 
• According to the in-sample classification results, most of the artificial neural 
networks yield almost the same classification results as the logistic regression on the 
bank lending decision models. However, the probabilistic neural networks (PNN) 
and the general regression neural networks (GRNN) predict better than the logistic 
regression model and they can also detect a Type I error (wrongly reject Ho or accept 
a bad loan as a good loan) much better than the logistic regression. The PNN is 
considered the best prediction model since it has the highest overall percentage 
collect classification of all the models. 
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• In the out-of-sample forecast, the PNN is no longer the best classification model in 
term of classification accuracy. However, it can be regarded as the superior model 
for predicting the bank lending decision. The PNN with Duration can identify Type I 
error much better than the other models and offers the lowest expected 
misclassification loss on out-of-sample forecast. 
• For credit availability models, most of the artificial neural networks models can 
predict slightly better than the mUltiple regression technique in the in-sample 
forecast. However, on loan pricing models, all the artificial neural networks models 
perform better than the multiple regression model in terms of in-sample forecast 
accuracy. Both the in-sample and the out-of-sample forecast results point out that the 
GRNN is the superior prediction model to both credit availability and loan pricing in 
term of prediction accuracy. 
• The forecast results of in-sample and out-of-sample on the bank lending decision, 
credit availability, and credit price show that most of the artificial neural networks 
models outperform the logistic regression and the multiple regression models, 
especially on the loan pricing models. In addition, the results indicate the superiority 
of using the PNN model to classify and screen the borrowers, and the GRNN model 
to determine the volume of credit granted and loan price. 
5.2 Implications of the research findings 
The findings of this research have important implications for academics, borrowers, banks, 
and policy makers. For academics, the significant effects of the relationship indicators in 
the bank lending decision model, credit availability model, and loan pricing model imply 
that the relationship lending (relationship building between bank and borrower) can assist 
the bank (or lender) to overcome the incomplete and asymmetric information problems in 
the bank lending decision process. The research results also show that the PNN and the 
GRNN can be successfully implemented to screen the loan applications, and to predict the 
amount of credit granted and loan price, respectively. Thus, this research exhibits the 
potential of the neural methodology, especially the PNN and the GRNN, as an analysis tool 
for generalization problems (classification and prediction). However, the results in this 
research also show that the neural networks models might not necessarily perform better 
than the logistic and the multiple regression models. This is because some of the artificial 
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neural network models yield almost the same level of accuracy as the logistic and the 
multiple regression models on both in-sample and out-of-sample forecasting. 
For the borrowers, the research findings show that borrowing from many sources of funds 
can deteriorate the credit availability and raise the loan price. Therefore, the borrowers 
should use or rely on a single financial source rather than dealing with many financial 
sources. In addition, the research findings show that the borrowers who have a longer 
relationship with the bank should receive a lower loan rate. Hence, it is a good idea for the 
borrowers to maintain the relationship with the bank, since it can benefit them via the loan 
pnce. 
For the banks, the results found in this research show that a good credit scoring model 
which has the ability to detect a bad loan could help the bank to reduce the loan losses 
from bad borrowers. Consequently, it would improve the financial stability and the 
profitability of the bank. Therefore, the credit scoring model should be developed and 
used to support credit officers in screening loan applications. 
The results from the bank lending decision model, credit availability model, and loan 
pricing model show that the bank pays much attention to two major factors when making 
the lending decisions. These factors include the total asset value and the value of collateral. 
Focusing on these two factors alone might cause over lending and under pricing problems 
when there is a financial crisis or a high depreciation on the land or asset price. Hence, the 
banks should consider the potential of the borrower's capability to repay the loan. 
For policy makers, to promote the development of credit accessibility to farmers in rural 
regions, the property rights reformation and land titling programme must be accelerated. 
This is because the programme has progressed slowly during the past decades, but both 
asset and collateral playa very important role in determining the bank lending decision, the 
amount of credit granted, and the interest rate charge . 
. Since the default risk in 2002 is higher than the other years, the research findings show that 
the three-year debt moratorium programme introduced by the Thai government under 
Prime Minister Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) distorts the 
country's credit culture and encourages the good debtors to default on the debt repayments. 
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An inappropriate rural financial policy is not only inefficient in achieving the key goals of 
improving the farmers' welfare, but also distorts the country's monetary and financial 
culture. Therefore, the policy makers should be more concerned about this issue when 
implementing or introducing new rural financial policy. 
5.3 Research limitations 
There are a number of limitations related to the data set, the estimation techniques, and the 
variables used in this research. These include: 
• The data set used in this research is from BAAC only and it covers only 17 out of 76 
provinces. Therefore, the results in this research may not be applicable to the whole 
country (even if the data set covers all four different geographic regions). Moreover, 
they can not represent the lending behaviour of all the commercial banks in the rural 
financial market in Thailand. 
• Only the data and information of the applicants who have been granted a credit in the 
past are observed. There is no data and information on the applicants who were 
rejected. Thus, the models are parameterised using a sample of accepted applicants 
only. This may lead to biased estimates of the parameters. 
• The length of the bank-borrower relationship (Duration) in the data set is restricted 
to a maximum of seven years due to the lack of available information. Thus, 
Duration is a censoring variable which may cause inconsistent estimates of 
Duration. 
• The models ignore the potential exposure to the future credit risk. This is because 
credit scoring model, credit availability model, and loan pricing model are typically 
static models in nature. In addition, the information about financial distress of the 
borrower in the past is not included in the models. 
• In the case where there is a natural disaster, such as flooding or drought, BAAC may 
allow the borrower to postpone debt repayment or reschedule the repayment period. 
However, in some cases, the borrower and the credit officer may decide to use the 
"ever green" strategy (borrowing a new debt to repay an old debt) to resolve the 
overdue problem. As a result, a bad loan can become a good loan. Unfortunately, this 
research can not differentiate the use of this tactic. 
• In this research, the cut-off point of the bank lending decision model is set equal to 
0.50. Since the classification results can be improved by adjusting the cut-off point, 
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fixing the cut-off point of the model at 0.50 may limit the classification ability of the 
model. 
• There are some drawbacks on using the neural networks. They are (Limsombunchai 
et aI., 2004, and Gan et aI., 2005): 
o Firstly, the neural networks lack theoretical background concemmg the 
explanatory capabilities. The connection weights in the networks can not be 
interpreted or used to identify the relationships between dependent and 
independent variables. This means the neural networks are regarded as a "black 
box". 
o Secondly, there are no formal techniques for non-linear methods to test the 
relative relevance of the independent variables and to carry out the variable 
selection process. This is because the traditional statistical tests are either 
impossible or meaningless on the neural networks models. 
o Lastly, the neural networks learning process can be very time consuming, 
especially when the data set is large, and the model consists of many 
independent variables. 
5.4 Recommendations for future research 
To improve the research results and to increase the generalizability of the research 
findings, the credit files from other commercial banks should be collected and included in 
the data set. Furthermore, the numbers of the sample province should be increased and the 
information of the applicants who did not qualify for the credit should be taken into 
account. 
In addition, there are a number of variables that can be added to the models to enhance the 
performance of the models. These include geographic distance between the lending bank 
and the borrower (see Degryse and Ongena, 2005), farm diversification index (see 
Goodwin and Mishra, 2000), the borrower's credit rating or the borrower's credit bureau 
score (see Wu and Wang, 2000; Athavale and Edmister, 1999; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998), 
and the management ability of the borrower (see Angelini et aI., 1998; Ellinger et aI., 
1992). 
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To identify the suitable cut-off point for the lending decision model, the Kolmogorov-
Smimov statistic (K-S test) can be used. The K-S test measures the distance between the 
distribution functions of the two classifications (good loan and bad loan). The score that 
generates the greatest separability between the functions is considered the suitable cut-off 
value for good or bad loan. However, the significant weakness of the K-S test is that it 
assumes the relative costs of misclassification errors are equal. As a result, it does not 
incorporate relevant information regarding the misclassification rates and their respective 
costs (Nargundkar and Priestley, 2003). 
Since the PNN, GRNN, WN, and MLFN models are all supervised models, it might be 
useful to apply unsupervised neural network model such as the self-organizing map (SOM) 
with the credit scoring model. The SOM (Kohonen, 1982) is an artificial neural network 
method based on unsupervised algorithm technology that has been successfully applied to 
data mining (Shanmuganathan and Sallis, 2001). According to Ripley (1996), the SOM is 
mainly a clustering algorithm. It is argued that the SOM offers a powerful tool to visualise 
and analyse multi-dimensional data sets, and the distribution of variables in a data set can 
be make visible and easily understood. Despite the fact that this unsupervised model would 
suit clustering strategies, it has commonly been used in conjunction with supervised 
approaches in providing some explanation of the classification process (Vellido et aI., 
1999). 
Collateral requirement is considered as another key issue in the lending decision process. 
However, it has not been addressed in this research. Therefore, further research can be 
extended to include the determinants of collateral (what factors detennine the extent of 
total debt collateralization) and the influence of the bank-borrower relationship on the 
collateral requirement. These could be achieved by using the multiple regression analysis 
and the artificial neural networks techniques. 
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Appendix 1: Marginal effects of bank lending decision models 
Marginal Effects27 
Independent variables 11 Aggregate Agriculture Non-agriculture 
Modell Model 2 Modell Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Borrower Characteristics 
Log(asset) 0.0285 0.0406 0.0289 0.0387 0.0313 0.0302 
Age -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0003 
Education 0.0136 0.0147 0.0161 0.0190 -0.0081 -0.0161 
Credit risk proxies 
Log( collateral) -0.0026 -0.0084 -0.0030 -0.0072 -0.0086 0.0011 
Retum on asset 0.0045 0.0059 0.0030 0.0005 0.0226 0.0511 
Leverage ratio -0.0851 -0.0389 -0.0874 -0.0868 -0.0193 0.0257 
Capital tumover ratio -0.0073 -0.0091 -0.0060 -0.0062 -0.0208 -0.0351 
Relationship indicators 
Borrowing from others 0.0086 -0.0091 0.0095 0.0034 -0.0138 -0.0232 
Duration -0.0177 -0.0199 0.0099 
Dummy variables3/ 
Sector 0.0512 0.1133 
(Province) 
Province 1 0.1681 0.1891 
Province 2 0.0308 -0.0646 0.0278 -0.0196 0.2143 0.1297 
Province 3 -0.1731 -0.1223 -0.1767 -0.1184 0.1341 0.2262 
Province 4 -0.3229 -0.6218 -0.3143 -0.5412 0.0277 -0.8250 
Province 5 -0.1747 -0.2160 -0.1771 -0.1924 0.1347 0.0789 
Province 6 -0.2496 -0.4353 -0.2481 -0.3951 0.1091 0.0457 
Province 7 -0.1317 -0.1086 -0.1316 -0.0973 0.1429 0.1835 
Province 8 -0.1573 -0.1086 -0.1699 -0.1670 0.1514 0.1340 
Province 9 -0.1524 -0.2448 -0.1511 -0.2506 0.1393 0.1642 
Province 10 -0.1580 -0.3255 -0.1486 -0.2637 0.1440 0.0369 
Province 11 -0.5767 -0.5615 -0.5394 -0.4937 
Province 12 -0.3210 -0.1134 -0.3263 -0.0868 0.1409 0.1423 
Province 13 -0.1698 -0.2470 -0.1535 -0.1799 0.0712 -0.0322 
Province 14 -0.1221 -0.4023 -0.1001 -0.4946 0.1141 0.2254 
Province 15 -0.4242 -0.4611 -0.4062 -0.4107 0.0777 0.1055 
Province 16 -0.2857 -0.2696 -0.2302 -0.2214 
Province 17 -0.2365 -0.3195 -0.2280 -0.2865 0.1323 0.1150 
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Appendix 1: Marginal effects of bank lending decision models (Cont) 
Marginal Effects27 
Independent variables l ! Aggregate Agriculture Non-agriculture 
Model I Mode12 Modell Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
(Major production) 
Horticulture 0.0761 0.0805 0.0748 0.0775 
Orchard/Vegetab Ie 0.0719 0.0619 0.0674 0.0469 -0.0857 0.0168 
Li vestockl Aquaculture 0.0601 0.0417 0.0562 0.0306 0.0367 0.0592 
(Loan type) 
Short-term loan -0.0201 -0.0515 -0.0264 -0.0550 
Medium-term loan -0.0196 -0.1175 -0.0274 -0.1130 
Long-term loan -0.0582 -0.1006 -0.0584 -0.0931 0.1422 0.0532 
(Loan size) 
Medium loan -0.0364 -0.0327 -0.0381 -0.0376 -0.0219 -0.0035 
Large loan -0.0546 -0.1071 -0.0722 -0.3092 0.0158 0.0239 
(Lending year) 
2001 0.0279 0.0013 0.0132 -0.0062 
2002 -0.0413 -0.0443 -0.0352 -0.0377 -0.1054 -0.0998 
Constant -0.0584 0.0216 -0.0347 0.0699 -0.2565 -0.3814 
No. of observations 18,310 4,444 16,560 3,965 1,750 479 
Note: 11 Dependent variable is Bank lending decision (good/bad loan). 
2/ Marginal effect is at the mean value. For dummy variable, marginal effect is Pit - PIO. 
3/ To avoid singularity problem, a dummy variable is dropped from each group. 
Bold and Italic represent t 0% significant level or below. 
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Appendix 2: Relative contribution factor ofPNN on bank lending decision models 
Relative Contribution 
Independent variables l / Aggregate Agriculture Non-agriculture 
Model 1 Model 2 Modell Model 2 Modell Model 2 
Borrower Characteristics 
Log(asset) 0.0639 0.0567 0.0567 0.0571 0.0703 0.0293 
Age 0.0526 0.0377 0.0364 0.0544 0.0126 0.0053 
Education 0.0360 0.0110 0.0034 0.0418 0.0249 0.0139 
Credit risk proxies 
Log( collateral) 0.0506 0.0570 0.0476 0.0376 0.0880 0.0549 
Return on asset 0.0548 0.0108 0.0115 0.0036 0.0058 0.0253 
Leverage ratio 0.0158 0.0087 0.0567 0.0409 0.0072 0.0562 
Capital turnover ratio 0.0465 0.0583 0.0115 0.0155 0.0188 0.0301 
Relationship indicators 
Borrowing from others 0.0174 0.0268 0.0009 0.0342 0.0725 0.0029 
Duration 0.0325 0.0355 0.0091 
Dummy variables 
Sector 0.0013 0.0018 
(Province) 
Province 1 0.0905 0.0205 
Province 2 0.0189 0.0359 0.0016 0.0324 0.0296 0.0029 
Province 3 0.0018 0.0462 0.0187 0.0301 0.0087 0.0314 
Province 4 0.0141 0.0066 0.0240 0.0074 0.0267 0.0309 
Province 5 0.0551 0.0309 0.0000 0.0301 0.0025 0.0504 
Province 6 0.0619 0.0007 0.0405 0.0137 0.0725 0.0642 
Province 7 0.0171 0.0130 0.0782 0.0119 0.0148 0.0091 
Province 8 0.0224 0.0085 0.0448 0.0036 0.0768 0.0610 
Province 9 0.0091 0.0487 0.0601 0.0533 0.0660 0.0669 
Province 10 0.0362 0.0007 0.0065 0.0144 0.0126 0.0384 
Province 11 0.0619 0.0185 0.0604 0.0290 
Province 12 0.0571 0.0565 0.0224 0.0090 0.0718 0.0634 
Province 13 0.0221 0.0339 0.0227 0.0373 0.0105 0.0152 
Province 14 0.0030 0.0055 0.0442 0.0236 0.0256 0.0115 
Province 15 0.0224 0.0270 0.0380 0.0263 0.0036 0.0679 
Province 16 0.0141 0.0226 0.0215 0.0524 
Province 17 0.0448 0.0114 0.0576 0.0565 0.0198 0.0472 
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Appendix 2: Relative contribution factor ofPNN on bank lending decision models (Cont) 
Relative Contribution 
Independent variables ll Aggregate Agriculture Non-agriculture 
Model 1 Model 2 Modell Model 2 Modell Model 2 
(Major production) 
Horticulture 0.0121 0.0124 0.0078 0.0088 
Orchard/Vegetable 0.0302 0.0295 0.0016 0.0427 0.0451 0.0402 
Livestock! Aquaculture 0.0106 0.0329 0.0034 0.0155 0.0310 0.0663 
(Loan type) 
Short-term loan 0.0322 0.0078 0.0072 0.0418 
Medium-term loan 0.0262 0.0572 0.0405 0.0263 
Long-term loan 0.0133 0.0554 0.0131 0.0531 0.0133 0.0035 
(Loan size) 
Medium loan 0.0058 0.0149 0.0112 0.0135 0.0014 0.0096 
Large loan 0.0028 0.0288 0.0673 0.0148 0.0198 0.0072 
(Lending year) 
2001 0.0569 0.0503 0.0744 0.0252 
2002 0.0093 0.0428 0.0075 0.0063 0.0573 0.0653 
No. of inputs 35 36 34 35 28 29 
No. of observations 18,310 4,444 16,560 3,965 1,750 479 
Mean value of the 
0.0286 0.0278 0.0294 0.0286 0.0345 0.0333 
contribution factor3/ 
Note: 1/ Dependent variable is bank lending decision (goodlbad loan). 
2/ Equal to lover the number of inputs used in the model. 
Bold and italic indicate that the relative contribution is above the mean value of the contribution 
factors. 
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Appendix 3: Relative contribution factor ofGRNN on credit availability models 
Relative Contribution 
Independent variables l / Aggregate Agriculture Non-agriculture 
Model 1 Model 2 Modell Model 2 Modell Model 2 
Borrower Characteristics 
Log(asset) 0.0482 0.0421 0.0514 0.0447 0.0469 0.0412 
Age 0.0086 0.0117 0.0081 0.0035 0.0356 0.0005 
Education 0.0076 0.0081 0.0021 0.0232 0.0477 0.0000 
Credit risk proxies 
Lo g( collateral) 0.0639 0.0546 0.0541 0.0555 0.0671 0.0593 
Return on asset 0.0134 0.0458 0.0131 0.0356 0.0040 0.0070 
Leverage ratio 0.0129 0.0137 0.0500 0.0103 0.0369 0.0090 
Capital turnover ratio 0.0330 0.0214 0.0023 0.0152 0.0108 0.0007 
Relationship indicators 
Borrowing from others 0.0231 0.0222 0.0032 0.0110 0.0137 0.0169 
Duration 0.0123 0.0333 0.0245 
Dummy variables 
Sector 0.0348 0.0161 
(Province) 
Province 1 0.0650 0.0620 
Province 2 0.0543 0.0108 0.0449 0.0522 0.0555 0.0571 
Province 3 0.0008 0.0390 0.0092 0.0253 0.0078 0.0403 
Province 4 0.0386 0.0277 0.0247 0.0396 0.0278 0.0583 
Province 5 0.0269 0.0075 0.0343 0.0337 0.0202 0.0260 
Province 6 0.0043 0.0238 0.0558 0.0129 0.0485 0.0202 
Province 7 0.0502 0.0469 0.0065 0.0145 0.0566 0.0522 
Province 8 0.0480 0.0152 0.0274 0.0075 0.0286 0.0513 
Province 9 0.0167 0.0271 0.0412 0.0349 0.0642 0.0586 
Province 10 0.0467 0.0269 0.0551 0.0150 0.0226 0.0109 
Province 11 0.0218 0.0053 0.0283 0.0283 
Province 12 0.0411 0.0222 0.0281 0.0201 0.0213 0.0270 
Province 13 0.0165 0.0273 0.0454 0.0237 0.0550 0.0287 
Province 14 0.0216 0.0333 0.0154 0.0518 0.0275 0.0226 
Province 15 0.0109 0.0333 0.0551 0.0187 0.0677 0.0457 
Province 16 0.0388 0.0258 0.0378 0.0347 
Province 17 0.0190 0.0559 0.0408 0.0344 0.0369 0.0610 
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Appendix 3: Relative contribution factor of GRNN on credit availability models (Cont.) 
Relative Contribution 
Independent variables 11 Aggregate Agriculture Non-agriculture 
Modell Model 2 Modell Model 2 Modell Model 2 
(Major production) 
Horticulture 0.0025 0.0046 0.0048 0.0091 
Orchard/Vegetable 0.0490 0.0295 0.0551 0.0222 0.0121 0.0406 
Livestock! Aquaculture 0.0617 0.0562 0.0304 0.0382 0.0105 0.0041 
(Loan type) 
Short-term loan 0.0094 0.0407 0.0046 0.0309 
Medium-term loan 0.0129 0.0255 0.0456 0.0393 
Long-term loan 0.0325 0.0352 0.0288 0.0506 0.0089 0.0411 
(Loan size) 
Medium loan 0.0434 0.0544 0.0468 0.0506 0.0380 0.0457 
Large loan 0.0546 0.0504 0.0371 0.0445 0.0453 0.0576 
(Lending year) 
2001 0.0304 0.0073 0.0099 0.0157 
2002 0.0018 0.0203 0.0025 0.0192 0.0173 0.0301 
No. of inputs 35 36 34 35 29 30 
No. of observations 18,310 4,444 16,560 3,965 1,750 479 
Mean value of the 
0.0286 0.0278 0.0294 0.0286 0.0345 0.0333 
contribution factor2! 
Note: 11 Dependent variable is log(volume of credit). 
21 Equal to lover the number of inputs used in the model. 
Bold and italic indicate that the relative contribution is above the mean value of the contribution 
factors. 
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Appendix 4: Relative contribution factor of GRNN on loan pricing models 
Relative Contribution 
Independent variables 11, 21 Aggregated Agriculture Non-agriculture 
Modell Model 2 Modell Model 2 Modell Model 2 
Borrower Characteristics 
Log(asset) 0.0466 0.0100 0.0136 0.0101 0.0495 0.0459 
Age 0.0278 0.0135 0.0187 0.0060 0.0108 0.0364 
Education 0.0027 0.0046 0.0088 0.0345 0.0210 0.0045 
Credit risk proxies 
Log( collateral) 0.0369 0.0254 0.0224 0.0467 0.0361 0.0379 
Return on asset 0.0082 0.0086 0.0445 0.0009 0.0077 0.0058 
Leverage ratio 0.0103 0.0073 0.0171 0.0170 0.0011 0.0184 
Capital turnover ratio 0.0203 0.0168 0.0296 0.0400 0.0011 0.0324 
Log(volume of credit) 0.0483 0.0549 0.0667 0.0582 0.0720 0.0571 
Relationship indicators 
Borrowing from others 0.0228 0.0071 0.0139 0.0203 0.0003 0.0232 
Duration 0.0409 0.0555 0.0297 
Dummy variables 
Sector 0.0411 0.0303 
(Province) 
Province 1 0.0501 0.0236 
Province 2 0.0116 0.0239 0.0248 0.0384 0.0384 0.0423 
Province 3 0.0333 0.0232 0.0256 0.0032 0.0145 0.0409 
Province 4 0.0272 0.0206 0.0275 0.0559 0.0714 0.0079 
Province 5 0.0418 0.0493 0.0355 0.0493 0.0185 0.0177 
Province 6 0.0262 0.0206 0.0507 0.0522 0.0725 0.0553 
Province 7 0.0048 0.0487 0.0459 0.0226 0.0319 0.0529 
Province 8 0.0430 0.0323 0.0003 0.0430 0.0575 0.0207 
Province 9 0.0207 0,0186 0.0056 0.0516 0.0654 0.0511 
Province 10 0.0127 0.0181 0.0275 0.0557 0.0594 0.0556 
Province 11 0.0367 0.0321 0.0301 0.0005 
Province 12 0.0331 0.0558 0.0211 0.0513 0.0609 0.0162 
Province 13 0.0036 0.0270 0.0171 0.0159 0.0336 0.0238 
Province 14 0.0228 0.0237 0.0272 0.0193 0.0600 0.0522 
Province 15 0.0405 0.0069 0.0397 0.0532 0.0720 0.0481 
Province 16 0.0405 0.0199 0.0589 0.0304 
Province 17 0.0318 0.0564 0.0365 0.0334 0.0629 0.0522 
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Appendix 4: Relative contribution factor of GRNN on loan pricing models (Cont) 
Relative Contribution 
Independent variables 1/. 2/ Aggregated Agriculture Non-agriculture 
Modell Model 2 Modell Model 2 Modell Model 2 
(Major production) 
Horticulture 0.0392 0.0520 0.0339 0.0099 
Orchard/Vegetable 0.0346 0.0538 0.0589 0 .. 0283 0.0145 0.0562 
Livestock! Aquaculture 0.0304 0.0285 0.0621 0.0090 0.0026 0.0540 
(Loan type) 
Short-term loan 0.0458 0.0000 0.0099 0.0391 
Medium-term loan 0.0308 0.0527 0.0016 0.0028 
Long-term loan 0.0466 0.0555 0.0515 0.0265 0.0026 0.0353 
(Loan size) 
Medium loan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Large loan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
(Lending year) 
2001 0.0378 0.0173 0.0219 0.0012 
2002 0.0394 0.0436 0.0512 0.0182 0.0119 0.0025 
No. of inputs 34 35 33 34 28 29 
No. of observations 18,310 4,444 16,560 3,965 1,750 479 
Mean value of the 
0.0294 0.0286 0.0303 0.0294 0.0357 0.0345 
contribution factor3/ 
Note: 11 Dependent variable is loan price (interest rate). 
2/ Assume that volume of credit is determined before the loan price. Therefore. dummy variables on 
the loan size are excluded and replaced by log(volume of credit). 
3/ Equal to lover the number of inputs used in the model. 
Bold and italic indicate that the relative contribution is above the mean value of the contribution 
factors. 
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